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Abstract 
Trust is a mechanism used by people to facilitate interactions in human societies where 
risk and uncertain are common. Over the past decade, the importance of trust management 
in computational intelligence research (e.g. in multi-agent systems (MASs)) has been 
recognized by both the industry and the academia. Computational trust models for 
evaluating the trustworthiness of a trustee agent based on a wide range of evidence have 
been proposed. Nevertheless, two important research problems remain open in this field. 
Firstly, how to mitigate the adverse effects of biased third-party testimonies on the 
accuracy of evaluating the trustworthiness of an agent? Secondly, how to make trust-
aware task delegation decisions to efficiently utilize the capacities of trustee agents to 
achieve high social welfare? 
This thesis presents the research into addressing these two problems. It first proposes a 
novel reinforcement learning based trust evidence aggregation model – namely the Actor-
Critic Trust (ACT) model – to address the problem of biased testimonies. Individual 
truster agents can use the ACT model to dynamically learn to adjust the selection of 
witness agents, the weights given to each of their testimonies, as well as the weights given 
to the collective opinions of the witness agents and the first-hand trust evidence to 
produce a trustworthiness evaluation. The model operates according to observable 
changes in the MAS environment and has been shown to be robust against collusions 
among witness agents. The ACT model eliminates the need for manually tuning these 
weight parameters in most existing trust models and makes agents more adaptive in 
changing environments. 
xv 
 
This work then goes beyond the existing trust management research framework by 
removing an widespread assumption implicitly adopted by existing research: that a trustee 
agent can process an unlimited number of interaction requests per discrete time unit 
without compromising its performance as perceived by the truster agents. The trust 
management problem is re-formalized as a multi-agent trust game based on the principles 
of the Congestion Game, which is solved by two trust-aware interaction decision-making 
approaches: 1) the Social Welfare Optimizing approach for Reputation-aware Decision-
making (SWORD) approach, and 2) the Distributed Request Acceptance approach for 
Fair utilization of Trustee agents (DRAFT). SWORD is designed for use in MASs where 
a central trusted entity is available, while DRAFT is designed for individual trustee agents 
in fully distributed MASs. Both of these proposed approaches have been demonstrated to 
help an MAS achieve significantly higher social welfare than existing trust-aware 
interaction decision-making approaches. Theoretical analyses have shown that the social 
welfare produced by these two approaches can be made closer to optimal by adjusting 
only one key parameter. With these two approaches, the framework of research used by 
current multi-agent trust models can be enriched to handle more realistic operating 
environment conditions where the computational resources possessed by the agents are 
limited. 
The proposed approaches can potentially be used in many application domains. In this 
work, we evaluated the performance of the ACT model in cognitive radio networks, 
which is an emerging field in wireless communication. We demonstrated its effectiveness 
in improving the quality of the results produced by multiple radio nodes sensing the 
availability of network spectrums over wide geographic locations. SWORD was evaluated 
xvi 
 
under crowdsourcing conditions, while DRAFT was evaluated under open dynamic MAS 
conditions. The results have shown that the agents are able to make more socially 
beneficial interaction decisions with the proposed approaches and the social sustainability 
of the MASs with resource constrained trustee agents can be significantly enhanced with 
the help of this research. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
For decades, trust has been one of the important foci in the study of various humanity 
related fields such as sociology, philosophy, and economics, etc. After the turn of the 
century, with a boom of computing and network technologies and the emergence of 
virtual online communities extending people’s daily life into the cyberspace, trust 
research has become an important topic in computer science as well. This is especially the 
case in the field of open multi-agent systems (MASs) research where self-interested 
human-like virtual entities need to delegate tasks to each other in order to achieve their 
own goals. In this chapter, we provide an introduction to the original concept of trust, the 
research on trust in MASs, the scope of research documented in this thesis and the 
contributions to this area of research. 
1.1. The Concept of Trust 
Trust is a central ingredient in human relationships. The concept of “trust” was originally 
a topic of study in the social sciences. Our understanding of trust has mainly been derived 
from people’s daily experience in applying it to real world situations. Many researchers 
have attempted at defining trust [Hardin, 2002], so far the most well accepted definition 
for the concept of trust was given by Gambetta [Gambetta, 1998] as: 
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“the subjective probability by which an individual, A, expects that another individual, 
B, performs a given action which its welfare depends.” 
The notion of trust defers from cryptographic security techniques in their primary aims. 
Cryptographic security techniques’ focus on ensuring data integrity and data 
confidentiality through secure identification of the users through authentication and 
assigning access rights to them via policies is aimed to protect data or services from 
malicious users. Trust, on the other hand, offers a way to guard the users against 
malicious services or exploitation from other malicious people. The concept of trust has 
the following characteristics: 
1) Trust is useful only in an environment characterized by uncertainty and where the 
participants need to depend on each other to achieve their goals. In a perfectly 
observable and predictable environment, it is not necessary to measure trustworthiness 
because each participant would already know the action that should be taken. In 
addition, if all tasks can be performed satisfactorily by individuals without the need 
for interactions, trust would be of no significance. 
2) Trust is context sensitive. It is commonly agreed in the trust literature that trusting is a 
three-part relationship which can be expressed as “Alice trusts Bob to do X”. The “to 
do X” part places a limit on the trust relationship based on how well the subject’s 
capabilities suit the context in which the relationship exists. For example, Alice may 
trust Bob to repair her computer but she may not trust Bob to repair her car. In this 
case, even if Bob has good intentions towards Alice, benevolence alone does not 
warrant a high level of trust across all contexts. The capability of Bob in a subject 
matter also affects the level of trust Alice places in him.  
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3) Trust is subjective. The formation of an opinion about someone’s trustworthiness 
depends not only on the behaviors of the subject but also on how these behaviors are 
perceived by the agent. The perception of the subject’s behaviors often depends on 
some intrinsic characteristics of the agent such as a propensity to trust (how trustful 
the agent is towards others) and the expectation the agent has on the subject’s 
performance. For instance, although Bob’s performance in repairing computers is 
consistent across all customers, Malory, being a more demanding customer than Alice, 
may trust Bob less than Alice in terms of letting Bob repair his computer.  
4) Trust is unidirectional. An agent’s trust in a subject is based on the knowledge that it 
has about the subject. This knowledge may be acquired either through the agent’s own 
observations, the recommendations from the agent’s friends or other means. The 
subject may not necessarily know the agent and therefore may not trust the agent in 
this case. Even if the agent has direct observations of the subject’s past behaviors, the 
perception of the subject on the agent’s performance and benevolence may differ. 
Thus, an agent’s trust in a subject may not be reciprocated. 
5) Trust may not be transitive. The first time Alice meets Bob, she does not know how 
much to trust him. David, whom Alice trusts, comes forward and vouches for Bob. In 
this scenario, should Alice trust Bob? The answer can be both yes and no. This 
depends on the context in which Alice trusts David. David’s opinion of Bob is only 
useful to Alice if Alice trusts David’s trust assessment of others. The trust on the 
witness’s (David’s) trust assessment of the subject is an important concept in the 
computational trust literature. It is known as the credibility of the witness [Weng et al., 
2006]. In a system with no central trusted authority to vouch for the users, the 
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credibility of witnesses becomes a critical facilitator for allowing an agent who has 
had too few interactions with a subject to form a meaningful trust opinion. 
1.2. Computational Trust Research 
In recent years, the concept of trust has been introduced into computer based systems 
modeled as open MASs. An MAS consists of many building blocks known as agents. 
According to [Wooldridge, 1997]: 
“An agent is an encapsulated computer system situated in some environment and 
capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment in order to meet its design 
objectives.” 
With this definition, [Jennings, 2001] further specifies the desired characteristics an agent 
should possess as: 
1) Clearly identifiable problem-solving entities with well-defined boundaries and 
interfaces; 
2) Situated in a particular environment over which they have partial control and 
observability; 
3) Designed to fulfill a specific role; 
4) Autonomous (they have control over both their internal states and their own 
behaviors); 
5) Capable of exhibiting flexible problem-solving behavior in pursuit of their design 
objectives. 
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An agent with autonomous reasoning and decision-making capability may act on behalf of 
one or more human owners in complex interactions with other agents or human beings. 
Agents usually live in a society of agents which is referred to as multi-agent systems 
[Wooldridge 2002]. Such a system usually possesses the following characteristics: 
1) Each agent has incomplete information or capabilities for solving the problem and, 
thus, has a limited viewpoint; 
2) There is no global control; 
3) Data are decentralized; 
4) Computation is asynchronous. 
Although in today’s world where the advance in cloud computing technologies have made 
centralized storage and analysis of data as well as global control in an MAS possible, 
these characteristics have heavily influenced agent trust research for years. 
Agent trust research really took off over the last decade as more complex and large scale 
online transaction systems (e.g., e-commerce systems, online virtual worlds, social 
networking websites, etc.) emerge. Using three of the most popular annual conferences on 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and MAS related topics – the Association for the Advancement 
of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Conference, the International Conference on Autonomous 
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), and the International Joint Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) – as a gauge, we can get some rough ideas on the 
development of this research area. 
In general, a trust agent can be conceptualized as consisting of two main modules which 
dictate its behavior: 1) a trust evaluation module, which helps the agent assess the 
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trustworthiness of potential interaction partners; and 2) a trust-aware decision module, 
which directs the agent’s selection of future interaction partners based on trust evaluations. 
As shown in Table 1, the majority of the research effort is currently focused in the trust 
evaluation sub-field. This sub-field deals with the problem of accurately evaluating the 
trustworthiness of potential interaction partners. The proposed solutions can be divided 
into four main categories, 1) direct trust evaluation models, which rely on past observed 
behaviors; 2) indirect/reputation-based trust evaluation models, which rely on third-party 
testimonies from other agents in the same environment; 3) socio-cognitive trust evaluation 
models, which rely on analyzing the social relationships among agents to estimate their 
trustworthiness; and 4) organizational trust evaluation models, which rely on the 
organizational affiliation or certificates issued by some trusted organizations to estimate 
the trustworthiness of agents. Compared with the trust evaluation sub-field, very limited 
research has been done in the trust-aware decision making sub-field. 
Apart from these two major research sub-fields, assessing the performance of proposed 
agent trust models is also an important sub-field in agent trust research. Although datasets 
concerning certain aspects of the trust evaluation problem (e.g., the Epinions and 
Extended Epinions datasets [Massa and Avesani, 2005]) are available, since the 
effectiveness of various trust models need to be assessed under different environment 
conditions with different types of misbehaviors, it is difficult to find suitable real world 
data all the time. Therefore, in the current agent trust research field, most of the existing 
trust models are assessed with simulation or synthetic data. One of the most popular 
simulation test-beds for trust models is the agent reputation and trust (ART) test-bed 
proposed by [Fullam et al., 2005]. However, even this test-bed does not claim to be able 
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to simulate all experimental conditions of interest. With this reason, many existing work 
designed their own simulation environments when assessing the performance of their 
proposed trust models. 
In the current multi-agent trust research landscape, agents are normally considered to be 
individually rational – meaning that agents will take whatever action that is expected to 
maximize their own utility. Although there has been some preliminary attempt in studying 
the influence of inherently irrational factors (e.g., emotion) on trust agents [Jones and Pitt, 
2011], irrational agents are usually not among the primary focuses of the research in MAS. 
1.3. Scope of Research and Motivations 
In systems that can be modeled as open MASs (e.g., e-commerce systems, wireless 
networks, distributed sensor networks), agents need to rely on services from each other to 
achieve their design goals. In these environments where risk and uncertainty exists when 
interacting with other agents, multi-agent trust is regarded as one of the most useful 
technologies to help agents make decisions that reduce their risk exposure in the long run. 
To make such decisions, agents must be able to assess the trustworthiness of potential 
interaction partners with a high degree of accuracy. The most reliable and relevant source 
of trust evidence for a truster agent is its first-hand prior interaction experience with the 
trustee agents. However, in large scale open MASs consisting of many agents who may 
dynamically leave or rejoin the MASs, individual truster agent often do not have enough 
direct trust evidence with a lot of trustee agents in order to make a reliable estimation of 
their trustworthiness.  
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To this end, many research works (such as those listed in Table 1 under the column 
labeled “Indirect Trust”) propose models that enable truster agents to obtain indirect trust 
evidence from each other to tap into the wisdom of the crowd. Third-party testimonies, 
which are supposed to be derived from an agent’s prior first-hand interaction experience 
with certain trustee agents, can be shared among the truster agents. They are combined 
with direct trust evidence, if any, to calculate the reputation of the trustee agent, which 
should improve the accuracy of the estimation. However, in practice, these testimonies 
can be biased. This may be due to the difference in personal preference among agents, or 
even malicious act of collusion among agents to artificially inflate or drive down the 
reputation of certain trustee agents. Mitigating the adverse effect of biased testimonies, 
therefore, becomes an important issue that need to be resolved in order to make effective 
trust decisions. 
In some popular e-commerce systems and online rating systems, biased testimonies have 
become a major issue threatening the credibility, and thus the sustainability, of the 
business. For example, news reports concerning the rampant use of software and staged 
transactions to artificially boost an e-shop’s reputation in Taobao.com (which is one of 
China’s largest online e-commerce systems and using a reputation system similar to that 
used by eBay.com) have surfaced in 2010 [CIOTimes.com, 2010] and is still happening as 
recently as Aug 2012 [Hexun.com, 2012]. Rumors about companies in China offering 
services to help people build up their reputation through favorable online voting by their 
employees (such as http://www.hyh1688.com/) can be found through Chinese search 
engine Baidu.com. However, due to broken links, these rumors cannot be independently 
verified. Nevertheless, the problem of biased testimonies is plaguing online e-commerce 
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systems, especially in China. One important feature of this type of collusion is that 
perpetrators focus on boosting their colluder’s reputations rather than tarnishing the 
reputations of their competitors. This is due to the fact that the sheer number of 
competitors in a large scale online e-commerce system like Taobao.com makes the 
badmouthing approach prohibitively difficult and costly.  
From Table 1.1, it can be observed that research on trust-aware interaction decision-
making (TID) mechanisms has not attracted much attention from researchers in this field. 
In MASs, the goal of trust-aware interaction decision-making is to help a truster agent 
decide which candidate trustee agent is to be selected to perform a given task at the 
current time. It is a general consensus among the current multi-agent trust community that, 
in order to minimize a truster agent’s risk exposure, it should always interact with the 
trustee agent with the highest reputation that it can find in the context of the given type of 
task. This approach is a rational choice from the perspective of a truster agent and it is 
adopted by the majority of the existing trust models.  
However, in a system involving trust-aware interaction decision-making approaches, 
truster agents are not the only stakeholder affected by them. The trustee agent and the 
collective utility of all agents in an MAS derived through the interactions can also be 
affected by the interaction decisions made by the truster agents. Theoretically, TID 
approaches should reward trustee agents with high reputations with more tasks so that 
they can derive more utility through completing them.  Over time, it should help the MAS 
exclude untrustworthy trustee agents and sustain repeated interactions among agents over 
the long term. Nevertheless, a closer look at the assumptions used by existing trust models 
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to reach this conclusion reveals that there are limitations to the applicability of this 
conclusion.  
The perceived behavior of a trustee agent comprises of various facets, one of the most 
important is the timeliness in completing the given tasks [Griffiths, 2005]. The facet of a 
trustee agent’s performance depends not only on the ability of the agent itself, but also the 
workload placed on it by the truster agents in the MAS. Under the existing TID approach, 
the more reputable it is and the wider its reputation is disseminated throughout the MAS, 
the more likely it will become the interaction partner of choice by a large number of 
truster agents for certain types of tasks. In some cases, such a development can 
overwhelm the trustee agent if it can only handle a limited number of tasks effectively per 
unit time step, and hurt its reputation. In this thesis, this phenomenon is referred to as the 
reputation damage problem (RDP). 
In reality, the RDP can have deadly consequences. As recently as July 2012, multiple 
news reports from China about over-worked entrepreneurs managing e-shops on 
Taobao.com dying of fatigue related illnesses have surfaced [163.com, 2012; iFeng.com, 
2012; Sina.com, 2012; Sohu.com, 2012]. The common features of such cases are 1) the 
victims are young (in their 20s); 2) the e-shops under their management are highly 
reputable on Taobao.com; 3) they receive large number of orders; 4) their e-shops are 
small and medium sized enterprises which require them to personally handle most 
business activities; and 5) they misjudged their capacity to keep handling incoming orders 
effectively. Although these are extreme cases and should not be entirely blamed on 
existing TID approaches, the assumption that the utility of a trustee agent (a human being 
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in this case) is linearly related to the amount of business it can get appears not to be 
always appropriate.  
Motivated by the need to the above observations, this thesis aims to achieve the following 
research objectives: 1) to propose a model that can effectively mitigate the adverse effect 
of biased testimonies which can be applied to most computational trust models; and 2) to 
propose TID approaches that can help truster agents make interaction decisions which not 
only protect their own interest, but enhance the social welfare for the entire MAS. 
1.4. Summary of Contributions 
By achieving the research objectives set out in the previous section, this thesis makes the 
following important contributions to the state of the art in the area of multi-agent trust 
research: 
(i) The ACT Model: Although there are a large number of research works over the years 
focused on addressing the problem of unfair testimonies from public reports of direct 
trust experience by witness agents. Many of these approaches generally suffer from 
three main types of shortcomings: 1) relying on assumptions about the characteristics 
of the witness agent population: They are usually majority voting based and perform 
poorly in situations where the majority of the witness agent population are 
compromised; 2) tightly coupled with specific operating environments: They often 
require additional infrastructural support (e.g., payment systems, knowledge of social 
relationships among agents, etc.) in order to work; or 3) involving manual tuning of 
parameters crucial to the performance of the model: This reduces the adaptability of 
the models in the face of a dynamically changing environment and makes regular 
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human intervention necessary. We propose a trust evidence aggregation model based 
on the principles of reinforcement learning called the Actor-Critic Trust (ACT) model. 
It enables truster agents to dynamically learn the appropriate values of a large number 
of parameters based on their interaction experience. Compared to existing work, the 
ACT model does not require additional information or infrastructure support other 
than the third-party testimonies received by a truster agent. Experimental results show 
that it outperforms related work. The ACT model was applied to solve the 
collaborative spectrum sensing problem in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) and 
demonstrated effectiveness in preserving the wellbeing of the network under various 
attack scenarios. 
(ii) Multi-agent Trust Game: To further study the RDP, the assumption made by most 
existing multi-agent trust research that trustee agents’ perceived performance is not 
affected by the amount of workload assigned to them has to be removed. In order to 
do so, the multi-agent trust management problem must be reframed into a framework 
of thinking that is capable of taking the limitations in trustee agents’ capacities into 
account. In this research, we redefine the TID problem as a Multi-agent Trust Game 
(MTG) based on the concept of Congestion Games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. 
The MTG complements existing research [Mikulski et al., 2011] by providing a 
theoretical framework for analyzing TID approaches under more realistic conditions 
where trustee agents have limited resources and capabilities to handle workload and 
the delay experienced by truster agents is a function which is partially affected by the 
choices of interaction partners made collectively by them. By explicitly including 
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these limitations into the analysis of trust in MASs, the MTG can facilitate the design 
of TID approaches that can produce higher system-wide social welfare. 
(iii)The SWORD Approach: Based on the MTG, we propose the Social Welfare 
Optimizing Reputation-aware Decision-making (SWORD) approach. Designed for a 
system manager such as an e-commerce platform operator to use, the SWORD 
approach observes agents’ real-time situations (such as their reputations, current 
workload, historical performance in handling assigned tasks per unit time, etc.) and 
help truster agents who want to delegate tasks at the current time select interaction 
partners. The SWORD approach is the first TID approach designed with the objective 
to mitigate the adverse effect of the RDP. Based on the principles of Lyapunov Drift 
analysis [Neely, 2010], it produces solutions to the MTG which can be proven to 
achieve social welfare values in an MAS close to the optimal value in the long run. 
Solutions are produced in polynomial time. Experiments conducted under 
crowdsourcing system environments have shown that the SWORD approach 
significantly outperforms related work in terms of promoting social equity and 
enhancing social welfare. The SWORD approach protects trustee agents from being 
overloaded with requests, makes efficient use of the overall trustee agent resources in 
an MAS, reduces truster agents’ waiting time for delegated tasks to be completed, and 
increases the throughput of interactions among agents in an MAS. 
(iv) The DRAFT Approach: in order to extend the SWORD approach to enable it to 
operate in fully distributed MASs, we propose the Distributed Request Acceptance 
approach for Fair utilization of Trustee agent services (DRAFT). Existing TID 
approaches are mostly designed for truster agents. The DRAFT approach bridges this 
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gap in the state of the art by enabling trustee agents to make situation-aware decisions 
about whether to accept incoming task delegation requests. Through an analysis of its 
current situation taking into account its current reputation standing in the MAS, its 
current workload, and the anticipated effort level it can spend on completing tasks 
over the current time step, the trustee agent can adjust the degree of greediness for 
accepting incoming requests with the DRAFT approach. Based on the same design 
principle as the SWORD approach, the DRAFT approach can also be proven to 
produce solutions for the MTG achieving close to optimal social welfare over the long 
run. The solutions can also be produced in polynomial time. Experiments conducted in 
open dynamic MAS environments show that the DRAFT approach achieves 
significantly higher social welfare than related work and promotes social equity in the 
community. 
The research proposed in this thesis can be applied to the general context of MASs 
complementing existing trustworthiness evaluation models and trust-aware interaction 
decision-making approaches. 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of this report is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current state of the art in multi-agent trust 
research. 
 In Chapter 3 proposes the ACT model and describes applications of the model in the 
domains of e-commerce and cognitive radio networks. 
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 Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of the adverse effects of the reputation damage 
problem and proposes the multi-agent trust game. 
 Chapter 5 proposes the SWORD approach and analyzes its performance through 
theoretical proof. 
 Chapter 6 applies the SWORD approach in crowdsourcing system scenarios and 
analyzes its performance under different conditions. 
 Chapter 7 proposes the DRAFT approach, analyzes its performance through 
theoretical proof, and evaluates its effectiveness under e-commerce application 
environments. 
 Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and outlines potential future research directions. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
 
Trust was first introduced as a measurable property of an entity in computer science in 
[Marsh, 1994]. Following this seminal work, a significant number of computational 
models focusing on various facets of trust management has been proposed in MAS 
research. Trustworthiness evaluation models employ probabilistic, socio-cognitive, and 
organizational techniques to enable truster agents to estimate the potential risk of 
interacting with a given trustee agent. Once the trustworthiness evaluations for a set of 
candidate trustee agents have been produced, trust-aware interaction decision-making 
approaches help the truster agent to select a trustee agent for interaction at a particular 
point in time. By reviewing the key advancements published in multi-agent trust research, 
it can be seen that most existing research effort is concentrated on improving the accuracy 
of trust evaluation models. These models can be further classified into four categories 
according to their approaches, namely:  
1) Direct trust evaluation models, 
2) Reputation-based trust evaluation models, 
3) Socio-cognitive trust evaluation models, and 
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4) Organizational trust evaluation models.  
In this chapter, we review a number of notable works in multi-agent trust management 
research and summarize the assumptions commonly used in this field.  
2.1. Direct Trust Evaluation Models 
One of the ways people establish trust between each other is through observing the 
outcome of past interactions between them. This evidence based approach of evaluating 
the trustworthiness of a potential interaction partner has been adopted by the multi-agent 
trust research community as one of the most widely used basis for enabling agents to 
establish trust. An intuitive way of modeling trust between agents is to view interaction 
risk as the probability of being cheated by the interaction partner. Such a probability can 
be established by a truster agent through looking back at the outcomes of past interactions 
with a trustee agent. The historical interaction outcomes serve as the direct evidence 
available for the truster agent to make an educated guess about a trustee agent’s 
trustworthiness. 
One of the earliest models that attempt to derive a trustworthiness value based on direct 
evidence is the Beta Reputation System (BRS) proposed by Jøsang and Ismail in [Jøsang 
and Ismail, 2002] which is inspired by the Beta Distribution. The model projects past 
interaction experience with a trustee agent into the future to give a measure of its 
trustworthiness. BRS estimates the trustworthiness of a trustee agent by calculating its 
reputation, which is defined as the probability expectation value of a distribution that 
consists of positive and negative feedbacks about the trustee agent. This expectation value 
is then discounted belief, disbelief and uncertainty about the truthfulness of the feedbacks 
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(in the case of direct evidence, the truster agent can be very sure about the truthfulness 
since the feedbacks were produced by itself) and then discounted by a forgetting factor to 
allow past evidence can be gradually discarded. The resulting value is the reputation of 
the trustee agent. 
In BRS, the outcome of an interaction is represented by a binary value (i.e., the interaction 
is regarded as either a complete success or a complete failure). As an extension to this 
model in order to handle cases where the interaction outcomes are rated on a multinomial 
scale, Jøsang and Haller extended their previous work by proposing the Dirichlet 
Reputation System (DRS) in [Jøsang and Haller, 2007]. The basic intuitions of this model 
are similar to that used in BRS except when modeling the outcomes of historical 
interactions. However, instead of rating an interaction outcome as a binary value, the 
outcome of an interaction can take a value of i where 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘 (e.g.. a rating of 1 to 5 
where 1 represents most unsatisfactory and 5 represents the most satisfactory). With more 
finely grained ratings on the outcomes of past interactions, multiple ways of deriving the 
reputation of a trustee agent are available in DRS. It can be represented as 1) an evidence 
representation, 2) a density representation, 3) a multinomial probability representation, or 
4) a point estimate representation. Nevertheless, the first two representations are more 
difficult for human interpretation than the third and fourth types of representations. In 
general, BRS is more widely adopted than DRS. 
To gauge the performance of a trustee agent, various aspects of the quality of services 
provided by it should be analyzed. [Griffiths, 2005] proposed a multi-dimensional trust 
model that models the trustworthiness of a trustee agent along four dimensions: 1) the 
likelihood it can successfully produce an interaction result, 2) the likelihood of producing 
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an interaction result within the expected budget, 3) the likelihood of completing the task 
within the deadline specified, and 4) the likelihood that the quality of the result meets 
expectation. A weighted average approach is used to compute the trustworthiness of an 
agent based on these dimensions where the weights are specified by individual truster 
agents according to their personal preferences. The advantage of the multi-dimensional 
trust model is that the reason for assigning an agent a trustworthiness value can be viewed 
in more details which may facilitate more complex interaction decision-making. 
The work by Wang and Singh in [Wang and Singh, 2007] focused on another important 
aspect in evidence-based trust models – quantifying the uncertainty present in the trust 
evidence. Consider a scenario where one truster agent A has only interacted with a trustee 
agent C twice, and in both instances, the outcomes are successful; whereas truster agent B 
has interacted with C for 100 times and only 50 interactions are successful. Which set of 
evidence contains more uncertainty for evaluating C’s trustworthiness? [Wang and Singh, 
2007] addressed this problem by proposing a method to calculate the uncertainty in a set 
of trust evidence based on the distribution of positive and negative feedbacks. Based on 
statistical inference, the method produces a certainty value in the range of [0, 1] where 0 
represents the most uncertain and 1 represents the most certain. The method satisfies the 
intuition that 1) certainty is high if the amount of trust evidence is large; and 2) certainty 
is high if the conflicts among the feedbacks are low. 
In practice, the trustworthiness of a trustee agent is often defined within certain context. 
This allows individual truster agents to simplify complex decision-making scenarios and 
focus on evidence which is the most relevant to the interaction decision that has to be 
made at the moment. Existing evidence-based trust models often handle context by storing 
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past evidence according to the context they belong to. This makes the evaluated 
trustworthiness valid only within the stipulated context (e.g., a trustee agent’s 
trustworthiness in repairing computers tells other agents nothing about its trustworthiness 
in selling T-shirts). 
2.2. Reputation-based Trust Evaluation Models 
While direct evidence is one of the most relevant source of information for a truster agent 
to evaluate a trustee agent, such information may not always be available. This is 
especially the case where a large number of agents exist in an MAS and interactions 
among them are sparse. Therefore, indirect evidence (third-party testimonies which are 
derived from direct interaction experience with a trustee agent from other agents which 
are called witness agents) may be needed to complement direct evidence with estimating a 
trustee agent’s trustworthiness. Nevertheless, doing so exposes the truster agents to a new 
category of risk – the possibility of receiving biased testimonies which can negatively 
affect the trust-aware interaction decisions. 
It is widely recognized within the research community that the importance of 
incorporating mechanisms to mitigate the adverse effects of biased testimonies. In this 
section, we discuss some recent research work on aggregating trust evidence from 
different sources and filtering out biased testimonies.  
2.2.1. Trust Evidence Aggregation Approaches 
Evidence-based trust models often make use of two distinct sources of information to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of a trustee agent: 1) direct trust evidence: a truster agent’s 
personal interaction experience with a trustee agent, and 2) indirect trust evidence: third-
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party testimonies about the trustee agent. The majority of existing trust models adopts a 
weighted average approach when aggregating these two sources of trust evidence. Direct 
trust evidence is often assigned a weight of 𝛾  (0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1), and indirect evidence is 
assigned a corresponding weight of (1 − 𝛾). Existing approaches for aggregating direct 
and indirect trust evidence can be divided into two broad categories: 1) static approaches, 
where the value of 𝛾 is pre-defined; and 2) dynamic approaches, in which the value of 𝛾 
is continually adjusted by the truster agent. 
In many papers, static 𝛾 values for trust evidence aggregation. The majority of them tend 
to take a balanced approach by assigning a value of 0.5 to γ [Weng et al., 2006; Weng et 
al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Shen et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2011]. In some studies, the authors 
assign the value 0 [Jonker and Treur, 1999; Schillo et al., 2000] or 1 [Shi et al., 2005] to 𝛾 
to exclusively use only one source of trust information. Barber and Kim [Barber and Kim, 
2003] have empirically shown, without considering the presence of biased testimonies, 
that direct trust evidence is the most useful to a truster agent over the long term while 
indirect trust evidence gives an accurate picture more quickly. Thus, approaches that 
discard one source or the other, forfeit some of the advantages provided by evidence 
based trust models. However, using a static value for 𝛾 is also not always a good strategy.  
Some researchers have explored adjusting the value of 𝛾 dynamically based on different 
rationales. In [Mui and Mohtashemi, 2002], the value of 𝛾  is varied according to the 
number of direct observations on the behavior of a trustee agent available to a truster 
agent. It is assumed that every truster agent starts with no prior interaction experience 
with a trustee agent and gradually accumulates direct trust evidence over time. Initially, 
the truster agent relies completely on indirect trust evidence (i.e. 𝛾 = 0) to select trustee 
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agents for interaction. As the number of its interactions with a trustee agent 𝑠𝑗 increases, 
the value of 𝛾 also increases according to the formula 
 𝛾 = {
𝑁𝑗
𝑏
𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑗
𝑏 < 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛
1, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                  (2.1) 
where 𝑁𝑗
𝑏is the total number of direct observations of 𝑠𝑗’s behavior by 𝑐𝑏, and 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the 
minimum number of direct observations required in order to achieve a pre-determined 
acceptable level of error rate ε and confidence level 𝜗. 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 is calculated following the 
Chernoff Bound Theorem: 
   𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 = −
1
2𝜖2
ln(
1−𝜗
2
).                                                    (2.2) 
This approach is not concerned with filtering potentially biased third-party testimonies. 
Rather, its aim is to accumulate enough direct trust evidence so that a truster agent can 
make a statistically accurate estimation on the trustworthiness of a trustee agent without 
relying on indirect trust evidence. In order to achieve a high level of confidence and a low 
error rate, 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 may be very high. In practice, this may mean a significant risk to the 
truster agent. Moreover, since the value of 𝛾  increases to 1, this approach implicitly 
assumes that agent behaviors do not change with time. This may not always be true and 
limits the applicability of the approach under more dynamic scenarios. 
In [Fullam and Barber, 2007], an approach based on the Q-learning technique [Sutton and 
Barto, 1998] to select an appropriate 𝛾 value from a predetermined static set of values 𝛤 
has been proposed. In order to select appropriate values for the set 𝛤, expert opinions 
about the underlying system characteristics are assumed to be available. Based on the 
24 
 
reward accumulated by a truster agent under different 𝛾 values, Q-learning selects the 𝛾 
value associated with the highest accumulated reward at each time step. This work 
provided the first step towards using interaction outcomes to enable the truster agent to 
weight the two sources of trust evidence. However, as this method uses a predetermined 
set of 𝛾 values, its performance is affected by the quality of the expert opinions used to 
form the set of permissible 𝛾 values. 
2.2.2. Testimony Filtering Approaches 
Over the years, many models for filtering potentially biased third-party testimonies have 
been proposed. However, these models are usually based on assumptions of the presence 
of some infrastructure support or special characteristics in the environment. In this section, 
some representative models in this sub-field are discussed. 
The ReGreT model [Sabater and Sierra, 2002] makes use of the social relationships 
among the members of a community to determine the credibility of witnesses. Pre-
determined fuzzy rules are used to estimate the credibility of each witness which, in turn, 
is used as the weight of its testimony for a trustee agent when aggregating all the 
testimonies. This model relies on the availability of social network information among the 
agents which may not be present in many systems. 
In [Whitby et al., 2004], unfair testimonies are assumed to exhibit certain characteristics. 
The proposed approach is closely coupled with the Beta Reputation System [Jøsang and 
Ismail, 2002] which records testimonies in the form of counts of successful and 
unsuccessful interactions with a trustee agent. The received testimonies are aggregated 
with equal weights to form a majority opinion and then, each testimony is tested to see if 
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it is outside the q quartile and (1 - q) quartile of the majority opinion. If so, the testimony 
is discarded and the majority opinion updated. This model assumes that the majority 
opinion is always correct. Thus, it is not effective in highly hostile environments where 
the majority of witnesses are malicious. 
In [Weng et al., 2006], it is assumed that the direct experience of the truster agent is the 
most reliable source of belief about the trustworthiness of a particular trustee agent, and it 
is used as the basis for filtering testimonies before aggregating them to form a reputation 
evaluation. An entropy-based approach is proposed to measure how much a testimony 
deviates from the current belief of the truster agent before deciding whether to incorporate 
it into the current belief. However, by depending on having sufficient direct interaction 
experience with a trustee agent, this assumption conflicts with the purpose for relying on 
third-party testimonies, which is to help truster agents make better interaction decisions 
when they lack direct trust evidence. 
The model in [Liu et al., 2011] supports interaction outcomes recorded in multi-
dimensional forms. It applies two rounds of clustering of the received testimonies to 
identify testimonies which are extremely positive or extremely negative about a trustee. If 
neither the extremely positive opinion cluster nor the extremely negative opinion cluster 
forms a clear majority, they are both discarded as unfair testimonies and the remaining 
testimonies are used to estimate the reputation of a trustee agent. Otherwise, the majority 
cluster is considered as the reliable testimonies. Due to its iterative nature, the 
computational complexity of this method is high, with a time complexity of 𝑂(𝑚𝑛2) 
where m is the number of candidate trustee agents whose reputations need to be evaluated 
and n is the number of testimonies received for each candidate trustee agent. The method 
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is also not robust in hostile environments where the majority of the witnesses are 
malicious. 
2.3. Socio-cognitive Trust Evaluation Models 
Another school of thought in multi-agent trust research emphasizes on the analysis of the 
intrinsic properties of the trustee agents and the external factors affecting the agents to 
infer their likely behavior in future interactions. This category of trust models are mainly 
designed to complement evidence-based trust models in situations where there is not 
enough evidence to draw upon when making trusting decisions.  
In [Castelfranchi et al., 2003], a trust decision model based on the concept of fuzzy 
cognitive maps (FCMs) is proposed. It constructs a generic list of internal external factors 
into FCMs to allow truster agents to infer if a trustee agent is worthy of interacting with. 
Each truster agent can determine the values to be given to the causal links between 
different factors so as to express their own preferences. Nevertheless, belief source 
variations and the variations in choosing values for the causal links can heavily affect the 
performance of the model and it is difficult to verify the validity of the models produced 
since there is a large degree of subjective preference involved. 
The model proposed in [Ashri et al., 2005] narrows down the scope of analysis to focus 
on the relationship between agents. The relationships used in their model are not social 
relationships but market relationships built up through interactions. The model identifies 
the relationships between agents (e.g., trade, dependency, competition, collaboration, 
tripartite, etc.) by analyzing their interactions through the perspective of an agent-based 
market model; these relationships are then filtered to identify which are most relevant to 
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the analysis of agent trustworthiness; then, the relationships are interpreted to derive the 
trustworthiness evaluations for the agents. 
The SUNNY model [Kuter and Golbeck, 2007] is the first trust inference model that 
computes a confidence measure based on social network information. The model maps a 
trust network into a Bayesian Network which is useful for probabilistic reasoning. The 
generated Bayesian Network is then used to produce estimates of the lower and upper 
bounds of confidence values for trust evaluation. The confidence values are used as 
heuristics to calculate the most accurate estimations of the trustworthiness of the trustee 
agents in the Bayesian Network. 
In [Burnett et al., 2010], the bootstrapping problem facing evidence-based trust model is 
investigated. In bootstrapping, it is assumed that neither prior interaction experience nor 
social relationship information is available about trustee agents who are new comers into 
an MAS. In this work, the underlying intuition used to design the model is that the 
intrinsic properties of a trustee agent can reflect its trustworthiness to some degree. The 
model learns a set of stereotypes based on the features in trustee agents’ profiles using a 
decision tree based technique. New comer trustee agents are then classified into different 
stereotypes and stereotypical reputation values are produced for them. Nevertheless, due 
to the lack of suitable data, this paper did not point out which features may be useful in 
estimating a trustee agent’s trustworthiness. 
[Noorian et al., 2011] enriches trust evaluation models by incorporating human 
dispositions such as optimism, pessimism and realism into the process of selecting whose 
opinions to believe in. The model proposed in this work consists of a two-layered 
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cognitive filtering algorithm. The first layer filters out the agents whose lacks required 
experience or reliability using the BRS the uncertainty measure proposed in [Wang and 
Singh, 2007]. The second layer calculates a similarity measure for opinions received from 
advisor agents and the current belief by the truster agent. Combining it with the truster 
agent’s innate disposition, the model produces credulity measures for the advisor agents 
and enables the truster agent to know whose opinions it should trust more. 
2.4. Organizational Trust Evaluation Models 
Another approach to maintaining trust in an MAS is to introduce organizational structure 
into multi-agent trust management. Such a goal can be accomplished only if there exists at 
least one trusted third-party in an MAS who can act as a supervising body for the 
transactions among other agents.  
[Kollingbaum and Norman, 2002] is one of the earliest research works in this area. The 
proposed framework consists of three components: 1) a specific transactional organization 
structure made of three roles (i.e., the addressee, the counter-party and the authority), 2) a 
contract specification language for contract management, and 3) a set of contract 
templates created using the contract specification language. In order to conduct 
transactions, an agent needs to register with the authority, negotiate with other agents to 
set up the terms in the contracts, and carry out the work required by the contracts under 
the supervision of the authority.  
The Certified Reputation (CR) model is proposed in [Huynh et al., 2005]. It provides a 
mechanism for a trustee agent to provide truster agents with certified ratings about its past 
performance. It is possible to make sharing certified ratings a standard part of setting up a 
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transaction between agents. By putting the burden of demonstrating past performance on 
the trustee agents, truster agents can enjoy savings on effort required to solicit third-party 
testimonies and filtering these testimonies. In addition, the certified ratings are provided 
by the trustee agent’s previous interaction partners, thus making the CR model a 
distributed approach which is suitable for use in MASs. 
In [Hermoso et al., 2010], an agent coordination mechanism based on the interplay of 
trust and organizational roles for agents is proposed. It provides a mechanism for agents to 
establish which task a trustee agent is good at through multiple interactions and gradually 
allow the role each agent can play in an agent society to evolve and thus, dynamically 
changing the organizational structure by evolving an organizational taxonomy in the MAS. 
In subsequent interactions, the updated roles for the trustee agents act as a reference for 
truster agents to decide how to delegate tasks. 
2.5. Trust-aware Interaction Decision-making Approaches 
Existing trust-aware interaction decision making approaches can be broadly divided into 
two categories: 1) greedy and 2) dynamic. Such a classification is based on the strategy 
adopted by different approaches in terms of selecting trustee agents for interaction. Static 
approaches tend to use simple rules while dynamic approaches often attempt to assess the 
changing conditions in its operating environment in an effort to balance the exploitation of 
known trustworthy trustee agents with the exploration for potentially better alternatives. 
2.5.1. Greedy Approach 
In a typical greedy approach, a truster agent explores for trustee agents with a desired 
reputation standing through either some supporting infrastructure (e.g., peer 
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recommendation, social network analysis, etc.) or random exploration. The reputation 
values of the candidate trustee agents are evaluated using a trust evaluation model of 
choice, and the one with the highest estimated reputation is selected for interaction. Such 
an approach is currently the most widely adopted in computational trust literature [Jøsang 
and Ismail, 2002; Yu and Singh, 2003; Teacy et al., 2005; Weng et al., 2006; Teacy et al., 
2008; Weng et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Shen et al., 2011]. From an individual truster 
agent’s point of view, in order to maximize its own long term wellbeing, it is rational to 
always select the best possible option that can be found as often as possible. 
2.5.2. Dynamic Approaches 
Compared to static approaches, there are significantly fewer dynamic approaches in the 
current computational trust literature. A reinforcement learning based approach is 
proposed in [Teacy et al., 2008]. The gain derived by a truster agent from choosing each 
trustee agent for interaction consists of the Q-value from Q-learning as well as the 
expected value of perfect information. At each time step, a truster agent chooses an action 
(i.e., exploration v.s. exploitation) which can maximize its gain. 
In [Muñoz et al., 2009], the authors measure a truster agent’s knowledge degrees about 
trustee agents and use this metric to determine which trustee agent to select for interaction. 
The knowledge degree depends on the amount of direct past interaction experience with 
the trustee agent, third-party testimonies about that trustee agent, and the self reported 
trustworthiness by that trustee agent available to the truster agent. The value of the 
knowledge degree is normalized within the range of [0, 1], with 1 representing 
“completely known” and 0 representing “no direct interaction experience”. In the local 
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record of a truster agent, candidate trustee agents are organized into four different groups 
according to their knowledge degree values. If there are enough trustee agents with 
reputation values higher than a predefined threshold in the most well known group, the 
truster agent will only select from these trustee agents for interaction; otherwise, a number 
of exploration rounds will be allocated to trustee agents in groups to build up the 
knowledge degree about them and promote them into higher order groups.  
Another dynamic approach proposed in [Hoogendoorn et al., 2010] measures how much 
the behavior of the trustee agents has changed to determine the amount of effort a truster 
agent should devote to exploration. In this approach, each truster agent keeps track of the 
long term trust (𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡)) and the short term trust (𝑆𝑇𝑖(𝑡)) of candidate trustee agent i, 
where 𝑆𝑇𝑖(𝑡) reflects the changes in i’s behavior faster than 𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡). The average absolute 
difference between 𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑆𝑇𝑖(𝑡) is used to estimate the collective degree of change 
𝐶(𝑡) in trustee agents’ behavior. When 𝐶(𝑡) is larger than 0, an exploration extent value 
𝐸(𝑡) is calculated. Together with the reputation value of each trustee agent, this value is 
used to derive a selection probability 𝑅𝑃𝑖(𝑡) for every trustee agent. The candidate trustee 
agents are then selected using a Monte Carlo method based on their 𝑅𝑃𝑖(𝑡) values. When 
𝐶(𝑡) = 0, the trustee agent with the highest reputation evaluation is always selected for 
interaction. 
Both the greedy and the dynamic approaches eventually settle in the same strategy which 
is to “always select the known trustee with the highest reputation for interaction”.  While 
this strategy is rational from the perspective of an individual truster, it disregards the 
potential influence on the perceived performance of the trustee agents by the choices of 
interaction partners made by the truster agents. 
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Apart from decisions on the balance of exploration and exploitation, a truster agent can 
also decide on when to use additional mechanisms to induce the desired behavior from 
trustee agents following the framework proposed in [Burnett et al., 2011]. In this 
framework, strategies a truster agent can adopt include 1) explicit incentives, 2) 
monitoring, and 3) reputational incentives. Based on the consideration of a wide range of 
factors including reputation, cost of monitoring, expected loss, and expected value of 
monitoring an activity, etc., a truster agent dynamically makes a choice among these 
strategies in addition to the decision on which trustee agent to select for an interaction. 
While most trustworthiness evaluation models and trust-aware interaction decision-
making approaches are designed for truster agents to use, [Fullam and Barber, 2006] 
proposed an interesting model that includes mechanisms to help trustee agents determine 
how trustworthy to be. Based on the Agent Reputation and Trust (ART) Testbed, the 
interdependencies, rewards and complexities of trust decisions are identified. A Q-
learning based method is then used to help truster agents determine who to trust, how 
truthful to be in sharing reputation information and what reputations to believe in; and 
help trustee agents to determine how trustworthy to be. 
2.6. Common Assumptions 
In order to advance the research in multi-agent trust, many assumptions have been made. 
These assumptions can be classified into two categories: 
1) Fundamental assumptions: the ones that are essential for multi-agent trust research 
to be carried out and are commonly accepted by researchers in this field. They include: 
a. Trustee and truster agents are self-interested; 
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b. An identity is associated with each trustee agent although it can be discarded by 
the agent; 
c. Every truster agent always prefers to interact with the most trustworthy trustee 
agent. 
2) Simplifying assumptions: the ones that are made to enable certain trust models to 
operate and not necessarily adopted by many researchers in this field. They include: 
a. The outcome of an interaction between a truster agent and a trustee agent is 
binary (success or failure); 
b. The effect of an interaction between a truster agent and a trustee agent on the 
wellbeing of the truster agent can be known immediately after the interaction is 
complete; 
c. Interactions between a truster agent and a trustee agent occur in discrete time 
steps; 
d. The majority of third-parties testimonies are reliable; 
e. A truster agent’s own direct interaction experience with a trustee agent is the 
most relevant to itself; 
f. The properties of a trustee agent are useful for predicting its future behavior;  
g. A truster agent needs to select only one trustee agent for each interaction; 
h. A trustee agent can service an unlimited number of requests from truster agents 
during a time step without affecting its quality of service. 
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While the fundamental assumptions have stayed the same over the past decade, some of 
the simplifying assumptions have been relaxed. For example, Assumption 2.a was relaxed 
by [Jøsang and Haller, 2007], Assumption 2.c was relaxed by [Liu et al., 2012] and 
Assumption 2.d was relaxed by [Teacy et al., 2005]. One the other hand, new assumptions 
are sometimes added into the list. For example, Assumption 2.f was proposed by [Burnett 
et al., 2010].  
2.7. Evaluating the Performance of Trust Models 
To evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed model in multi-agent trust research, two major 
evaluation methods are available: 1) simulation-based evaluation, and 2) evaluation 
through test datasets. Each of these methods has its own merits and has been observed to 
be applied either individually or in combinations by researchers in the field. 
Currently, the most widely used method for evaluating a trust model is through 
simulations. In an effort to standardize the evaluation of trust models through simulations, 
the Agent Reputation and Trust (ART) testbed [Fullam et al., 2005] was proposed and a 
series of competitions in this testbed were held in the International Conference on 
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS). The ART testbed creates an 
environment where agents need to delegate task to each other to produce appraisals for 
virtual artworks and earn virtual profits during this process. Nevertheless, the testbed is 
designed mainly for evaluating models that aim to mitigate the adverse effect of biased 
third-party testimonies which is only one of the problems multi-agent trust research aims 
to address. Three ART testbed competitions were held in AAMAS from 2006 to 2008. 
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Currently, researchers are still creating their own simulation environments in order to 
produce conditions under which their trust models are designed to operate. 
Another way of evaluating the performance of a trust model is by feeding data collected 
from real world applications into them. Depending on the specific features in a trust 
model, data from different types of online sources may be selected. For example, the 
Epinions dataset and the Extended Epinions dataset compiled by [Massa and Avesani, 
2006] have been used to analyze the performance of trust models concerned with 
bootstrapping and collaborative recommendation [Massa and Avesani, 2007; Massa and 
Avesani, 2009; Li and Wang, 2010; Ray and Mahanti, 2010]; in [Kuter and Golbeck, 
2007], data from the FilmTrust social network are used to analyze the performance of the 
proposed SUNNY socio-cognitive trust model; rating information from eBay was used in 
[Rettinger et al., 2008]; the web spam dataset from Yahoo! was used in [Zhang et al., 
2011] to evaluate their model for propagating trust and distrust in the web; and data 
crawled from the Internet auction site Allegro were used as part of the evaluation in [Liu 
and Datta, 2012]. 
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Real world data enables researchers to have a better idea of how their models would work 
in realistic environment conditions. However, the behavior patterns of the users in such 
datasets are fixed which makes it difficult for researchers to vary experimental conditions 
to simulate different ways the model can be attacked. In addition, many datasets are not 
specifically collected for the purpose of evaluating trust models. Thus, they may lack the 
ground truth about the user behavior and intention to facilitate more in-depth analysis of 
the performance of proposed trust models. In order to comprehensively evaluate a trust 
model, we believe a combination of these two methods should be employed. Nevertheless, 
it remains a difficult task collecting data from real world sources or convincing the 
industry to release datasets related to trust research with the concerns of privacy and trade 
secret protection. As shown in Figure 1, by analyzing research papers on the topic of trust 
management published in the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence 
Figure 1. The percentage of research papers on trust management published in AAAI, 
AAMAS and IJCAI from 2002 to 2012 adopting the two methods of performance evaluation. 
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(AAAI) Conference (15 papers), the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and 
Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS) (45 papers) and the International Joint Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (11 papers) from 2002 to 2012, it appears that over 80% of 
them use simulations to assess the performance of their proposed trust models while the 
rest using real world data as part of the evaluation. 
2.8. Summary 
In this chapter, we presented an overview of multi-agent trust research. We divided 
existing work into five categories according to the problems they are trying to address and 
reviewed selected notable works. Then we summarized a list of assumptions used by 
existing work. After that, we discussed the relative merits of evaluating trust models using 
simulation and real world data. The focus of this thesis is on the challenging problem of 
filtering biased testimonies in reputation-based trust evaluation modeling as well as 
helping agents make socially sustainable trusting decisions so as to enhance the social 
welfare in an MAS without sacrificing the wellbeing of individual agents. In the next 
chapter, we will present our work in mitigating the adverse effect of biased third-party 
testimonies in reputation-based trust evaluation models. 
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Chapter 3  
ACT: Protecting Truster Agents against 
Collusion 
 
 
3.1. Background 
In open and highly dynamic distributed computing systems where users are from diverse 
backgrounds and may have conflicting goals, distributed social control is needed to 
sustain long term interactions among them. Nowadays, such systems are quite common 
(e.g., service oriented computing systems [Jøsang et al., 2007], e-commerce systems 
[Noorian and Ulieru, 2010], wireless communication networks [Yu et al., 2010], etc.). In 
such environments in which services and devices usually have limited capabilities, users 
often have to interact with each other in order to achieve their goals. These interactions 
usually involve an exchange of services, information, or goods with value. Selfish users 
may renege on their commitments, thereby breaching the trust placed in them by others. 
Therefore, trust and reputation management mechanisms are often used to minimize the 
negative impact of selfish users. 
Generally, users in an open distributed computing system may play two types of roles 
[Jøsang et al., 2007]: 
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1) service providers (SPs), who provide services, goods or information requested by 
others and do not need to rely on others to perform these services; and 
2) service consumers (SCs), who need to rely on service providers to accomplish certain 
tasks. 
The main objective of evidence-based trust models is to estimate the trustworthiness of a 
potential interaction partner which represents its true behavior pattern. Evidences about a 
service provider from the perspective of a service consumer are usually from two sources: 
1) direct trust evidence: which are a service consumer’s direct interaction experience 
with the service provider; and 
2) indirect trust evidence: which are third-party testimonies about the service provider 
from other service providers in the system. 
In practical systems, it is not possible to definitively know the trustworthiness of a service 
provider. Therefore, it is often estimated using trust evidences. The estimation of a service 
provider’s trustworthiness derived from the direct trust evidence of a service consumer 
alone is called direct trust, while that derived from the indirect trust evidence is called 
indirect trust. An estimation derived from both sources of trust evidence is commonly 
known as the reputation of a service provider. In the eyes of a service consumer, other 
service consumers who provide it with indirect trust evidence (i.e. testimonies) about a 
service provider are regarded as witnesses. A witness’s reliability in terms of providing 
useful testimonies is referred to as its credibility. 
Since such systems tend to be very large in practice, service consumers often have to 
interact with service providers with whom they may not be very familiar (i.e. have little or 
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no prior interaction experience with) [Fullam and Barber, 2007]. Thus, it is both necessary 
and advantageous to allow service consumers to act as witnesses to provide their own 
first-hand interaction experience as testimonies to other service consumers who lack such 
information.  
However, such an approach is not without its perils. A witness might fabricate or hide 
information to promote the reputations of service providers who are related to it in some 
way, due to self-interest; the behavior patterns of service providers might change over 
time, thus rendering some service consumers’ existing record of past interaction 
experience obsolete; service consumers may use different criteria to define the success 
and failure of an interaction, thereby making it difficult to use testimonies in a uniform 
way. Biased testimonies resulting from one or more of these factors can degrade the 
accuracy of trust decisions [Jøsang et al., 2007]. Therefore, testimonies from witnesses 
need to be filtered before being used to evaluate a service consumer’s reputation. 
 
Figure 2. The general flow of trust-aware interaction decision making for evidence-based trust 
and reputation management models, and the contributions by the proposed ACT model. 
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To this end, a number of evidence-based trust and reputation management (TRM) models 
have been proposed over the years. The general flow for a service consumer to decide 
which service provider to select for interaction is illustrated in Figure 2. Each service 
consumer continuously records its direct interaction experience with service providers 
over time. When a service provider’s trustworthiness needs to be evaluated, the service 
consumer may request third-party testimonies from witnesses, depending on the service 
consumer’s confidence on its own direct trust evidence. These testimonies are 
preprocessed in an attempt to filter out unfair ratings. The resulting direct and indirect 
trust evidences are then aggregated to form a trustworthiness evaluation for that particular 
service provider. At the end of this process, the service consumer decides which service 
provider to interact with based on their trustworthiness evaluations. Recently, there are a 
number of adaptive trust evaluation approaches being proposed [Moe et al., 2008; Teacy 
et al., 2008; Liu and Datta, 2012]. However, these approaches are all focused on 
predicting trustee performance based on direct trust evidence alone which is not the focus 
of this study. 
Existing approaches for third-party testimony filtering and aggregation fall into three main 
categories:  
1) filtering witness testimonies before aggregating them without recording the witnesses’ 
credibility in terms of providing useful testimonies [Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Whitby et 
al., 2004; Weng et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2011]; 
2) aggregating testimonies according to witnesses’ credibility evaluations [Jurca and 
Faltings, 2003; Yu and Singh, 2003; Weng et al., 2010]; and 
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3) incorporating incentive mechanisms into existing trust models to induce witnesses to 
provide fair testimonies [Miller et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2008; Marsh and Briggs, 
2009]. 
However, these approaches tend to be either based on majority voting which negatively 
affects their perform in scenarios where the majority of the witnesses are compromised, or 
tightly coupled with certain infrastructure support (e.g., payment systems, knowledge of 
social relationships among agents, etc.) which may be lacking in many application 
domains. 
In this research, we address these limitations by proposing the Actor-Critic learning Trust 
(ACT) model based on the principles of the Actor-Critic Learning Method [Tesauro, 
1995]. The ACT model enables a service consumer to dynamically make two important 
decisions when presented with third-party testimonies for a service provider: 1) how much 
weight to give to its own personal direct trust evidence and the collective opinions from 
witnesses, and 2) how much weight to assign to the testimonies of each witness. The 
reward and penalty strategy design in the ACT model enables the service consumer to 
base its learning process on the actual outcomes of its past interactions with service 
providers. As a result, its performance is less affected by the fraction of malicious 
witnesses in the agent population.  It also does not require additional infrastructure 
support for its operations. The contribution of the proposed ACT model is mainly focused 
on the third-party testimony filtering and aggregation procedures. 
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3.2. System Model 
Before discussing details of the proposed model, we introduce the notation that will be 
used in this chapter. At each time step t, a service consumer 𝑐𝑖 will interact with at most 
one service provider 𝑠𝑗  in our target system. For each interaction, 𝑐𝑖  chooses a service 
provider from among several candidates based on their estimated trustworthiness values. 
Whenever 𝑐𝑖 needs to assess the trustworthiness of 𝑠𝑗, it draws upon both its own direct 
trust evidence about 𝑠𝑗 (if there is any) as well as testimonies from a list of witnesses 𝑊𝑖,𝑗 
which are known by 𝑐𝑖 to have previously interacted with 𝑠𝑗. A witness 𝑤𝑘 may reply to 
𝑐𝑖 ’s request at time step t with a testimony 𝑑𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) . A malicious 𝑤𝑘  may distort its 
testimonies before sharing them with others. The service provider chosen for interaction 
by 𝑐𝑖 at time step t is affected by the selection of witnesses as well as the weights given to 
the direct and indirect trust evidence by 𝑐𝑖. 
For each interaction with 𝑠𝑗, 𝑐𝑖 incurs an utility cost C. If 𝑠𝑗  successfully completes the 
task assigned to it by 𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 receives an utility gain of G. We assume that the outcome of 
the interaction 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡)  can be observed by 𝑐𝑖  within the same time step in which the 
interaction occurs. We further assume that the interaction outcome is either successful 
(𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1) or unsuccessful (𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 0). By comparing the recommendation 𝑑𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) by 
each 𝑤𝑘 ∈ 𝑊𝑖,𝑗 about 𝑠𝑗 at time t with 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡), 𝑐𝑖 can learn the ranking of each 𝑤𝑘 in 𝑊𝑖,𝑗. 
New witnesses for 𝑠𝑗  discovered by 𝑐𝑖  over time are added into 𝑊𝑖,𝑗 . The interaction 
outcome value, 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡), is further compared with the recommended interaction decision 
value, 𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡),  based on direct trust evidence and the value, 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑡), based on indirect 
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trust evidence from the testimonies of selected witnesses. Reward and penalty values are 
assigned to these two sources of trust evidence by 𝑐𝑖 in its local record to determine how 
much to rely on either source in the future. 
The individually rational objective of a service consumer is to maximize its utility over its 
lifetime in the presence of malicious service providers and malicious witnesses. For 
convenience, the main symbols used in this chapter are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Key Notations used in this Chapter 
𝑐𝑖 A service consumer. 
𝑠𝑗 A service provider. 
𝑤𝑘 A witness. 
𝑊𝑖,𝑗 A set of witnesses for 𝑠𝑗 known to 𝑐𝑖. 
𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) The binary outcome of an interaction between 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 at time t. 
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) A testimony from 𝑤𝑘 with regard to 𝑠𝑗 at time t. 
𝑑𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) The interaction decision as suggested by 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡). 
𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) The decision by 𝑐𝑖 on whether to interact 𝑠𝑗 with at time t based on direct trust 
evidence only. 
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑡) The decision by 𝑐𝑖 on whether to interact 𝑠𝑗 with at time t based on indirect trust 
evidence only. 
𝐷𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) The overall decision by 𝑐𝑖 on whether to interact 𝑠𝑗 with at time t based on both 
direct and indirect trust evidence. 
C The cost in utility incurred by 𝑐𝑖 when engaging the service of 𝑠𝑗. 
G The gain in utility after a successful interaction 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗. 
𝛾𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) The weight assigned to direct trust evidence about 𝑠𝑗 by 𝑐𝑖. 
R The reward assigned to a source of trust evidence. 
P The penalty assigned to a source of trust evidence. 
𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) The direct trust for 𝑠𝑗 by 𝑐𝑖. 
𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) The indirect trust for 𝑠𝑗 by 𝑐𝑖. 
𝑟𝑝𝑗(𝑡) The reputation of 𝑠𝑗. 
𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) The credibility ranking of 𝑤𝑘 in 𝑐𝑖’s local record. 
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3.3. The Basics of Actor-Critic Learning 
Before proposing the ACT model, we briefly introduce the basic concept of the actor-
critic method of reinforcement learning. The actor-critic methods are temporal difference 
(TD) methods that represent the decision-making policy in a separate memory structure 
independent of the value function. The decision-making policy is known as the actor and 
the value function is known as the critic. The critic criticizes the actions made by the 
actor. Learning is always on-policy, which means that the critic must learn about and 
critique whatever policy is currently being followed by the actor. The critique is in the 
form of a temporal difference error. The output of the critic is this TD error and it drives 
all learning in both the actor and the critic, as shown by Figure 3. The actor-critic method 
 
Figure 3. The general framework of the ACT model [Tesauro, 1995]. 
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requires minimal computation when selecting an action. 
3.4. The ACT Model 
We now propose the ACT model to assist service consumers make trust-aware interaction 
decisions in the presence of potentially unreliable third-party testimonines. The general 
framework of the proposed ACT model is presented in Figure 4.  Each service consumer 
𝑐𝑖  keeps two local lists: 1) a list of known witnesses, and 2) a list of known service 
providers. Since a witness may only have interacted with a few service providers, the list 
of known witnesses organizes the witnesses into sub-lists indexed according to known 
service providers. The list of known service providers stores the direct trust evidence 𝑐𝑖 
has for each known service provider and the weight assigned to the direct trust evidence 
 
Figure 4. The general framework of the ACT model. 
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𝛾𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)  in the case of that service provider. These two lists grow as 𝑐𝑖  acquires more 
interaction experience with these two types of system participants.  
The ACT model is designed based on a variant of the reinforcement learning (RL) 
approach – the actor-critic method [Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2002]. The actor module 
represents the policy used to choose which witnesses’ testimonies should be selected and 
how much weight each of them should have when aggregating them together to form the 
indirect trust evidence. The policy also determines how much weight should be given to 
the direct and indirect trust evidence in order to evaluate the service provider’s 
trustworthiness.  The critic module represents the value function that determines whether 
the service provider 𝑐𝑖  is better off or worse off after each interaction with a selected 
service provider 𝑠𝑗. Overtime, the learning parameters of the ACT model are updated in 
such a way that more preference is given to witnesses and the source of trust evidence that 
enhance 𝑐𝑖’s wellbeing. 
Although the ACT model can be used together with many possible trust evaluation 
models, to be specific, we assume that the popular Beta Reputation System (BRS) [Jøsang 
and Ismail, 2002] is used as the underlying trust evaluation method. The direct trust for 𝑠𝑗 
by 𝑐𝑖 can be calcaulated using the BRS as 
𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) = 𝐸[Pr(𝑠𝑗)] =
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 
𝛼 = 𝑁𝑝(𝑡) + 1, 𝛽 = 𝑁𝑛(𝑡) + 1                                       (3.1) 
It is equivalent to the expectation of the probability that 𝑠𝑗  will successfully serve a 
requests from 𝑐𝑖 .  𝑁𝑝(𝑡)  and 𝑁𝑛(𝑡)  are variables representing the total number of 
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successful and unsuccessful interactions between 𝑠𝑗 and 𝑐𝑖 until time step t respectively. 
3.4.1. Learning Witness Credibility Ranking 
In the critic module, the reward function for 𝑐𝑖 is 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = (𝜇𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) ∙ (𝐺 − 𝐶) − (1 − 𝜇𝑗
𝑖(𝑡)) ∙ 𝐶).                            (3.2) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗 is computed at the end of each interaction between 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗. It reflects the level of 
success achieved by 𝑐𝑖 following the current interaction decision policy. 𝑇𝑖,𝑗 is the number 
of interactions between 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗, and the parameter 𝜇𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) is defined as 
𝜇𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = {
0, 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 0|𝐷𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1 
1, 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1|𝐷𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1 
.                                          (3.3) 
𝐷𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) denotes the overall decision by 𝑐𝑖  to interact with 𝑠𝑗  at time t based on both the 
direct and indirect trust evidence currently available. Here, we only consider the case 
when the decision is to interact with a service provider (i.e. 𝐷𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1), because in order 
for a service consumer 𝑐𝑖  to be able to observe the actual interaction outcome with a 
service provider 𝑠𝑗 at the end of time step t, 𝑠𝑗 must be selected by 𝑐𝑖 for interaction in that 
time step. When 𝐷𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 0 , it implies that 𝑐𝑖  deems 𝑠𝑗  untrustworthy based on its 
reputation value. Thus, in these cases, no interaction between them will take place at that 
time and no 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) value can be observed. In this study, we assume that the agents’ direct 
trust values and indirect trust values are normalized to a range [0, 1]. A testimony 
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) is simply 𝑤𝑘’s direct trust value for 𝑠𝑗  based on its own direct trust evidence 
upto time step t. Thus, its value is also within the range [0, 1].  
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Once the latest interaction outcome is known, a reward correction value 𝜃𝑘,𝑗 is computed 
for each of the M selected witnesses whose testimonies have been used to calculate the 
reputation of 𝑠𝑗 namely: 
𝜃𝑘,𝑗 =
1
𝑇𝑘,𝑗
∑ [𝑑𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) )]
𝑇𝑘,𝑗
𝑡=1 .                                        (3.4) 
In (3.2), 𝑇𝑘,𝑗 denotes the total number of times that 𝑤𝑘’s testimonies about 𝑠𝑗  has been 
used by 𝑐𝑖 , and 𝑑𝑗
𝑘(𝑡)  represents the interaction recommendation implied by 𝑤𝑘 ’s 
testimony, 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡), on 𝑠𝑗 at time step t and is given by 
𝑑𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) < 𝑇ℎ
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡) ≥ 𝑇ℎ
.                                              (3.5) 
In (3.3), 𝑇ℎ ∈ [0,1] is a predefined threshold value. 𝜃𝑘,𝑗  increases with the number of 
times that 𝑤𝑘 has given testimonies suggesting a service provider is trustworthy but the 
actual interaction outcome is unsuccessful. It is used to penalize the act of unfairly 
praising a service provider, which is the most common form of collusion between service 
providers and witnesses.  
After the interaction outcome with a service provider is known, the critic process is 
carried out by updating the learning parameter 𝑝𝑘,𝑗  for each of the M witnesses whose 
testimonies resulted in the selection of  𝑠𝑗 by 𝑐𝑖 as follows 
𝑝𝑘,𝑗 ← 𝑝𝑘,𝑗 + 𝜌 ∙ (𝑟𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑟𝑖,?̃? − 𝛿 ∙ 𝜃𝑘,𝑗) ∙ (1 − 𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡 − 1)).                    (3.6) 
The constant 𝜌  ( 0 < 𝜌 ≤ 1 ) denotes the learning rate. As 𝜌  increases, the learning 
parameter 𝑝𝑘,𝑗 change more rapidly as new interaction outcomes become available. In this 
50 
 
study, we choose a 𝜌 value close to zero to make 𝑝𝑘,𝑗 vary more smoothly. The constant δ 
(0 < 𝛿 ≪ 1) represents the bias towards penalizing collusion when updating the learning 
parameter; its value should be significantly smaller than 1 to avoid drastic changes in the 
value of 𝑝𝑘,𝑗. 
The credibility ranking value 𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) of each known 𝑤𝑘 with regard to a service provider 
𝑠𝑗 is calculated using the Gibbs softmax method [2] as 
𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) =
𝑒
𝑝𝑘,𝑗
∑ 𝑒
𝑝𝑙,𝑗𝑀
𝑙=1
.                                                           (3.7) 
The resulting values of 𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) is used to rank the witnesses known to 𝑐𝑖  to facilitate 
subsequent witness selections. The sum of all 𝜋𝑘,𝑗 values always equals to 1. Thus, the 
credibility ranking value can be thought of as the probability of soliciting testimonies 
from each of the known witnesses.  
After the credibility ranking values are calculated, the total accumulated reward 𝑟𝑖,?̃?  is 
updated. It is used as a reference in the process of evaluating the well-being of 𝑐𝑖 resulted 
from interactions with 𝑠𝑗. It is updated as 
𝑟𝑖,?̃? ← 𝜑 ∙ 𝑟𝑖,?̃? + (1 − 𝜑) ∙ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗                                                 (3.8) 
where constant 𝜑  (0 < 𝜑 ≤ 1 ) determines the influence of the latest rewards in the 
smoothed baseline reward 𝑟𝑖,?̃?. When 𝜑 = 1, only the current reward is used to evaluate 
the credibility of each witness. 
The indirect trust for 𝑠𝑗 by 𝑐𝑖 can be computed as 
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𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) =
∑ [𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡)∙𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
𝑘(𝑡)]𝑀𝑘=1
∑ 𝜋𝑘,𝑗
𝑀
𝑘=1 (𝑡)
.                                          (3.9) 
3.4.2. Learning Trust Evidence Source Preference 
With the values of 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) and 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) calculated using (3.1) and (3.9), the next step is to 
aggregate them to compute the reputation of 𝑠𝑗. In the ACT model, for each 𝑠𝑗 known to 
𝑐𝑖, two critic modules are used to learn the weights for the two sources of trust evidence 
and one actor module is used for estimating the trustworthiness of 𝑠𝑗. The critic module in 
the proposed method determines the relative merit of each source of trust evidence 
through reward accumulation. The learning process is similar to that presented in the last 
section. Since the two critic modules are essentially the same but only use different 
sources of trust evidence as input data, in the following, we only discuss the critic module 
for direct trust evidence source. 
The value function of the critic module is designed as: 
𝑟𝑑 = 𝜇(𝑡) ∙ 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜇(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑃 
𝜇(𝑡) = {
0, 𝑖𝑓𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 0|𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) = 1 𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1|𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) = 0  
1, 𝑖𝑓𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 0|𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) = 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) = 1|𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) = 1
 
𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) = {
0, 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) < 𝑇ℎ
1, 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) ≥ 𝑇ℎ
.                                                (3.10) 
𝑟𝑑 can be considered as the time averaged per interaction reward achieved by 𝑐𝑖 through 
relying on its direct trust evidence source about 𝑠𝑗 with the current weight value 𝛾𝑖,𝑗. R 
and P are predetermined constant values for reward and penalty, based on the 
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consequences of the interaction decision. The ratio of R to P, rather than their absolute 
values, is important to the learning process. A small R:P ratio means that trust is hard for 
a service provider to gain, but easy to lose. The variable 𝜇(𝑡) determines whether this 
trust evidence source should be rewarded or penalized at time step t. Its value toggles 
between 0 and 1 according to the relationship between the interaction decision 𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡), 
which is related to the direct trustworthiness evaluation 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) (0 ≤ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) ≤ 1), and the 
actual interaction outcome 𝑂𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) . As 𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)  is only one component of the overall 
interaction, it is possible that even as 𝐷𝑑
𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) suggests not to interact with 𝑠𝑗, the overall 
decision is otherwise. 
Once the latest 𝑟𝑑 is calculated, it is compared with the baseline reward 𝑟?̃? accumulated by 
this trust evidence source to update the learning parameter 𝑝𝑑 according to  
𝑝𝑑 ← 𝑝𝑑 + 𝜌 ∙ (𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟?̃?) ∙ (1 − 𝜋𝑑(𝑡 − 1)).                                 (3.11) 
After 𝑝𝑑 is updated, 𝑟?̃? is updated to incorporate the latest reward 𝑟𝑑: 
𝑟?̃? ← 𝜑 ∙ 𝑟?̃? + (1 − 𝜑) ∙ 𝑟𝑑.                                               (3.12) 
𝑟?̃?  can be treated as a basis for comparing whether 𝑐𝑖  is better off or worse off by 
aggregating the direct trust evidence into the estimation for the trustworthiness of 𝑠𝑗 using 
the latest 𝛾𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) value.  
Similarly, the learning parameter 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑  for the indirect source of trust evidence can be 
obtained. When both 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑 are obtained, the learning parameters 𝜋𝑑(𝑡) and 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) 
are updated as: 
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𝜋𝑑(𝑡) =
𝑒𝑝𝑑
𝑒𝑝𝑑 + 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑
 
 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) =
𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑒𝑝𝑑+𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑑
.                                             (3.13) 
𝜋𝑑(𝑡)  and 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡)  can be treated as the probability of selecting each source of trust 
evidence 𝜋𝑑(𝑡) + 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡) = 1. In the ACT model, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) = 𝜋𝑑(𝑡). 
While the strategy for exploiting known witnesses with high credibility is relatively 
straightforward (i.e. selecting the top M most credible witnesses to request testimonies 
from), balancing it with exploration for addition witnesses requires careful design. In the 
ACT model, the exploration process is controlled by two parameters: 1) an exploration 
probability Pr, and 2) the magnitude of M. The value of Pr is initialized to 1 at the start of 
a service consumer 𝑐𝑖’s life time to enable 𝑐𝑖 to explore when the list of known witnesses 
is empty. The value of Pr is gradually decreased over time until it reaches a pre-defined 
minimum value, 𝑃𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛. Testimonies returned by previously unknown witnesses are given 
the benefit of the doubt and included in the calculation of the service provider’s reputation 
with weight values equal to the lowest 𝜋𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) among that of the selected known witnesses. 
This is to ensure that 𝑐𝑖 will always have some opportunity to discover new witnesses.  
A service provider 𝑠𝑗’s reputation is calculated as 
𝑟𝑝𝑗(𝑡) = 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 ∙ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑑 (𝑡) + (1 − 𝛾𝑖,𝑗(𝑡)) ∙ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝑡).                                (3.14) 
𝑟𝑝𝑗(𝑡)  represents the overall reputation of 𝑠𝑗  and is used by 𝑐𝑖  to estimate 𝑠𝑗 ’s 
trustworthiness. At each time step, 𝑐𝑖  might have more than one candidate service 
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providers to choose from. In this study, we assume that 𝑐𝑖  always selects the service 
provider with the highest overall reputation for interaction. 
3.5. Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the ACT model, we have designed a test-bed which 
allows the well-being of service consumers adopting different approaches to be gauged. 
Through extensive simulations, it has been shown that the ACT model significantly 
outperforms existing approaches in terms of the reduction in normalized average utility 
loss and, in the case of colluding witnesses, the reduction in their collusion power. 
3.5.1. Design of the Simulation Test-bed 
The test-bed simulates a scenario where a number of service consumers need the services 
offered by service providers. A service consumer incurs a cost of C in order to utilize the 
service of a service provider. If the service provider acts honestly, i.e. satisfies the service 
consumer’s request, the service consumer gains an amount of utility of G after the 
interaction; otherwise, it gains zero utility. Therefore, the maximum average utility gain a 
service consumer can achieve is G – C, corresponding to all its interactions with service 
providers being successful; the minimum of this value is –C, if all its interactions are 
unsuccessful. 
The main purpose of this test-bed is to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed ACT 
model in mitigating the adverse effects of unfair testimonies relative to existing 
approaches. Since it is impractical to investigate the proposed model for a large number of 
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possible service provider population configurations, we focus on a highly hostile service 
provider population consisting of  
- 10% honest service providers (which renege randomly with a probability of 10%);  
- 10% Type I dishonest service providers (which renege randomly with an initial 
probability of 40%);  
- 40% Type II dishonest service providers (which renege randomly with an initial 
probability of 60%); and  
- 40% Type III dishonest service providers (which renege randomly with an initial 
probability of 80%). 
Except for the honest service provider group, the behavior patterns of all other groups 
changes gradually during the simulation. A service provider’s behavior can change 
according to three different profiles: 1) increasing reneging probability, 2) decreasing 
reneging probability, or 3) unchanging reneging probability. The magnitude of each 
change is randomly chosen from the interval [0, 0.01]. Each dishonest service provider 
chooses one of the three profiles in each interaction with equal probability (i.e. 1/3). If the 
proposed ACT model can achieve good performance in this hostile environment, it should 
also perform well under more benign environments. The test-bed environment consists of 
100 service providers with different behavior patterns. During each round of simulation, 
each service consumer attempts to solve a total of 200 problems. The service consumers 
select service providers for interaction based on their reputation. The outcome of the 
interaction is assumed to be binary, namely successful or unsuccessful, depending on 
whether the service provider provides the requested service. 
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There are 100 witnesses who accumulate direct trust evidence about the service providers 
and respond to service consumers requesting testimonies. When a request for testimony is 
received by a witness it will return a testimony to the requester if it has prior interaction 
experience with the particular service provider in the request; otherwise, it will decline the 
request. Two categories of malicious testimony sharing strategies are studied: 1) random 
lying, and 2) collusive lying. 
In the case of random lying, a malicious witness does not collude with any other service 
provider. It either positively distorts a testimony (ballot-stuffing) or negatively distorts a 
testimony (badmouthing) following a preset lying probability. In the case of collusive 
lying, a number of service providers collude with lying witnesses to inflate their 
reputation in the eyes of service consumers (ballot-stuffing). The colluding witnesses do 
not give unfair testimonies about service providers who are outside the collusion ring. In 
both random lying and collusive lying cases, the distortions are implemented as offset 
values added to or subtracted from the original testimony. Two types of unfair testimonies 
are supported in the test-bed:  
1) Moderately Unfair Testimonies (MUT): the magnitude of the offset is randomly 
chosen in the range [0.1, 0.4]; 
2) Highly Unfair Testimonies (HUT): the magnitude of the offset is randomly chosen in 
the range [0.8, 1.0]. 
Table 3. Parameter Values used in the Experiments 
Parameter Value 
Th 0.5 
𝜑 0.6 
𝛿 0.05 
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𝜌 0.4 
M 10 
G 5 
C 1 
R 1 
P -10 
𝑃𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 0.1 
 
The values of the distorted testimonies are always kept within the range [0, 1] by hard-
limiting to 1 (or 0) if the distorted testimonies after adding (or subtracting) exceeds 1 (or 
falls below 0). In the proposed ACT model, we use BRS as the trust evaluation model in 
this study. The values selected for the parameters in the ACT model are listed in Table 3. 
3.5.2. Evaluation Metrics 
Two evaluation metrics from [Weng et al. 2010] are adopted to facilitate comparisons 
with state-of-the-art methods: 1) Normalized Average Utility Loss (NAUL), and 2) 
Collusion Power. The normalized average utility gain 𝜎 (0 ≤ 𝜎 ≤ 1)  measures the 
average per time step utility gain for each service consumer over its lifetime. It is 
calculated as 
𝜎 =
1
𝑇∙𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖(𝑡)−𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
.                                          (3.15) 
In (3.15), T is the total number of times a service consumer 𝑐𝑖 has interacted with the 
service providers, N is the number of service consumers adopting the same approach as 
𝑐𝑖’s in the test-bed and 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐺 − 𝐶, 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 = −𝐶. 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the actual utility gain of each 𝑐𝑖 
after each interaction at time step t. If the interaction is successful, 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; 
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otherwise, 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 . The normalized average utility loss is then (1 − 𝜎). A lower 
value corresponds to a better performance. 
The Collusion Power is a measure of the effectiveness of different strategies in the face of 
collusion. It is defined as [Weng et al., 2010] 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 =  
∑ #𝑡𝑟𝑦(𝑐𝑖)𝑐𝑖∈𝐴𝑛𝑐
|𝐴𝑛𝑐|∗𝑁𝑚
                                  (3.16) 
where 𝐴𝑛𝑐 denotes the set of non-colluding service consumers, |𝐴𝑛𝑐| is the total number 
of service consumers in set 𝐴𝑛𝑐, 𝑐𝑖 is a service consumer in this set, and #𝑡𝑟𝑦(𝑐𝑖) is the 
number of times 𝑐𝑖  interacted with any colluding service provider (i.e. considered a 
colluding service provider as a potential interaction partner) during the simulation. In 
essence, the collusion power represents the percentage of all tasks delegated to any of the 
colluding service providers. The lower the collusion power, the more effective a strategy 
is against collusion. 
3.5.3. Experiment Setup 
For each experiment, the composition of the common witness population is altered to 
simulate different scenarios. In the following sections, Hon denotes a population 
consisting entirely of honest common witnesses. BMn denotes a population consisting of n% 
badmouthing witnesses and (100-n)% honest witnesses. BSn denotes a population 
consisting of n% ballot-stuffing witnesses and (100-n)% honest witnesses. The malicious 
witness populations consist of half giving out MUTs and half giving out HUTs. 
The experiments conducted in this study include two parts: 1) verifying the effectiveness 
of the adaptive trust evidence aggregation module of the ACT model (labeled as ACT’), 
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and 2) verifying the effectiveness of the ACT model as a whole (labeled as ACT). In Part 
1 of the study, five groups of service consumers are used for comparison. They are: 
1) Group 𝛾 = 0: service consumers who completely rely on indirect trust evidence; 
2) Group 𝛾 = 0.5: service consumers who rely on a balanced mix of direct and indirect 
trust evidence; 
3) Group 𝛾 = 1: service consumers who completely rely on direct trust evidence; 
4) Group M2002: service consumers who use the method described in [Mui and 
Mohtashemi, 2002] to set the 𝛾 value; 
5) Group F&B2007: service consumers who use the method described in [Fullam and 
Barber, 2007] to set the 𝛾 value. 
The group of service consumers equipped with the proposed method is labeled as Group 
ACT’. Each group consists of 10 agents. All competing groups only request for 
testimonies from the common witness group. 
In Part 2 of this study, we compare the performance of the ACT model against:  
1) Group W2010: service consumers which employ an existing state-of-the-art method 
[Weng et al., 2010]; 
2) Group YS2003: service consumers which employ a classic method [Yu and Singh, 
2003];  
3) Group NoCred: service consumers which employ a baseline method which adopts 
BRS as the trust evaluation model and blindly aggregating any testimonies they 
receive;  
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4) Group BRS2002: service consumers who only rely on their direct interaction 
experience to evaluate a service provider’s trustworthiness using BRS [Jøsang and 
Ismail, 2002]. 
The group of service consumers equipped with the ACT method is labeled as Group ACT. 
Each group also consists of 10 agents. All groups only request for testimonies from the 
common witness group same as in Part 1 of this study. 
3.6. Analysis of Results 
3.6.1. The Effect of Adaptive 𝜸 Values 
 
 
Figure 5. Ranges of variation of NAUL by service consumer groups under non-collusive 
conditions from Part 1 of this study. 
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Part 1 of this study is conducted assuming non-collusive common witnesses. The common 
witness population composition is altered from BM80 to Hon and then to BS80 to test the 
performance of service consumers employing different testimony aggregation methods. 
The results are summarized in Figure 5. It can be observed that Group 𝛾 = 1 achieves the 
highest NAUL values as they need more exploration to identify trustworthy service 
providers. Its performance is not affected by the changes in the common witness 
population composition. Completely relying on indirect trust evidence is also not a good 
strategy as the performance of Group  𝛾 = 0  is heavily affected by the presence of 
unreliable witnesses of both BM and BS types. However, the saving in exploration from 
completely relying on third party testimonies allows Group 𝛾 = 0 to achieve lower NAUL 
 
Figure 6. Performance of various service consumer groups under different non-collusive 
common witness populations from Part 1 of this study. 
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values than Group 𝛾 = 1. Nevertheless, the advantage drops with number of misbehaving 
witnesses as shown in Figure 6. The performance of the Group 𝛾 = 0.5 is the best among 
the three groups using static 𝛾 values. Group F&B2007’s performance is similar to that of 
Group M2002. As F&B2007 tries to learn which static strategy (𝛾 = 0, 0.5, 𝑜𝑟 1) is the 
best under different conditions, its performance more or less tracks that of Group 𝛾 = 0.5 
in our experiments. Group ACT’ outperforms all other methods under all testing 
conditions by an average of 20.79% in terms of the reduction in NAUL. A detailed 
breakdown of the comparisons is shown in Table 4. 
 
Figure 7. The variation of the 𝜸 value from the record of a service consumer in Group ACT’ 
with respect to an honest service provider under different non-collusive common witness 
populations from Part 1 of this study. 
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The performance achieved by the proposed ACT’ service consumers can be attributed to 
their ability to adapt the values of 𝛾  for each service provider as the environment 
conditions change in a continuous manner. Figure 7 shows a snap-shot of the 𝛾 value from 
a service consumer in Group ACT’ with respect to an honest service provider in its local 
record. It can be seen that as the witness population becomes increasingly hostile, the 
reliance on third-party testimonies is reduced to mitigate their negative influence on the 
service consumer’s interaction decisions. 
Table 4. Improvement of Group ACT’ over other groups. 
Methods Improvement 
Static γ = 0 23.00% 
 
Figure 8. Ranges of variation of NAUL by service consumer groups under non-collusive 
conditions from Part 2 of this study. 
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Methods Improvement 
Methods γ = 0.5 16.82% 
γ = 1 31.99% 
Dynamic 
Methods 
M2002 16.73% 
F&B2007 15.41% 
Average 20.79% 
 
3.6.2. Performance of ACT under non-Collusive Lying 
In Part 2 of this study, the performance of the complete ACT model is investigated. The 
distributions of the NAUL achieved by all five models in this study are shown in Figure 8. 
It can be seen that Group NoCred is outperformed by all other groups as it blindly 
includes all testimonies into the reputation evaluation process. Group ACT has achieved 
 
Figure 9. Performance of various service consumer groups under different non-collusive 
common witness populations from Part 2 of this study. 
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significantly lower level of NAUL than existing models. 
As shown in Figure 9, when the percentage of malicious witnesses increases, the 
performance of Group BRS2002 is relatively stable as it does not take into account 
testimonies from witnesses when making trustworthiness evaluations. However, the 
NAUL of Group NoCred deteriorates significantly. The performance of groups W2010 
and ACT are relatively consistant across different witness population configurations. The 
consistent performance achieved by the ACT model is due to that fact that it uses the 
interaction outcomes with the service providers rather than the majority opinion of the 
witnesses to update the credibility ranking of known witnesses, as well as its ability to 
 
Figure 10. Ranges of variation of NAUL by service consumer groups under collusive conditions 
from Part 2 of this study. 
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adjust its preference of the two trust evidence sources dynamically. 
As can be seen from Table 5, overall, Group ACT outperforms all other groups in terms of 
reduction in NAUL by significant margins. The advantage is more significant under 
ballot-stuffing conditions due to the addition of the reward correction value 𝜃𝑘,𝑗 in (3.6) 
that penalizes positively biased testimonies.  
Table 5. Improvement of the ACT model over other Models 
Trust 
Models 
Improvement  
Badmouthing Ballot-stuffing Overall 
W2010  18.44% 29.91% 25.16%  
YS2003 64.18% 70.20% 66.98% 
NoCred  68.19% 72.99% 69.70%  
BRS2002  69.07% 74.18% 71.66%  
3.6.3. Performance of ACT under Collusive Lying 
In our test-bed, the collusive witnesses always form collusion rings with Type III 
Figure 11. Performance of various service consumer groups under different collusive common 
witness populations from Part 2 of this study. 
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malicious service providers to try to promote their reputation. The proportion of collusive 
witnesses in the total common witness population is varied from Hon to BS80. From 
Figure 10, it can be seen that the presence of colluding witnesses tricks the NoCred group 
into interacting more often with collusive service providers than other groups. In addition, 
by comparing Figure 10 with Figure 8, we find that the negative impact of collusion is 
more powerful than that of non-collusive random lying. The most adversely affected 
group is still the NoCred group. The highest NAUL of this group is about 0.4 under BS80 
without collusion. However, under BS80 with collusion, this value increases to around 0.9 
(as shown in Figure 11). This is due to the fact that colluding witnesses do not give unfair 
testimonies about non-colluding service providers, so that their testimonies are considered 
accurate in these cases. Thus, they are essentially strategically building up their credibility 
with the service consumers in order to mislead them into interacting with collusive service 
providers later. The performance of all the models studied in our test-bed deteriorated 
under the influence of collusion as shown in Table 6. Although Group ACT and Group 
W2010 managed to maintain the witness agents’ collusion power at relatively low levels 
compared to other groups as illustrated in Figure 12, their performances in terms of 
NAUL still deteriorated under collusion. It is observed, from Table 7, that the ACT model 
significantly outperforms all other approaches in terms of mitigating the adverse effect of 
collusion. The outperformance in terms of reduction in collusion power is the most 
significant when the majority of the witness population consists of collusive witnesses, as 
can be seen from Figure 13. 
Table 6. Performance Deterioration of various Models due to Collusion 
Trust 
Models 
Average NAUL 
Non-collusive  Collusive  
ACT 0.0890 0.1825 
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W2010 0.1283 0.2479 
YS2003 0.2895 0.4145 
NoCred 0.3070 0.5737 
 
Table 7. Improvement of the ACT Model over other Models 
Trust 
Models 
Improvement 
Collusion Power NAUL 
W2010  77.60%  26.37%  
YS2003 85.94%  55.97%  
NoCred  90.90%  68.18%  
 
3.7. Sensitivity Analysis 
Several reasons contribute to the ACT model’s superior performance over W2010 and 
YS2003: 
 
Figure 12. Ranges of variation of Collusion Power by service consumer groups under collusive 
conditions from Part 2 of this study. 
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1) YS2003 uses the number of past interactions between a service consumer 𝑐𝑖 and the 
service provider of interest 𝑠𝑗  to determine whether third-party testimonies are required. 
If the number of past interactions between 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗  exceeds a predefined threshold, 𝑐𝑖 
will not ask for testimonies when estimating 𝑠𝑗’s trustworthiness. However, since the 
behavior of the witnesses are changing in the experiments, 𝑐𝑖’s direct trust evidence 
may become outdated. This increases 𝑐𝑖’s risk exposure in the long run. 
2) W2010 applies an adaptive strategy in aggregating third-party testimonies. However, it 
also uses a service consumer 𝑐𝑖 ’s own evaluation of a service provider 𝑠𝑗 ’s 
trustworthiness as a baseline to determine which testimonies are potentially unfair. It 
 
Figure 13. Performance of various service consumer groups under different collusive common 
witness populations from Part 2 of this study. 
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proposed a measure of uncertainty induced by additional testimonies. If a new 
testimony contradicts 𝑐𝑖’s current belief about the trustworthiness of 𝑠𝑗 , it would be 
regarded as increasing 𝑐𝑖 ’s uncertainty and discarded. While this approach is more 
dynamic than YS2003, it still suffers from the effect of changing service provider 
behavior to some degree. 
3) In contrast, the ACT model always seeks testimonies from witnesses when estimating a 
service provider’s reputation. By learning the weights assigned to different witnesses’ 
testimonies based on the outcomes after each interaction, the ACT model dynamically 
decides which witnesses to keep in the top M list for each service provider based on 
their contributions to the well-being of the service consumer. Even in the face of highly 
hostile witness populations, the ACT model still can maintain a relatively good 
performance by relying more on the direct trust evidence source. This mechanism also 
helps the service consumers when the behavior of a service provider changes. If this 
change is reflected first in the testimonies, the service consumer can increase the 
weight given to the indirect trust evidence source to reduce the need for trial and error; 
if this change is detected first by the service consumer itself, it can increase the weight 
given to the direct trust evidence source to reduce its chance of being misled by 
outdated opinions from others. 
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To study the influence of M on the proposed ACT model, we alter the value of M and re-
run the experiments. The value of M is varied to be equivalent to between 5% to 100% of 
the common witness population. The experiments are re-run only for the cases where 
collusion exists since collusive testimonies are more powerful in affecting the credibility 
models.  
From Figure 14, it can be seen that generally, collusion power increases with the fraction 
of colluding witness agents. However, the value of collusion power is maintained at a 
relatively low level by the ACT model. This trend is true for the different values of M.  
 
Figure 14. The influence of the parameter M on the performance of the proposed approach 
under different witness population compositions. 
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By taking an average of the collusion power over different witness population 
configurations under different M values, the effect of different choices of M on the 
average collusion power and the time taken for the ACT model to estimate the reputation 
of a service provider is plotted in Figure 15. T(M) represents the time taken for the ACT 
model to estimate the reputation of a service provider measured in multiples of the time 
taken when M=5% of the common witness population (i.e. T(3.3)=1). As M increases, 
initially, the performance of the ACT model is improved (reduced average collusion 
power). However, increasing M beyond about 15% yields no further reduction in 
collusion power. Nevertheless, T(M) consistently increases with M.  
There is a trade-off in the selection of a value for M. It is expected that the effectiveness 
of the ACT model improves with M. However, the value of M also determines the storage 
capacity required at each individual service consumer as well as the time taken to estimate 
the reputation of a service provider. From Figure 15, a good choice of M appears to be in 
 
Figure 15. The trade-off between reduction in average collusion power and time required for 
computation under different choices of value for parameter M. 
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the range of [5%, 15%] which achieves a balance between effectiveness and computation 
time. 
3.8. Application in Cognitive Radio Networks  
In this section, we report the study of the proposed ACT model under an emerging 
wireless network application scenario. As the demand for wireless communications grows, 
so does the importance for efficient utilization of the scarce radio spectrum resource. The 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has reported that most of the licensed 
spectrum is currently under-utilized [Marcus et al., 2002]. Cognitive radio (CR) is a novel 
approach for improving the utilization by making it possible for a group of secondary 
(unlicensed) users (SUs) to access spectrum bands which are not being used by the 
primary (licensed) users (PU) in some geographical location [Haykin, 2002]. A CR 
system is an intelligent wireless communication system capable of learning from its radio 
environment and dynamically adjusting its transmission characteristics accordingly. 
Dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA) is one of the central ideas in the cognitive radio 
network (CRN) paradigm. Efficient DSA requires the SU to be able to accurately 
determine when a PU spectrum band is idle. In a CRN, the sensing accuracy is affected by 
a number of factors such as terrain features, the types of the sensing devices, etc. [Ilisei, 
2006]. Sensing accuracy can be improved by collecting measurements from a number of 
sensing devices located in a wider geographic area rather than relying on one or two 
dedicated devices [Mishra et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008]. SU devices may possess 
different sensing capabilities or may purposely choose to misbehave in order to maximize 
their own utility gains. Although efforts have been directed at making CRNs more robust 
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against traditional security attacks [Clancy & Goergen, 2008], few attempts have been 
made to deal with legitimate users who misbehave. Authors in [Jøsang et al, 2007] coined 
the term “soft security threat” to describe the aforementioned situation and suggested the 
use of trust management to mitigate these threats. A SU’s actions in the PU spectrum 
usage sensing process can impact the collective decision making process either positively 
or negatively depending on both its intentions and its capabilities. Therefore, we study the 
effectiveness of incorporating trust management into the CR system architecture in 
improving the robustness of the distributed PU spectrum sensing process. 
3.8.1. System Architecture 
The CRNs can be deployed in various kinds of network architectures such as centralized, 
Ad-hoc and mesh architectures [Chen et al., 2008] as shown in Figure 16. In this study, 
we adopt an infrastructure-based CRN with centralized base station in cellular networks 
which is an extension of the one in [Lee and Akyildiz, 2008] as the underlying habitat on 
top of which a trust ecosystem is to be overlaid. We assume that PUs coexist with SUs in 
some geographical area and PUs are controlled by a PU base station (PUBS). In this CRN, 
SUs are distributed in the coverage area of an SU base station (SUBS) and SUs within the 
transmission range of the SUBS can only communicate with each other through the SUBS. 
The SUs are not able to communicate with either PUs or the PUBS but communication 
between SUBS and PUBS is possible through backbone networks. During the sensing 
process, SUs sense the PU spectrum individually and report the results to SUBS. By 
integrating sensing results reported by SUs and its own sensing result, SUBS determines 
the availability of PU spectrum band and allocates resources to SUs in its range. While a 
PU experiences undue interference, it informs its PUBS which then sends a complaint 
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message immediately to SUBSs within range. This complaint message from PUBS to 
SUBS will cause a temporary shutdown of SUBS operation and may cause a great utility 
loss for SUs. In this study, we assume that PUs, PUBS and SUBS are trustworthy entities 
in the CRN. 
Under the CRN architecture mentioned above, the decision on whether a PU is using its 
assigned spectrum band or not depends on two major sources of information: 1) the 
sensing result from the SUBS, and 2) the collective sensing results obtained from the SUs 
managed by this SUBS. This mode of operation enables the SUBS to contribute to the 
Figure 16. An overview of CRN Architectures [Akyildiz et al., 2008] 
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overall sensing result while still harnessing the power of distributed sensing by 
participating SUs which could enhance the overall sensing result accuracy provided they 
act in an honest way. However, as the sensing results can be significantly influenced by 
the relative locations between the PU transmitter and the SUBS as well as between the PU 
transmitter and the SUs, sometimes, the SUBS or the SUs may not be confident about the 
sensing results they have obtained. Therefore, when SUs report their sensing results to the 
SUBS and when the results are aggregated, the confidence level, µ, of each result is taken 
into account. The confidence level of the sensing result relies on a range of factors. For 
simplicity, in our subsequent experiments, we assume it to be related only to the channel 
gains between the transmitters and the sensors. Three types of sensing results can be 
obtained when trying to establish whether PU is using its allocated spectrum band: 1) the 
PU spectrum band is in active use (denoted by numeric value 1); 2) the PU spectrum band 
is not in active use (denoted by numeric value -1), and 3) the usage situation of the PU 
spectrum band is not clear or abstain from the sensing operation (denoted by numeric 
value 0). An honest SU can choose to return any one of these three types of results to the 
SUBS on the basis of its sensing algorithm output and its own confidence level on the 
result. Therefore, the aggregated sensing result for a particular PU spectrum band p can be 
calculated with the formula:  
𝑅𝑝 = 𝜃ΓBS + (1 − θ)
∑ τipΓip
M
i=1
∑ τip
M
i=1
                                           (3.17)  
where 𝑅𝑝 is the overall sensing result for PU spectrum band p; µ is the confidence level of 
the SUBS; ΓBS is the sensing result provided by the SUBS; τip is the trustworthiness of 
the ith SU in the context of PU spectrum band p; Γip is the sensing result for PU spectrum 
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band p provided by ith SU; M is the number of SU whose trustworthiness with respect to 
PU spectrum band p is above a predefined threshold of ŋ. 
In the case when the variance in trustworthiness of each SU in the context of a primary 
user p is not considered, ŋ is set to 0 and all τip are set to 1. Thus, the second term in the 
above formula becomes a simple average of all the sensing results obtained from the SUs. 
It is effectively a weighted sum of the SUBS sensing result and a majority voting from all 
the SUs who choose to participate in the distributed sensing operation. The final decision 
𝐷𝑝 is made based on the sign of 𝑅𝑝: 
𝐷𝑝 = {
−1, 𝑅𝑝 < 0
0, 𝑅𝑝 = 0
1, 𝑅𝑝 > 0
.                                                      (3.18) 
In a CRN, two types of errors in the decision to utilize the PU spectrum can occur: 1) 
when the PU spectrum band is idle but the final decision of the SUBS is not to use the 
spectrum band; and 2) when the PU spectrum band is actively used but the final decision 
of the SUBS suggests otherwise. We will refer to these two category errors as false alarm 
error, ε1, and miss detection error, ε2, respectively. The false alarm error, ε1, tends to 
reduce the efficiency of the system by reducing the system throughput while the miss 
detection error, ε2, tends to cause interference to the normal usage of the PU spectrum by 
the primary user which may result in a forced shutdown of the SUs sharing the spectrum. 
In view of these characteristics, ε2 is considered a more severe error than ε1. 
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3.8.2 Trust Aware Collaborative Spectrum Sensing Model 
As a spectrum band can only have two states: 1) occupied by a PU, or 2) vacant, the 
sensing result from each SU which chooses not be abstain can only be either right or 
wrong. The behavior of a SU can be generally divided into three categories: honest, 
neutral and dishonest. Although there can be many forms of misbehaviors in a particular 
system, their common characteristic is the tendency to deviate the final decision from the 
truth. The evaluation of the behavior of a SU in one sensing operation is in the form of [α, 
β]. For example, if a SU is regarded as having provided a right sensing result in this turn, 
a value of [1, 0] can be added to the storage of its historic behaviors. A window size N of 
past behaviors are recorded. This provides a way for the trust and reputation score of a SU 
to vary with deviations in its behaviors from the past but also dampens the rate of change 
of these scores to prevent them from being overly affected by the latest behavior. It is 
commonly acknowledged in computational trust and reputation model literatures that trust 
is a context-dependent concept. For instance, an agent who behaves honestly when 
dealing with a large and well established organization may be malicious towards an 
individual person in order to maximize its utility gain. Therefore, to better account for the 
possible dichotomy in a secondary user’s sensing behaviors towards different PU 
spectrum bands, we divide the trustworthiness score of each SU into contexts based on the 
PU’s characteristics (e.g. geographical location, general spectrum usage rate etc.). 
Therefore, a history of behaviors and the corresponding forgetting factor of each SU for 
each context is stored in the trust and reputation database. The context dependent 
trustworthiness score can be computed as: 𝜏𝑖𝑐 =
∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑐
𝑁−1−𝑗
𝛼𝑗𝑖𝑐
𝑁−1
𝑗=0
∑ 𝜌
𝑖𝑐
𝑁−1−𝑗
(𝛼𝑗𝑖𝑐+𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑗=0
, where 𝜏𝑖𝑐  is the 
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trustworthiness score of ith SU in the context c; N is the window size of store past 
behavior history; 𝜌𝑖𝑐  (0 ≤ 𝜌𝑖𝑐  ≤ 1) is the forget factor for the ith SU in the context c; αjic 
is the jth positive behavior score of ith SU in the context c; βjic is the jth negative behavior 
score of ith SU in the context c. 
Since in our system, ε2 is regarded as having more serious consequences than ε1, it is 
desirable to drastically reduce the trust and reputation score of a SU when its sensing 
result could contribute to the complaint from the PU. In our trust and reputation model, 
two techniques are employed to accomplish this goal. The first one is the adaptive forget 
factor technique. The context-dependent forget factor is adapted as: 
𝜌𝑖𝑐 = {
𝜌1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝜀2
𝜌2, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝜏𝑖𝑐 ≥ 𝜂
, where 0 ≤ (𝜌1, 𝜌2) ≤ 1  and 𝜌1 ≥ 𝜌2 . A larger 
forgetting factor translates into more weight assigned to past behaviors. So when new 
ratings come in, the past negative ratings exert more dampening effect to prevent the 
trustworthiness score to vary too much. 
However, this technique alone is not adequate in combating ε2 causing behaviours since it 
magnifies both past negative and positive behaviours. Therefore, we employ a second 
technique which assigns larger weight to negative behaviours causing ε2. In the case when 
the sensing result of a SU is considered to have caused a complaint from a PU, a record of 
[0, N] is entered into its behaviour history. This technique can dramatically reduce the 
trustworthiness of a dishonest SU when a complaint from a PUBS is received by the 
SUBS. The ε2 errors result in definitive feedbacks from the PUBS in the form of 
complaints to the SUBS. In this case, those SUs who reported that the PU spectrum band 
was idle will be subject to both the aforementioned punitive measures. However, in the 
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situation when the overall decision suggests the PU spectrum band is in active use, there 
is no definitive feedback which can be used to guide the subsequent reward and 
punishment decisions. Therefore, in these cases, our trust model adopts a conservative 
approach which assigns a unit positive rating of [1, 0] to those who agrees with the overall 
decision Dp and a unit negative rating [0, 1] to those who disagree with the overall 
decision Dp. Abstaining SUs will always get a rating of [1, 1] regardless of Dp. However, 
in the situation where Dp is 0 (i.e. not sure), no rewards or punishments will be bestowed 
on any SUs. 
The reputation of a SU which represents its overall probability of behaving honestly 
across different contexts is calculated using the proposed ACT model. 
3.8.3. Evaluating the ACT Model under Various Attack Scenarios 
In this section, we investigate the robustness and efficiency of trust management using 
computer simulations. We considered a system with 8 PU spectrum bands and a total of 
100 secondary users. The confidence level of SUBS and SU, µ, was outcomes of 
independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables (rvs) with mean 
equal to 0.5. A confidence level below 0.25 was considered to be inadequate to justify the 
sensing result which led to the reporting of a not-sure message (0 in our case). The 
trustworthiness threshold was set to η = 0.65. Only SUs with trustworthiness scores 
exceeding this threshold have their sensing results used by the SUBS in the decision 
making process. The forgetting factors was set to ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0.9. Each experiment 
consisted of 10,000 iterations for each PU spectrum band.  
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To investigate the effectiveness of trust management against various attacks, we 
introduced a performance evaluation metric, TUL, to describe the total system utility loss 
due to the attacks. The TUL can be expressed as:  
𝑇𝑈𝐿 = 𝑊1𝜀1 + 𝑊2𝜀2                                                    (3.19) 
where W1 and W2 denote the weight factors for false alarm error rate and miss detection 
error rate respectively. In the proposed CRN, since a misdetection is regarded as more 
damaging to the system than false alarm, W2 is assigned a larger value than W1 in the 
following simulations. We denote the attack rate by σ. To show that trust management is 
robust and efficient, we consider a number of attack scenarios. 
A. Fabrication Attack 
In the fabrication attack, a malicious SU deliberately reports inverted sensing results to 
Figure 17. Total utility loss, TUL, of CRN under the fabrication attack. 
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SUBS all the time. This kind of misbehavior aims to cause deterioration to the overall 
performance of the network since it will either prevent other secondary users from 
accessing network resources or introduce excessive interference to PU spectrum bands.  
Figure 17 shows the total utility loss under the fabrication attack. As σ increases above 
40%, trust management can reduce the total utility loss significantly. Without trust 
management, the decision depends on the majority vote from the SUs. If the majority of 
the SUs present fabricated sensing results, the probability of miss detection error increases 
with increasing PU spectrum usage rate. Thus, when the PUs are using their designated 
spectrum bands more actively, the fabrication attack will cause more miss detection errors 
in the long run which, in turn, result in dramatic increases in the TUL. The simulation 
results with σ < 40% are not presented here since both CRN with and without trust 
management can handle this case well. The cumulative rates of false alarm error and 
misdetection error with the fabrication attack are shown in Figure 18. It can be seen that 
as the number of iterations increases, both false alarm rate and miss detection rate increase 
if trust management is not used. However, with trust management in place, both 
cumulative rates remain close to 0. It can be concluded that the trust management model 
is robust under the fabrication attack.  
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B. On-off Attack 
Figure 19. Cumulative false alarm rate, ε1, and misdetection rate, ε2, with the fabrication 
attack rate, σ =50% for PU band usage rate at 45%. 
Figure 18. Total utility loss, TUL, of the CRN under the on-off attack. 
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The on-off attack refers to malicious SUs behaving honestly or dishonestly alternatively 
to avoid punishments while sending wrong sensing results on purpose. Unlike the 
fabrication attack in which the behaviors of the attackers are static, the on-off attack 
follows a dynamic pattern which makes the misbehaviors harder to detect. 
Figure 19 shows the TUL as a function of PU band usage under high rate of the on-off 
attack. The results with an attack rate of below 40% are not shown since the TUL in these 
cases approaches 0. It can be seen that trust management reduces TUL greatly under 
heavy on-off attacks. However, we notice that at σ = 40% the TUL with trust management 
is slightly higher than the one without trust management. Figure 20 shows that both false 
alarm and miss detection rates with trust management are higher than without trust 
management. This is because, without trust management, when the confidence level of 
SUBS for the sensing result falls below the threshold which is set at 0.25 and if there is 40% 
on-off attack rate, i.e. SUs who behave well with probability of 0.6, the majority voting in 
this situation is more likely to help the SUBS make a correct sensing decision. But with 
trust management, after filtering out most of the on-off attackers, the sensing result just 
depends on the SUBS and those whose trustworthiness scores are higher than η which is 
set at 0.65, that is, SUBS has a higher probability to make a false alarm or miss detection 
error decision. This situation happens only when (1 − 𝜎) ≈ 𝜂. 
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C. Denial of Service Attack 
The denial of service attack prevents SUs from utilizing the PU spectrum band. The 
attackers generate sensing results that will mislead the SUBS to make a false alarm error. 
This means the SUs will lose the opportunity to utilize the PU spectrum band which is 
actually not occupied by primary users. If the attacks are successfully conducted, the 
system performance will degrade sharply. 
Figure 20. Cumulative false alarm rate, ε1, and misdetection rate, ε2, with the on-off attack 
rate, σ =50% for PU band usage rate at 45%. 
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Figure 21 shows the total utility loss under the denial of service attack. The TUL results 
with an attack rate below 40% are not presented because they are close to 0. It can be seen 
that trust management generally works well under this kind of attack. However, it can be 
seen that, when the attack rate is 100% and PU band usage is low, the TUL of trust 
management is higher than the one without trust management. Since with a population 
consisting entirely of denial of service attackers, the sensing decisions of SUBS depend 
solely on its own sensing results while the PU band usage rate is below η. Since there is 
no misdetection error under this kind of attack, the false alarm error rate is close to the 
SUBS confidence level threshold which is predefined.  
D. Resource Hungry Attack 
In resource hungry attacks, malicious SUs always report to SUBS that the PU spectrum 
band is not in use. By doing so, they hope that the SUBS will make a miss detection error 
Figure 21. Total utility loss, TUL, of CRN under the denial of service attack. 
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and consequently allocate resources to them. This kind of misbehavior, if successful, will 
introduce undue interference to the PU using the same spectrum band. This could lead to 
serious consequences such as the SUBS being shut down for a certain period of time 
which will impair the whole system significantly. 
Figure 22 shows total utility loss, TUL, under the resource hungry attack. The results of 
TUL with the attack rate below 40% are not presented because they are close to 0. It can 
be seen that trust management significantly reduces the TUL compared to the one without 
trust management. Without trust management, TUL increases as PU band usage rate 
increases since more misdetection error occur and this will cause a large utility loss since 
the misdetection error is regarded as a serious offense in this CRN.  
Figure 22. Total utility loss, TUL, of CRN under the resource hungry attack. 
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3.9. Summary 
Biased third-party testimonies can distort the interaction decisions made by agents relying 
on trust models and cause havoc in an open MAS. In this chapter, we proposed a 
reinforcement learning based testimony aggregation model – the ACT model to address 
this problem. We go beyond the state of the art by providing an adaptive method for a 
truster agent to fine tune important parameters such as the selection of witness agents, the 
weight given to each of their testimonies as well as the weights given to the collective 
recommendation based on third-party testimonies and the direct trust evidence. By 
eliminating the need for human operators to help the agent fine tune these parameters, the 
ACT model enables truster agents to operate with more autonomy and adaptability when 
facing risk and uncertainty in an MAS. The ACT model is verified with extensive 
simulations under general multi-agent interactions as well as in the application domain of 
cognitive radio networks. The performance of the proposed model is upheld under various 
attack scenarios. In the next chapter, we will take a new perspective toward trust-aware 
interaction decision-making by removing one of the most widely used implicit 
assumptions in existing trust models. 
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Chapter 4  
The Multi-agent Trust Game – A 
Preliminary 
 
In Chapter 3, we have analyzed how the trust evaluation produced by a truster may be 
influenced by the behavior of other trusters in an MAS, and the proposed ACT model to 
address these problems. However, even with accurate trust information, trusters face an 
additional challenge. How should a truster delegate tasks to trustees given their reputation 
in such a way which not only maximizes its long term utility, but also does not negatively 
affect other trusters in the MAS?  In this chapter, we formalize the trust-aware task 
delegation problem in MASs with resource constrained trustee agents into a trust game 
similar in spirit to the Congestion Game. We then analyze the unintended negative 
consequences produced by existing approaches in this environment. This chapter defines 
an important problem few researchers in this area have realized. Solutions for this 
problem will be proposed in Chapter 5 to 7. 
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4.1. The Unintended Consequence of Self-interested Trust-aware 
Decision-making  
From Chapters 1 to 3, it is obvious that the most widely accepted method of studying the 
topic of trust management in MASs is through simulations which emulate the conditions 
of the target environments. Existing works often take an individual truster agent’s 
perspective when evaluating the effectiveness of their proposed trust models. This gives 
rise to a variety of individual-performance-centric evaluation metrics. Two of the most 
widely adopted such metrics are the average accuracy rate of the estimated 
trustworthiness [Falcone et al., 2004; Teacy et al., 2005; Weng et al., 2006; Reece et al., 
2007; Hang et al., 2009; Matt et al., 2010; Vogiatzis et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Liu and 
Datta, 2011; Jiang et al., 2012; Koster et al., 2012; Piunti et al., 2012] and the average 
utility achieved by individual truster agents [Dash et al., 2004; Tran and Cohen, 2004; 
Huynh et al., 2005; Zheng et al., 2006; Fullam and Barber, 2007; Reches et al., 2008; 
Teacy et al., 2008; Kerr and Cohen, 2009; Liu et al., 2010; Burnett et al., 2010; Burnett et 
al., 2011; Burnett and Oren, 2012; Haghpanah and desJardins, 2012].  
To achieve high individual welfare, most existing trust models adopt a greedy decision-
making approach after evaluating the reputations of trustee agents – a truster agent should 
interact with the most trustworthy trustee agent known to it as often as possible. This 
doctrine is consistent with the assumption that, in an open MAS, individual agents are 
self-interested and do not have a common goal to work towards. Although several types of 
methods for exploration for potentially better alternative trustee agents have been 
proposed [Weng et al., 2010; Wierzbicki and Nielek, 2011], in general, this doctrine is 
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upheld in these methods. Thus, the behavior exhibited by truster agents using most 
existing trust models to make interaction decisions tend to be - to concentrate most of 
their interactions with a few known trustworthy trustee agents. 
In many existing trust models, such a general approach seems to yield good performance 
results. In order for this to happen, one implicit assumption is made by existing studies:  
[The Unlimited Processing Capacity (UPC) Assumption]: trustee agents have 
unlimited request processing capacities compared to the number of incoming requests 
from truster agents at each time step.  
In MASs entirely consisting of software agents offering digital services, such an 
assumption is generally valid. Thus, from the perspective of a trustee agent, the more 
business it can attract from truster agents, the better off it will become. However, in 
MASs where the services being exchanged are performed by human beings and involving 
physical processes (e.g., e-commerce systems, crowdsourcing systems, etc.) which can be 
referred to as human-agent collectives, such an assumption stops being valid. 
Evidence-based trust models depend on the feedback provided by truster agents in order 
to function. Such feedbacks are often regarded as a way to reflect the subjective belief in 
the quality of the result received by the truster agent from an interaction with a trustee 
agent. The quality of an interaction is judged by the commonly used quality-of-service 
(QoS) metrics suitable for the context of the interaction. It is often made up of two main 
aspects 1) metrics related to the correctness of the interaction results, and 2) timeliness of 
completion of the interaction. For example, when a truster agent a wants to send a 
message to another agent using the messaging service provided by trustee agent b, only if 
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the message is successfully received by the recipient agent within the expected time will a 
consider the interaction with b to be successful. 
Under the UPC assumption, the satisfaction of the correctness and timeliness 
requirements depends only on the intrinsic characteristics of trustee agents. The collective 
choice of interaction partners made by a population of truster agents has no effect on the 
observed performance of the trustee agents. However, when the UPC assumption is 
removed (i.e., trustee agents have limited process capacities for incoming requests), the 
timeliness aspect starts to be influenced by two factors 1) the process capacity (or effort 
level) of the trustee agent which is innate to the trustee agent, and 2) the current workload 
of the trustee agent which is exogenous to the trustee agent. In this situation, the trustee 
agent receiving a good feedback not only depends on its own trustworthiness, but also 
depends on the collective interaction decisions made by the truster agents. Here, we 
assume that truster agents do not purposely distort their feedbacks. 
Interaction outcome evaluation is simple with the UPC assumption. Since results can 
always be assumed to be received on time, a truster agent just needs to produce a rating 
based on the correctness of the results. Such a rating can be binary (i.e., success/failure) 
[Jøsang and Ismail, 2002] or multi-nominal (i.e., on a scale of 1 to n) [Jøsang and Haller, 
2007]. Nevertheless, existing literatures are generally vague about how a rating based on a 
received interaction result and a truster’s own preferences can be derived. This is mainly 
because of the difficulty of designing a generic model to judge the correctness of a 
received result relative as this may be manifested in different ways for different domains 
of application. For example, in an e-commerce system, receiving a parcel containing the 
purchased item with expected quality may be consider a successful interaction result 
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while, in a crowdsourcing system, receiving a file containing a piece of properly 
transcribed audio may be considered a successful interaction result. These ratings can be 
relatively easily produced by human beings, but are difficult for software agents to 
determine. 
With the removal of the UPC assumption, the timeliness aspect of an interaction result 
needs to be explicitly taken into account when evaluating the outcome of that interaction. 
Keeping track of the completion time v.s. deadlines of a large number of interactions is a 
task that is more tractable for a software agent to perform and help lighten the cognitive 
load for its user. In this situation, the rating produced by the user based on the quality of 
the interaction result needs to be discounted by the timeliness of its reception in order to 
derive a feedback for future evaluation of the trustee agent’s reputation. 
Intuitively, if no result is received when the predetermined hard deadline has passed, the 
interaction should be rated as a failure. For example, agent a depends on agent b to 
provide it with a component in order to build a product and deliver to agent c by a certain 
date t, and a needs at least n days to assemble the product once the component from b is 
received. If b fails to make the delivery by day (t – n), there is no way for a to serve c on 
time. In this case, a will consider its interaction with b as a failure regardless of whether b 
delivers the component on the next day. In this case, the timeliness discount factor can be 
a binary function as: 
𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑) = {
1, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 ≤ 𝑇𝑑𝑙
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                  (4.1) 
where 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑  is the time at which the interaction ended and its result is received by the 
truster agent, and 𝑇𝑑𝑙 is the stipulated deadline. 
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To distinguish the performance of different trustees further, the timeliness discount factor 
can be made into a smoother function with respect to the difference between 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 and 𝑇𝑑𝑙. 
The closer 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 is to the time the interaction started (𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡), the closer 𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑) should 
be to 1; the closer 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑 is to 𝑇𝑑𝑙, the closer 𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑) should be to 0. A simple example of 
such a function may be 
𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑) = 1 −
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑−𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑇𝑑𝑙−𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
.                                                (4.2) 
Incorporating the concept of timeliness discount into one of the most widely used trust 
evaluation models – the BRS [Jøsang and Ismail, 2002] by as: 
𝜏𝑖,𝑗 =
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 
𝛼 = ∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝑁𝑝
𝑘=1
+ 1, 𝛽 = ∑ 𝑛𝑘
𝑁𝑝
𝑘=1
+ 1 
𝑝𝑘 = {
𝑝𝑘,                                𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑘 ) > 0
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑘 = 1,   𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑘 ) = 0
 
(4.3) 
where 𝜏𝑖,𝑗  is the trustworthiness evaluation of trustee agent j from the perspective of 
truster agent i, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑘 is the completion time of the kth interaction between i and j, 𝑝𝑘 equals 
to 1 if the kth interaction is successful and 0 otherwise. Here, we use Equation (4.1) as to 
calculate the timeliness discount. This extended version of BRS is referred to as BRS2012. 
Although not explicitly designed to cope with the removal of the UPC assumption, 
existing trust models can operate under the revised condition. To understand the dynamics 
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of existing trust models when the UPC assumption is removed, we design a simple 
experiment as follows. A simulated MAS consists of 200 trustee agents and 1,000 truster 
agents. At each time step of the simulation, a truster agent needs to engage the service of a 
trustee agent in order to achieve its goal. Truster agents employs a variation of BRS2012 
in which for a randomized 15% of the time, a truster agent will explore for potentially 
better alternative trustee agents by randomly selecting a trustee agent for interaction. The 
rest of the time, the truster agent always selects the known trustee agent with the highest 
trustworthiness value for interaction. The trustee agent population consists of 50% of 
agents who produce correct results 90% (Hon) of the time on average and 50% of agents 
who produce results 10% (Mal) of the time on average. Throughout the simulation, the 
behavior patterns of the trustee agent do not change. A trustee agent can serve at most 10 
interaction requests in its request queue. A uniform deadline of 3 time steps is used for all 
interaction requests. Each simulation is run for 500 time steps and the reputation of each 
trustee agent (i.e., the average trustworthiness evaluation calculated from the local trust 
evidence of all truster agents who has interaction experience with that trustee agent) are 
recorded at each time step. 
If the trustee agents are aware of the deadline requirements of the requests when the 
requests are accepted, they can periodically clean up their request queues to get rid of the 
pending requests whose deadlines have passed and inform the requesting truster agents of 
this decision. We call this operation clean sweep. Assuming the clean sweep operation is 
not used (i.e., the trustee agents keeps working on requests in their queues regardless of 
whether their deadlines have passed), the changes of five agents belonging to the Hon 
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group of trustee agents are shown in Figure 23. The changes in trustee agents’ reputation 
values as evaluated by BRS2012 are as follows: 
1) Reputation Building Phase: During this phase, the agent’s (for example Agent 2’s) 
reputation starts from a low or neutral level. At this stage, not many truster agents 
want to interact with this Agent 2. However, due to random exploration by some 
truster agents, Agent 2 can get some requests. Since its reputation is relatively low 
compared to those of other trustee agents, the workload of Agent 2 is likely to be 
within a level which it can easily handle. Since Agent 2 belongs to the Hon group of 
trustee agents, the quality of its service is high on average. Gradually, its reputation is 
built up due to the positive feedbacks received from satisfied truster agents. 
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2) Reputation Damage Phase: As Agent 2 builds up its reputation, it is known to an 
increasing number of truster agents. More truster agents start to request its services. 
Gradually, the workload of Agent 2 increases past its processing capacity which 
results in longer delays for some requests. As more requests fail to be served within 
Figure 24. Changes in reputation values of five trustee agents from the Hon group under 
BRS2012 without clean sweep. 
Figure 23. Changes in reputation values of five trustee agents from the Hon group under 
BRS2012 with clean sweep. 
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their stipulated deadlines, negative feedbacks from disgruntled truster agents start to 
damage Agent 2’s reputation. 
From Figure 23, it can be seen that the reputation values of the trustee agents alternate 
between these two phases. Their reputation values fluctuate around an average of 0.5272 
which is 41.42% lower than their actual trustworthiness which is 0.9.  
Figure 24 shows the changes in trustee agents’ reputation values, as evaluated by 
BRS2012, with the use of clean sweep operations by the trustee agents. The two phases 
can still be observed although the lengths of their cycles have become visibly shorter than 
in the case of no clean sweep operation. This is due to the fact that once a clean sweep 
operation is performed, the truster agents are informed of the fact that their requests 
cannot be served by the trustee agents. Therefore, their negative feedbacks can be issued 
more quickly than in the case of no clean sweep operation and have an impact on the 
trustee agents’ reputation values. From Figure 23, it can be seen that the reputation values 
of the trustee agents alternate between these two phases. Their reputation values fluctuate 
around an average of 0.4298 which is 52.25% lower than their actual trustworthiness 
which is 0.9. 
However, such a drastic deviation from the ground truth is not due to the fault of the 
trustee agents. On the contrary, they are victims of their own success. The greedy 
approach employed by truster agents when using the reputation evaluations to guide their 
interaction decisions with the aim of maximizing their own chances of success has caused 
the reputation evaluation to reflect not only the behavior pattern of the trustee agents, but 
also the impact of the collective interaction decisions made by the truster agents. Since the 
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interaction decision-making mechanism employed by existing trust models have not taken 
this factor into account, this phenomenon results in instability in the MAS and negatively 
affects the wellbeing of trustee agents and truster agents. In this dissertation, we refer to 
this phenomenon Reputation Damage Problem (RDP). 
Among the factors affecting the perceived trustworthiness of a trustee agent, the 
timeliness of task completion is one that is affected both by the ability and willingness of 
the trustee agent as well as the task delegation decisions made by the truster agents. If the 
RDP is not mitigated, the resulting reputation values will not fully reflect the behavior of 
the trustee agent, and become biased with the influence of the environment in which the 
trustee agent operates. In this case, the reputation value will lose its fairness and become 
less useful in guiding the decision making process of truster agents in subsequent 
interactions.  
4.2. Multi-agent Trust as a Congestion Game 
Congestion games are a type of games where the payoff for each player depends on the 
resources it selects and the number of players selecting the same resources. For example, 
commuting to work can be modeled as a congestion game where the time taken by an 
agent from its home to its workplace depends on how many other agents are taking the 
same public transport it chooses on each day. In a Discrete Congestion Game (DCG) 
[Monderer and Shapley, 1996], the following components are present: 
 A base set of congestible resources 𝑬; 
 n players; 
 A finite set of strategies 𝑺𝒊 for each player where a strategy 𝑃 ∈ 𝑺𝒊 is a subset of 𝑬; 
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 For each resource e and a vector of strategies (𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑛), a load 𝑥𝑒 is placed on e; 
 For each resource e, a delay function 𝑑𝑒 maps the number of players choosing e to a 
delay represented by a real number; 
 Given a strategy 𝑃1, player i experiences a delay of ∑ 𝑑𝑒(𝑥𝑒)𝑒∈𝑃𝑖 , assuming that each 
𝑑𝑒 is positive and monotonically increasing. 
The root cause of the RDP is similar to the situation described in the DCG. The 
performance perceived by a truster agent delegating tasks to a reputable trustee agent it 
has found is partially dependent on how many other truster agents are making the same 
choice as it is at the same time. A key difference in our case is that the perceived 
performance also depends on the behavior of the trustee agent which is uncertain in an 
open MAS. In order to give the RDP a concrete theoretical grounding, we formalize it as a 
special type of DCG where trustee agents (resources) may behave maliciously. We call 
this formalization the Multi-agent Trust Game (MTG). 
[Definition 4.1 (Multi-agent Trust Game)]: A multi-agent trust game is specified by an 
ordered quadruple 𝓆 = (𝑬, ℓ⃗ , 𝑪𝒏(𝑡), 𝑽(𝑡)) where 
 𝑬 is a finite set of trustee agents with limited task processing capacity per unit time; 
 ℓ⃗  is a vector of latency functions expressing the delay experienced by truster agents 
selecting the set of trustee agents for task delegation. The e-th component of ℓ⃗  is 
denoted as ℓ𝑒. It is a non-decreasing function mapping from ℝ
+ to ℝ+; 
 𝑪𝒏(𝑡) is the set of possible connections between a finite set of truster agents W and 
trustee agents in 𝑬 in the MAS when delegating their tasks to trustee agents in 𝑬 at 
time step t. The connections depend on what types of tasks each truster agent wants to 
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delegate to each trustee agent and the qualifications of the trustee agents to perform 
these tasks. For example, truster agent A may want to find a trustee agents who sells 
apples at time step t. A subset of trustee agents 𝑪′(𝑡) are qualified for this task. At 
time step t+1, A is looking to buy computers. Therefore, a different subset of trustee 
agents 𝑪′′(𝑡 + 1) are qualified for this task. The difference between the set of possible 
connections between truster agents and trustee agents can also be caused by agents 
dynamically joining or leaving an MAS; 
 𝑽(𝑡) is the set of functions for calculating the potential cost for truster agents who 
choose to delegate tasks to the same trustee agent at time step t. 
[Definition 4.2 (Task Delegation Flow)]: A task delegation flow in the MTG is a function 
f mapping from 𝑪𝒏(𝑡) to ℝ+. It can be regarded as the amount of workload assigned to a 
trustee agent.  
[Definition 4.3 (Task Delegation Cost)]: The load on a trustee agent 𝑒 ∈ 𝑬 is 
𝑥𝑒(𝑓) = ∑ 𝑓(𝑐(𝑡))𝑐(𝑡)∈𝑪(𝑡)|𝑒∈𝑐(𝑡) .                                             (4.4) 
The delay on a connection 𝑐(𝑡) ∈ 𝑪(𝑡) is 
𝐿(𝑐(𝑡)) = ∑ ℓ𝑒𝑒∈𝑐(𝑡) (𝑥𝑒(𝑓)).                                               (4.5) 
The cost of a task delegation is 
𝑣(𝑓) = ∑
𝑓(𝑐(𝑡))𝐿(𝑐(𝑡))
𝜏𝑒(𝑡)
𝑐(𝑡)∈𝑪(𝑡) = ∑
𝑥𝑒(𝑓)ℓ𝑒(𝑥𝑒(𝑓))
𝜏𝑒(𝑡)
𝑒∈𝑬                             (4.6) 
where 𝜏𝑒(𝑡) is the reputation of trustee agent e in performing a given type of tasks as 
assessed at time step t. 
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4.3. Summary 
In this chapter, we analyzed the adverse effect of the reputation damage problem that, left 
to chance, can happen under the greedy trust-aware interaction decision-making approach 
which is widely adopted by existing trust models in MAS. We propose a modified version 
of the BRS – the BRS2012 to explicitly take into account the timeliness of completion of 
a task delegated to a trustee agent. Under such an evaluation model, the reputation values 
of trustee agents who are programmed to be trustworthy fluctuate significantly during the 
course of interaction in a simulated MAS. We further propose a formalization of trust-
aware interaction decision-making problem into a multi-agent trust game based on the 
concept of discrete congestion games. In the Chapters 5 to 7, we will investigate possible 
approaches that can provide solutions to this type of games and help agents in MASs 
make better trust decisions. Two different approaches will be taken to address the RDP: 1) 
through coordinating how truster agents make decisions (Chapter 5 and 6), and 2) through 
helping trustee agents to decide how to respond to uncoordinated truster agent decisions 
(Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 5  
SWORD: A Centralized Decision Approach for 
Social Sustainability in Multi-Agent Systems 
 
 
In Chapter 4, the problem of delegating tasks to trustees with capacity constraints in 
practical applications has been formulated into a multi-agent trust game based on the 
congestion game. It provides a framework under which trust-aware task allocation can be 
analyzed in a principled way to derive appropriate solutions. In this chapter, we aim to 
propose a task trust-aware task allocation approach – SWORD - to be used by a central 
trusted entity in an MAS. The objective is to compute a decision policy in real time to 
maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the MAS over potentially infinite 
horizon of interactions. We demonstrate that the SWORD approach balances the 
consideration of multiple, and potentially conflicting objectives in a situation-aware 
manner, and is capable of producing results in polynomial time. Through theoretical 
analysis, we prove the existence of various performance bounds that make SWORD a 
boundedly-optimal approach. 
5.1. System Model and Problem Definition 
In order to address the RDP defined in Chapter 4, we first enrich the system model used 
by existing trust research to expressly include the timeliness consideration and remove the 
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UPC assumption. From the perspective of trust management, an MAS consists of a set of 
truster agents R requesting for services from a set of trustee agents W who work on these 
requests. For simplicity, in the following parts of this section, we will refer to truster 
agents as requesters and trustee agents as workers. A requester 𝑟 ∈ 𝑹 may need to request 
more than one services at each time step. These services can be of the same type (e.g., 5 
book chapters requiring proof reading) or different types (e.g., 2 book chapters requiring 
proof reading and 2 videos requiring transcription). These tasks are represented by a task 
group 𝑯(𝑡) = (ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑁)  proposed at time t. The requester will look for suitable 
workers to complete these tasks based on their reputations. As the time and skills of a 
worker 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 are limited, each worker can only complete up to a maximum of 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) 
tasks per time step without sacrificing quality. We assume 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)  is an innate 
characteristic of w and will not vary significantly from time to time. Once r receives the 
results, he can review whether they are up to the required standard.  
The outcome of an interaction is denoted as 𝑂𝑤
𝑟 (𝑡). It reflects the performance of w from 
the perspective of requesters r receiving the results at time step t and is assumed to be a 
binary value [0, 1]. If 𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑡) = 1 and 𝑂𝑤
𝑟 (𝑡) = 1, r will give w a positive feedback rating; 
otherwise, r will give w a negative feedback rating. A series of such ratings reported by 
various requesters can be converted into an evaluation of w’s reputation 𝜏𝑤(𝑡) using a 
trust evaluation model. There are many different trust evaluation models have been 
proposed [Noorian and Ulieru, 2010], but they are not the focus of our study here.  
Let 𝑨(𝑡) = (𝐴𝑤(𝑡)), 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 be a vector of decision variables representing the number of 
tasks assigned to the workers in an MAS at time step t, and let 𝝁(𝑡) = (𝜇𝑤(𝑡)), 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 be 
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a vector representing the number of tasks the workers in an MAS completed at time step t. 
The values 𝐴𝑤(𝑡)  and 𝜇𝑤(𝑡)  are non-negative integers for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 . For each task 
allocated to a worker w by a requester r, a utility cost 𝑐ℎ(𝑡) is incurred by r. In this study, 
we assume this cost to be a constant value c for all tasks of the same type. If the task is 
completed on time and considered to be of acceptable quality by the requester r, a utility 
reward is derived by r. In this study, we assume this utility is the same for all tasks of the 
same type and represented by 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥; otherwise, 0 reward is derived. 
Assuming each task requires one time step to complete. At each time step t, a worker w 
may complete 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) HITs according to the following constraints: 
𝜇𝑤(𝑡) ∈ {0,… , 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)} for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾                                         (5.1) 
𝜇𝑤(𝑡) ≤ 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾                                         (5.2) 
where 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) is a variable representing the total number of pending tasks in a worker w’s 
task queue at any time step t. Constraint (5.1) ensures that only an integer number of no 
more than 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) tasks can be completed by a worker w at any time step. Although the 
value of 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) may change over time, it is generally assumed to be remaining relatively 
stable over time. Constraint (5.2) requires that the number of HITs completed be less than 
or equal to the current number of tasks in w’s task queue. 
The objective of our study is to design a Trust-aware Interaction Decision-making (TID) 
approach that maximizes the social welfare for a given MAS which is defined as the sum 
of utility gain from all requesters minus the sum of the cost of allocation tasks to workers: 
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𝑈(𝑡) ≜ ∑ [𝑔(𝑡)𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑐𝐴𝑤(𝑡)]
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
 
𝑔(𝑡) = {
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑡𝑑(𝑡) = 1 and 𝑂𝑤
𝑟 (𝑡) = 1
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
.                                 (5.3) 
Since an MAS may exist for an unknown period of time, the time averaged social welfare 
is a better gauge into the performance of a TID approach: 
𝑈 ≜ 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑇→∞
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑈(𝑡)𝑇−1𝑡=0 .                                                   (5.4) 
5.2. Similarities and Differences with the Constraint Optimization 
Problem 
A Constraint Optimization Problem (COP) is usually defined as follows: 
 It consists a set of n variables 𝑉𝑎𝑟 = {𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛}; 
 Each of the variables may be assigned values from discrete and finite domains 
𝐷𝑜𝑚 = {𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑛}; 
 A set of cost functions 𝑓 = {𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑚} where each 𝑓𝑖(𝑑𝑖,1, … , 𝑑𝑖,𝑗) is 𝑓𝑖: 𝐷𝑖,1 × …×
𝐷𝑖,𝑗 → 𝑁. 
The problem is to find an assignment of values to the variables 𝐴∗ = {𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑛|𝑑𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝑖} 
which minimizes the global cost F, which is defined as: 
𝐹(𝐴) = ∑ 𝑓𝑖(𝐴)
𝑚
𝑖=1 .                                                         (5.5) 
The objective of our study is set in the same framework as COP. The set of variables, in 
our case, is the new task requests to be assigned to each worker at every time step. Instead 
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of minimizing a global cost function, we aim to maximize a global reward function with 
the cost of operation being infused in it – the social welfare of an MAS. The 
computational complexity of COP has been shown to be above NP-Hard. Nevertheless, 
there are several features in our proposed system model that make the problem even more 
challenging than COP. 
Firstly, it is generally assumed by COP solutions that agents in an MAS are working 
towards a common goal which is expressed by the objective function. Thus, most 
solutions to multi-agent COP assumes that a logical neighbourhood among agents exists 
and agents are willing and able to communicate with their neighbours in order to achieve 
their common goal [Mailler and Lesser, 2004]. This is true for cooperative MASs. 
However, in open and dynamically formed MASs which are the focus of study of the trust 
management field, competition rather than cooperation is assumed to be the main 
relationship among workers and among requesters. Without adequate incentives, self-
interested agents from diverse backgrounds who are not working towards a common goal 
of maximizing the social welfare of an MAS cannot be assumed to be willing to expend 
their own resources to communicate with each other. 
Secondly, some variants of the COP (e.g., Synchronous Branch and Bound (SBB) and 
Iterative Distributed Breakout (IDB) [Hirayama and Yokoo, 1997]) require that an agent 
may be able to know the value assigned to variables by other agents (a.k.a. inter-agent 
constraints). Again, in the case of an open dynamic MAS where agents are self-interested 
and competing with each other to maximize their own utility, such information cannot be 
assumed to be available. 
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Thirdly, some variants of the COP [Dantzig and Thapa, 2003] assume the probability of 
variations in agents’ characteristics to be known. This is not the case in our system model. 
The reputation of a worker depends on both its own characteristics and the collective 
interaction decisions made by requesters at each time step. Thus, it does not have a clearly 
defined probability distribution. The dynamics of the change in a worker’s workload 
depends on its reputation. Therefore, it, too, does not have a clearly defined probability 
distribution. 
These unique features in our system model pose new challenges to COP. It requires an 
approach that can translate the objective function in (5.4) into an expression that can be 
directly related to the strategy for request distribution that resolves the conflict between 
individual agents’ self-interest and the social welfare of the entire MAS. As clearly 
defined probability distributions for key metrics in our system model are not available, the 
solution approach must be adjusted based on observed performance feedbacks from 
previously iterations. In the following sections, we first propose a centralized reputation-
aware decision-making approach based on the theory of Lyapunov Drift. Then, in Chapter 
6, we further refined this approach to enable it to operate in a distributed fashion. 
5.3. The SWORD Approach 
To achieve the objective of maximizing social welfare in a trust-aware MAS, we first 
analyze what considerations constitute a good request distribution plan. Since social 
welfare is defined as the summation of the welfare of individual agents in an MAS, 
intuitively, a good request distribution plan should satisfy the following two properties: 
 Maximizing the average correctness of the interaction results; and 
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 Maximizing the total number of requests a given MAS can complete per time step. 
Ideally, if the worker population in a given MAS entirely consists of highly trustworthy 
workers and each of them are able to process a large number of request at each time step, 
both properties can be satisfied in the long run by randomizing allocation of requests to 
workers. However, in practical systems, these two properties are often in conflict with 
each other.  
Since highly trustworthy workers may only be a minority, a request assignment approach 
should achieve a balance between these two properties in order to maximize the social 
welfare of an MAS. We hypothesize that such balance can be achieved through satisfying 
the following two requirements: 
 Just Fairness: where more trustworthy workers should receive more requests than less 
trustworthy workers over the long run; and 
 Distributive Fairness: where workers whose reputation values are close to each other 
should receive similar number of requests over the long run. 
Just fairness affects the quality of the results received which while distributive fairness 
affects total number of requests a given MAS can complete per time step. Essentially, the 
adverse effect of the RDP needs to be mediated in order to improve social welfare over 
existing trust management models. 
The root cause of the RDP is congestion of requests at a small number of reputable 
workers. A solution to such a problem could be an algorithm for choosing control actions 
over time in reaction to the existing state each worker is in. The state consists of both the 
innate characteristics of the worker as well as the exogenous factors. In our study, the 
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state of worker is represented by the 3-tuple 𝑆𝑤(𝑡) = {𝜏𝑤(𝑡), 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡), 𝑄𝑤(𝑡)}. Inefficient 
control actions incur larger backlog in some workers’ task queues. These backlogs can act 
as sufficient statistic on which to base the next control decision. This makes it possible to 
optimize the objective function in (7) without knowledge of the probability associated 
with changes in 𝑆𝑤(𝑡). 
5.3.1. The Theory of Lyapunov Drift 
The theory of Lyapunov Drift [Neely, 2010] provides a way to measure the backlog in a 
population of agents. It defines a function 𝐿(𝑡) as the sum of squares of backlog in all 
queues in time step t. This is called a Lyapunov function and is a scalar measure of the 
level of congestion. If 𝐿(𝑡) is small, then all queues are short; and if 𝐿(𝑡) is large, then at 
least one queue is long. Use ∆(𝑡) = 𝐿(𝑡 + 1) − 𝐿(𝑡) to represent the difference between 
the Lyapunov function from one time step to the next. If control decisions are made to 
greedily minimize ∆(𝑡), then the backlogs of the queues are consistently pushed towards 
lower levels of congestion. Intuitively, this helps improve the distributive fairness among 
workers with similar level of trustworthiness. 
Minimizing the Lyapunov drift is only helpful in increasing the total number of requests 
that can be completed per time step for a given MAS by more efficiently utilizing the 
workers’ capacities. The requirement for the average quality of the interaction results still 
need to be incorporated. The objective function can be mapped to an appropriate reward 
function 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑡) . Instead of greedily minimize only the Lyapunov drift, control 
actions are taken at every time step t to greedily minimize the following drift-minus-
reward expression: 
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𝑎 × ∆(𝑡) − 𝑏 × 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑡)                                                   (5.6) 
where a and b are positive constant values representing the relative importance given to 
the two components of this expression. Maximizing the negative of ∆(𝑡) is equivalent to 
minimizing ∆(𝑡). Since both a and b are positive constant values, the expression can be 
further simplified by dividing it with b. It then becomes: 
∆(𝑡) − 𝑉 × 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑡).                                                    (5.7) 
Then, 𝑉 ∈ 𝑅+  is the only control parameter that needs to be chosen by the system 
administrator for the MAS. If 𝑉 = 0, then only the Lyapunov drift is minimized. If 𝑉 > 0, 
then the weighted reward term is included into the control actions to arrive at a smooth 
trade-off between queue backlog reduction and utility maximization. To the best of our 
knowledge, this research is the first introduction of this form of Lyapunov Drift to 
enhance social welfare in open and non-cooperative MASs. 
5.3.2. Making Situation-aware Trusting Decisions 
In this chapter, we reframe the objective function in (5.4) based on the principle of 
Lyapunov Drift and propose simple Social Welfare Optimizing approach for Reputation-
aware Decision-making (SWORD). The SWORD approach will be part of the 
administration system in an MAS (e.g., the transaction management system in an e-
commerce platform) to act as a broker between requesters and workers. By being a 
centralized approach, its domain of application may be limited. However, with the 
advance of cloud computing, scalability and resource constraints have become less critical 
issues for centralized modes of operation. In many large scale systems deploying 
reputation management in real world applications (e.g., eBay.com, Taobao.com, 
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tripadvisor.com, etc.), feedbacks and ratings from users are stored in a centralized manner 
by the system rather than in a distributed manner by individual users. For this type of 
systems, a centralized approach like SWORD is useful. Therefore, it is assumed that the 
proposed approach is able to access the state information about workers regarding their 
past performance in terms of serving requests, the statistical information about the 
maximum number of requests they can process per time step, and the number of requests 
currently pending in their request queues.  
Since SWORD is mainly concerned with making interaction decisions based on the 
reputation values of the workers, it relies on existing reputation evaluation models to 
supply it with the reputation values. In this study, we choose BRS2012 to perform this task. 
Nevertheless, many other models can be used in place of BRS2012 as long as the 
reputation values they produce can be normalized to a range of [0, 1]. However, they are 
not the focus of this study. 
The output produced by the SWORD approach is a request allocation policy that 
determines the control variables 𝑨(𝑡) for all workers in a given MAS when new requests 
are submitted to the system by requesters. 𝑨(𝑡) is constrained as follows: 
𝐴𝑤(𝑡) ∈ {0,1,2, … , 𝜃𝑤(𝑡)} for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾, if 𝜏𝑤(𝑡) ≥ 𝑇ℎ𝑟                        (5.8) 
Where 0 ≤ 𝜏𝑤(𝑡) ≤ 1 is the estimated reputation of worker w at time step t, and 𝑇ℎ𝑟 is 
the minimum reputation threshold specified by the requester r.  𝜃𝑤(𝑡) is the target HIT 
queue length for worker w. It is dynamically determined by the SWORD approach based 
on the ability of each worker as: 
𝜃𝑤(𝑡) ≜ 𝑁𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑉𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜏𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡).                                        (5.9) 
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where 𝜏𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) is the maximum reputation of a worker w observed over a given period of 
time, the values of the parameters N and V determines the relative importance given to the 
expected waiting time and the expected quality of the results, and need to be selected by 
the system administrators based on their preferences. 
A Lyapunov function 𝐿(𝑸(𝑡)) is constructed to as the sum of the squares of difference 
between the actual queue length and the target queue length for each worker at time step t:  
𝐿(𝑸(𝑡)) ≜
1
2
∑ 𝜔𝑤(𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤(𝑡))
2
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾 .                                  (5.10) 
{𝜔𝑤}𝑤∈𝑾  are a collection of positive weights to enable different queues to be treated 
differently. Here, we use  𝜔𝑤 = 1 for all w since we do not have prior knowledge of the 
relative importance of the task queues at each worker in an open MAS. Define 𝛥(𝑸(𝑡)), 
the per time step conditional Lyapunov drift, as 
𝛥(𝑸(𝑡)) ≜ 𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑡 + 1)) − 𝐿(𝑸(𝑡))|𝑸(𝑡)}                                 (5.11) 
which is the expected difference between the value of (5.10) at time step t+1 and that at 
time step t given the current task queue lengths of all the workers at time step t. It should 
be minimized if enough new requests are being proposed by requesters in a given MAS to 
ensure workers who can serve more requests per time step are assigned more requests and 
the task queues will not keep growing longer. In addition to this, the potential gain (which 
is directly corelated to the selected workers’ reputations) by requesters should also be 
maximized. Based on these considerations, we define a variation of the drift-minus-
reward expression – the drift-plus-penalty expression - as follows whose bound needs to 
be minimized: 
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𝛥(𝑸(𝑡)) + 𝑉 ∙ 𝔼{𝑃(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}                                              (5.12) 
where 𝑃(𝑡) is a penalty function representing the risk exposure involved in allocating 
requests to a selection of workers. The expectations in (5.11) and (5.12) are not clearly 
defined because the state transition probability distributions depend partially on the 
control actions taken by the SWORD approach at each time step. Therefore, instead of 
estimating them, the SWORD approach attempts to ensure the constraints in (5.8) and the 
drift conditions in (5.10) are satisfied in each time step. For a worker w, at time step t, 
when 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) new requests are assigned to it, the term for potential penalty involved in 
(5.12) can be expressed as: 
 𝑃(𝑡) ≜ ∑ [𝑝ℎ(𝑡) + 𝑐]
𝐴𝑤(𝑡)
ℎ=1 .                                              (5.13) 
Assuming a worker stores different types of requests into separate queues, with regard to 
one of the queues, the maximum reward for successfully serving requests of the same type 
is denoted by the constant 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑝ℎ(𝑡)  can be estimated using the reputation of the 
worker w (i.e., 𝜏𝑤(𝑡)). Thus, (5.13) becomes: 
𝑝ℎ(𝑡) ≜ [(1 − 𝜏𝑤(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑐]𝐴𝑤(𝑡).                                    (5.14) 
In essence, 𝑝ℎ(𝑡) represents the potential waste of utility which should be gained from 
allocating 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) new requests to w at time step t. In our case, instead of pushing the 
congestion level in each worker’s request queues towards 0, it is more desirable to push it 
towards their respective target queue sizes 𝜃𝑤(𝑡). This is to ensure the rate of utilization 
of the workers’ capacities to be maintained at a reasonable level if there are enough 
incoming requests. When 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) new requests are assigned to worker w at time step t, the 
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Lyapunov drift which is related to both the incoming requests and the current queue size 
in relation to the target queue size can be expressed as: 
𝛥(𝑄(𝑡)) ≜ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)𝐴𝑤(𝑡).                                         (5.15) 
Thus, by combining (5.14) with (5.15), the overall reward-minus-drift expression for all 
the request queues for requests of the same type at each time step t is: 
∑ {𝑉[(1 − 𝜏𝑤(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑐]𝐴𝑤(𝑡) + (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤(𝑡))𝐴𝑤(𝑡)}𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾 .         (5.16) 
Minimizing (5.16) at each time step is equivalent to minimizing (5.12). In this way, 
instead of trying to estimate the probability distribution representing what the queue drift 
may be given each configuration of current queues among the workers in a given MAS, 
the SWORD approach uses the observed current queue sizes and the potential reward to 
guide future request assignment decisions. Thus, it determines how many request to be 
assigned to which workers by choosing 𝑨(𝑡) = (𝐴𝑤(𝑡)), 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 so as to minimize (5.16) 
which can be simplified to: 
Minimize:                      ∑ {𝑉[(1 − 𝜏𝑤(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑐] + 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤}𝐴𝑤(𝑡)𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾  
Subject to:                      Constraint (5.8) 
Since we assume that the cost for serving a request is constant, request assignment 
decisions for each worker can be made independently. When new requests are submitted 
by requesters to the SWORD broker, the desirability score (𝐷𝑤(𝑡)) for all workers are 
calculated as: 
𝐷𝑤(𝑡) = 𝜃𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑉[(1 − 𝜏𝑤(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑐].                          (5.17) 
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Therefore, the SWORD approach calculates 𝑨(𝑡) as illustrated in Algorithm 5.1. The 
computational complexity of the SWORD approach is 𝑂(|𝑾|).  
The SWORD approach spends a fixed Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑝)  percentage of time exploring for 
unfamiliar workers. During this process, HITs are randomly allocated to workers in the 
MAS. Workers with low desirability scores are either having low reputation or already 
working a long backlog in their request queues. The resulting queuing dynamic for the 
request queues of the workers in a given MAS is thus: 
𝑄𝑤(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑤(𝑡), 0] + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡).                              (5.18) 
 
Algorithm 5.1 SWORD 
1: Input: 𝑆𝑤(𝑡)values for all trustee agent w, and the task 
requests in the incoming request queue at the task broker 
𝜆(𝑡) at time step t. 
2: Re-evaluate 𝜃𝑤(𝑡) for all w based on their 𝑆𝑤(𝑡)values. 
3: Re-evaluate 𝐷𝑤(𝑡) for all w. 
4: Rank all w in descending order of their 𝐷𝑤(𝑡) values. 
 5: for ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 do 
6:     if 𝐷𝑤(𝑡) > 0 then 
7:         if 𝜆(𝑡) ≤ 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) then 
8:             𝐴𝑤(𝑡) ← 𝜆(𝑡) 
9:          else 
10:             𝐴𝑤(𝑡) ← 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) 
11:          end-if 
12:         𝜆(𝑡) ← 𝜆(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) 
13:      else 
14:         𝐴𝑤(𝑡) ← 0 
15:      end-if 
16: end-for 
17: Return(𝑨(𝑡)) 
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5.4. Theoretical Analysis of the Performance of SWORD 
As 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) is determined by worker w at time step t at his own discretion, it is out of the 
control of SWORD. Nevertheless, by controlling 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) alone, SWORD can still ensure 
an upper bound on the request queue sizes for all workers in a given MAS. 
[Lemma 5.1]: (Upper bound of the request queue sizes) Under SWORD, and for arbitrary 
reputation variation processes that satisfies 0 ≤ 𝜏𝑤(𝑡) ≤ 1 for all w and t, 
if 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) > 𝜃𝑤  for some particular queue at w and time step t, then 
𝐴𝑤(𝑡) = 0 and thus, the queue cannot increase in the next time step. It 
follows that if 𝑄𝑤(0) ≤ 𝜃𝑤 + 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥, then 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) ≤ 𝜃𝑤 + 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 for all t. 
Proof: Suppose that 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) > 𝜃𝑤 for a particular worker w’s request queue at time step t, 
then 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤 > 0 . Let 𝑨(𝑡) = (𝐴1(𝑡), … , 𝐴|𝑾|(𝑡))  be a vector representing the 
request allocation decision made by SWORD that minimizes the expression: 
∑ {𝑉[(1 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥] + 𝑄𝑛(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑛}𝐴𝑛(𝑡)
|𝑾|
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝑉𝑐𝐴𝑛(𝑡)
|𝑾|
𝑛=1               (5.19) 
subject to (5.8). 
Suppose 𝐴𝑛(𝑡) > 0. Since 𝑉 > 0, 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈ 𝑅
+ , 1 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑡) ∈ [0,1], and 𝑐 ∈ 𝑅
+ , the term 
𝑉[(1 − 𝜏𝑛(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥] + 𝑄𝑛(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑛  is strictly positive. The value of expression (5.19) 
can be strictly reduced by choosing 𝐴𝑛(𝑡) = 0. By choosing 𝐴𝑛(𝑡) = 0, we can obtain a 
strictly smaller value for the expression (5.19) than choosing any 𝐴𝑛(𝑡) > 0  while 
satisfying Constraint (5.8). Thus, 𝐴𝑛(𝑡) > 0  contradicts the assumption that 𝑨(𝑡) 
minimizes expression (5.19). Therefore, if 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) > 𝜃𝑤, then 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) = 0. 
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Since at each time step t, the maximum 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) SWORD allocates to a worker w is equal to 
𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 and if 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) > 𝜃𝑤, then 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) = 0, it can be deduced that 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) ≤ 𝜃𝑤 + 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 for 
all t if 𝑄𝑤(0) ≤ 𝜃𝑤 + 𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥. Following the definition for 𝜃𝑤 in (5.9), we have  
0 ≤ 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) ≤ (𝑁 + 1)𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑉𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜏𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥,                                 (5.20) 
provided the conditions are satisfied at time step 𝑡 = 0. 
[Lemma 5.2]: (Upper bound of the Lyapunov Drift) For all possible values of 𝑸(𝑡) at any 
time step t: 
∆(𝑸(𝑡)) ≤ 𝐵 − ∑ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)𝔼{𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
 
where B is a finite constant that satisfies: 
1
2
∑ 𝔼{(𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡))
2
|𝑸(𝑡)}𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾 ≤ 𝐵 ≤
1
2
∑ (𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾                     
(5.21) 
Such a constant exists because of the assumption that 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) and 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) are bounded by 
𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Proof: from the queuing dynamics as a resulted of the SWORD approach in (5.18): 
(𝑄𝑤(𝑡 + 1) − 𝜃𝑤)
2 = {max[𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡), 0] − 𝜃𝑤}
2
≤ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)
2 
(5.22) 
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If 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) ≥ 0, the inequality in (5.22) holds with equality; if 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) −
𝜇𝑤(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) < 0, the max[∙ ,0] operator ensures that 
(0 − 𝜃𝑤)
2 < (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)
2 
holds when 𝜃𝑤 ≥ 0. 
(𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑤(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)
2 = [(𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤) − (𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡))]
2
= (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)
2 − 2(𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)(𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡))
+ (𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡))
2
 
(5.23) 
Substituting (5.23) into (5.22) and divide both sides of the equation by 2, we have: 
1
2
(𝑄𝑤(𝑡 + 1) − 𝜃𝑤)
2
≤
1
2
(𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)
2 +
1
2
(𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡))
2
− (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)(𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡)) 
(5.24) 
Summing over all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 and taking conditional expectation on both sides of (5.24), we 
have: 
∆(𝑸(𝑡)) ≤
1
2
∑ 𝔼{(𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡))
2
|𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
− ∑ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)𝔼{𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
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(5.25) 
Substituting (5.21) into (5.25), we have: 
∆(𝑸(𝑡)) ≤ 𝐵 − ∑ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)𝔼{𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
 
which proves Lemma 5.2. 
[Theorem 5.1]: (Proximity to the Optimal Solution) For any fixed 𝑉 > 0, if the initial 
request queues satisfy 0 ≤ 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) ≤ (𝑁 + 1)𝜇𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑉𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜏𝑤
𝑚𝑎𝑥(proven 
in Lemma 5.1) and the SWORD approach is used over time steps 
𝑡 ∈ {0,1,2, … }, then: 
𝑈 ≥ 𝑈
𝑜𝑝𝑡
−
𝐵
𝑉
−
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(0)}
𝑉𝑡
                                             (5.26) 
where 𝑈
𝑜𝑝𝑡
 is the optimal time averaged social welfare achievable by a request 
allocation policy 𝑨∗(𝑡) that yields for all t and all 𝑸(𝑡): 
𝔼{𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤
∗ (𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)} = 0                                            (5.27) 
which means all requests are always served within one time step. The optimal 
social welfare is thus defined as the situation where all requests are successfully 
served under 𝑨∗(𝑡): 
𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) ≜ ∑ 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑐𝐴𝑤
∗ (𝑡)
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
 
Therefore: 
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lim𝑡→∞ inf𝑈(𝑡) ≥ 𝑈
𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝐵
𝑉
.                                             (5.28) 
Proof: From Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, the drift-minus-reward expression in (5.7) can be 
re-written as: 
∆(𝑸(𝑡)) − 𝑉𝔼{𝑈(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
≤ 𝐵 − ∑ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)𝔼{𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
− 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑔(𝑡)𝜇𝑤(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
+ 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑐𝐴𝑤(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
 
(5.29) 
Substituting 𝐴𝑤
∗ (𝑡) into (5.29), we have: 
∆(𝑸(𝑡)) − 𝑉𝔼{𝑈(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
≤ 𝐵 − ∑ (𝑄𝑤(𝑡) − 𝜃𝑤)𝔼{𝜇𝑤(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑤
∗ (𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
− 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑔(𝑡)𝜇𝑤(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
+ 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑐𝐴𝑤
∗ (𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
 
(5.30) 
According to (5.27): 
∆(𝑸(𝑡)) − 𝑉𝔼{𝑈(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)} ≤ 𝐵 − 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑔(𝑡)𝜇𝑤(𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
+ 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑐𝐴𝑤
∗ (𝑡)}
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
= 𝐵 − 𝑉𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) 
(5.31) 
122 
 
Taking expectations of (5.31) over the distribution of 𝑸(𝑡) and according to the law of 
iterated expectations, we have: 
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑡 + 1)) − 𝐿(𝑸(𝑡))|𝑸(𝑡)} − 𝑉𝔼{𝑈(𝑡)} ≤ 𝐵 − 𝑉𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡.                    (5.32) 
Summing (5.32) over time steps 𝑡 = {0,1,2, … , 𝑇 − 1}, we have: 
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑇)) − 𝐿(𝑸(0))} − 𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑈(𝑡)}𝑇−1𝑡=0 ≤ 𝑇𝐵 − 𝑇𝑉𝑈
𝑜𝑝𝑡.                     (5.33) 
Through dividing (5.33) by TV (when t > 0 and V > 0), we have: 
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑇)) − 𝐿(𝑸(0))}
𝑇𝑉
− 𝑈(𝑇) ≤
𝐵
𝑉
− 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 
Thus, 
𝑈(𝑇) ≥ 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝐵
𝑉
+
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑇)) − 𝐿(𝑸(0))}
𝑇𝑉
 
Since 𝐿(∙) ≥ 0 and all 𝑄𝑤(0) = 0, 
𝑈(𝑇) ≥ 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝐵
𝑉
−
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(0))}
𝑇𝑉
= 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝐵
𝑉
−
∑ (𝜃𝑤)
2
𝑤:𝑤∈𝑾
2𝑇𝑉
 
When 𝑇 → ∞, this proves (5.28). 
Based on (5.28), by increasing the value of V, the term B/V can be reduced and the 
performance of the SWORD approach in term of social welfare can be made closer to the 
optimal social welfare. However, by increasing V, according to (5.20), the upper limit of 
𝑄𝑤(𝑡),𝑤 ∈ 𝑾 also increases. This creates a trade-off between the social welfare and the 
delay in obtaining results for the requesters. According to (5.9), 𝜃𝑤 is linearly related to 
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the value of V. Thus, increasing V will cause the last term in (5.28) to increase. This 
phenomenon can be understood from another perspective. Due to the requirement on the 
timeliness of completion of the requests, once the upper limit of 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) is increased to 
such an extent that some requests cannot be served within the stipulated deadlines, social 
welfare will start to decline. Therefore, the social welfare produced by SWORD can only 
be made closer to the optimal value if the upper limited of 𝑄𝑤(𝑡) as a result of changing 
the value of parameter V does not cause delays longer than the deadlines specified by the 
requesters. 
As each requester may specify different deadlines for different requests and the behavior 
patterns of workers in different MASs may differ, it is difficult to analyze the range of 
values for parameter V theoretically. In the next chapter, we will perform extensive 
empirical evaluation of the performance of the SWORD approach in a crowdsourcing 
scenario to complement the theoretical performance analysis presented in this section. 
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Chapter 6  
Evaluating the SWORD Approach in 
Crowdsourcing 
 
 
In Chapter 5, we proposed the SWORD approach that introduced the principles of 
queuing theory into trust-aware task allocation in an MAS with resource constrained 
trustee agents. Through theoretical analysis, we have proved the existence of various 
performance guarantees that make the SWORD approach a boundedly-optimal approach. 
In this chapter, we further evaluate the performance of the SWORD approach against 
existing state-of-the-art approaches in a crowdsourcing scenario where the trustee agents 
are human beings with limited cognitive and physical capabilities in serving requests. 
Through extensive simulation based on behaviorial characteristics observed from the 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing system, the SWORD approach is shown to 
significantly improve the social welfare achieved by given populations of agents with 
varying behavior patterns while maintaining short waiting time for truster agents to 
receive high quality results. 
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6.1. Introduction to Crowdsourcing Systems 
Crowdsourcing systems divide large problems which are too complex for computers but 
easy for human beings to solve into smaller tasks, and outsource them to a diverse group 
of people. They provide a platform where mass collaboration can occur where individual 
users contribute to solving a small part of the overall problem and be compensated for 
their effort by people who proposed the problem. Over the years, different types of 
crowdsourcing systems have emerged. Some of the well-known systems with 
crowdsourcing features include Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), 99designs, Mob4hire, 
Youtube, and Wikipedia, etc [Doan et al., 2011].  
Among them, AMT, 99designs and Mob4hire employ a business model similar to a job 
placement agency. Requesters break down their tasks into small Human Intelligence 
Tasks (HITs) using proprietary tools provided by the crowdsourcing systems and assign a 
monetary reward for each HIT. Each task appears as an HIT group in the system. Usually, 
Figure 25. The Ten Thousand Cents digital artwork created through crowdsourcing on AMT 
[Doan et al., 2011]. 
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the rewards are the same for HITs in the same HIT group. Workers who have registered 
with the crowdsourcing systems can browse through the available HITs and work on those 
which they are qualified.  
Ensuring the quality of the received HIT results is a challenging problem faced by 
crowdsourcing systems. Workers in crowdsourcing systems behave similarly to those in 
other types of labor markets – they are self-interested and want to maximize their own 
benefit. When there is a lack of deterrent, some may resort to behaving dishonestly (e.g., 
providing low quality results to HITs) to achieve this goal. A series of studies conducted 
in AMT has discovered that workers indeed lied more when given the opportunity 
[Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al., 2011; Suri and Watts, 2011]. For example, a well-
known crowdsourcing experiment called the Ten Thousand Cents project was conducted 
Figure 26. Examples of HITs completed by workers in AMT as compared to what was 
required by the requester of the Ten Thousand Cents project. 
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on AMT where a digital artwork was created to represent a US$100 bill as shown in 
Figure 25. Thousands of individuals working in isolation painted a tiny part of the bill 
without knowledge of the overall task using a custom drawing tool. Workers were paid 
one cent each via AMT. It was discovered that many of the returned HITs were not 
completed according to the requirements. Some examples of low quality HIT results are 
shown in Figure 26. The figure is organized into two columns. The left column represents 
the artwork that a worker is required to draw, and the right column represents the 
corresponding returned result. There are eight pairs of required and actual results shown 
in Figure 26. It can be seen that low quality results can be drastically different from the 
required result and they are the causes of the glitches visible in Figure 25. 
In popular crowdsourcing systems such as AMT, workers are anonymous in the eyes of 
the requesters, and it is impossible for the requesters to know who cheated them. The 
crowdsourcing systems also provide no recourse for requesters when low quality HITs are 
received. To the best of our knowledge, no crowdsourcing system implements 
mechanisms for proactive HIT allocation. Workers need to search for HITs and can accept 
HITs that they qualify on a first-come-first-served basis. In AMT, requesters can specify 
the minimum HIT approval rate (i.e., the percentage of HITs completed by a worker that 
has been accepted by the requesters) workers must achieve in order to work on their HIT 
Groups. However, from studies conducted by [Suri et al., 2011], there is no significant 
difference in the cheating behavior by workers with different approval rates. There is 
generally a lack of protection against malicious workers in the current crowdsourcing 
landscape. 
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Trust management mechanisms have been suggested by recent research [Doan et al., 2011] 
to be a viable way to address the problem of malicious workers in crowdsourcing systems. 
However, crowdsourcing systems present a unique challenge to existing trust management 
models. Firstly, HITs in a crowdsourcing system are completed by human beings. 
Naturally, they have limited capacities in terms of skills and time they can contribute to 
working in the crowdsourcing system each day, which limit the maximum number of 
HITs they can complete per day. Secondly, requesters in a crowdsourcing system usually 
associate deadlines with HIT Groups they proposed. In AMT, the deadline is usually two 
weeks or shorter. Once the deadline is passed, the HIT Group is deactivated and late 
coming HIT results will not be processed (which are equivalent of being unacceptable 
results). The characteristics of this application domain are similar to the proposed revised 
system model and it is suitable for studying the performance of the proposed SWORD 
approach and existing trust management models.  
6.2. Key Hypotheses and Evaluation Metrics 
Three major types of stakeholders are present in a crowdsourcing system: 1) the 
requesters who need to rely on the services provided by the workers in order to 
accomplish their goals (trusters), 2) the workers who provide their services to requesters 
in exchange of monetary or other rewards, and 3) the crowdsourcing system operator who 
provides and maintains basic services in the system to facilitate the exchange between the 
requesters and the workers. In this sense, a crowdsourcing system can also be modeled as 
an MAS. The requesters’ wellbeing depends on them being able to receive as many HIT 
results within the stipulated deadline as possible with high quality. The workers’ 
wellbeing depends on them receiving as many HITs to work on as they can effectively 
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handle. The system operator’s wellbeing depends on the system being able to attract 
enough business.  
From the above analysis, the requesters are likely to take the average accuracy of the 
received HIT results as well as the total utility (e.g., the balances in their accounts) 
derived from the satisfactorily completed on time; the workers are likely to mainly care 
about the total utility they can derive from completing the HITs assigned to them; the 
system operator is likely to mainly be concerned with the total amount of utility both the 
requesters and the workers can derive by collaborating in the system. We refer to the total 
utility produced by utilizing the capacities of workers in a crowdsourcing system 
following a given plan as the social welfare of the system. In order to sustain the healthy 
operation of a crowdsourcing system, the interest of these three different groups of 
stakeholders need to be satisfied. 
Since the requesters are the ones who put up the rewards and propose the HITs, their 
needs are likely to be the central consideration for the system operators. To satisfy the 
requesters requirements of timeliness, quality and number of HITs completed, the 
intuitive goal for the crowdsourcing system is to distribute their HIT requests as widely as 
possible among the workers whose reputations satisfy the requesters’ minimum 
requirement while minimizing the number of less reputable workers involved. By doing 
so, the less reputable workers are likely to receive less work than their more reputable 
counterparts. Nevertheless, this theoretically should not affect the wellbeing of the system 
as a whole since less trustworthy workers are being marginalized. This complies with the 
definition of social equity from [Adams, 1966] which postulates that individuals should be 
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rewarded in accordance with their contributions to society. It is an integral component to 
achieving social sustainability. 
In this study, we aim to verify the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: the SWORD approach improves the social welfare of a given 
crowdsourcing system compared to existing approaches. 
 Hypothesis 2: the SWORD approach improves social equity among workers in a given 
crowdsourcing system compared to existing approaches. 
In the following experiments, we use the time averaged total utility in Equation (5.4) as a 
measure of the social welfare achieved by a HIT allocation approach. Distributive fairness 
is measured using a Fairness Index proposed in [Jain et al., 1984] as: 
𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 =
[∑ 𝑛𝑤
𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛
𝑤=1 ]
2
𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛∙∑ 𝑛𝑤
2𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛
𝑤=1
                                                      (6.1) 
where 𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛 is the total number of workers considered belonging to the most reputable 
group (labeled as the Hon Group) in a crowdsourcing system; and 𝑛𝑤 ≥ 0 is the total 
number of HITs which have been assigned to a worker w upto the current time step; 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 
denotes the HIT distributive fairness towards the group of the most reputable workers. 
𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 = 0 represents the most unfair treatment of this group of workers (i.e., all HITs are 
assigned to one worker and the rest receives to HIT), while 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 = 1 represents the most 
fair treatment of this group of workers (i.e., everyone of them are assign an equal number 
of HITs). 
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6.3. Design of the Evaluation Test-bed 
In order to study the proposed approach against existing approaches under the 
crowdsourcing conditions, we design a simulation test-bed based on the characteristics of 
the AMT system which is one of the most widely studied crowdsourcing systems. In the 
test-bed, a population of requester agents puts up HITs with associated rewards for worker 
agents to complete while a population of worker agents seeks HITs to work on in order to 
earn artificial monetary rewards from the requester agents. Four different groups of 
worker agents with different behavior patterns are implemented in the test-bed. These 
agents are designed to simulate the limitations of human workers. Each worker agent can 
only complete up to a predetermined number of HITs in one time step (assuming all HITs 
require similar effort levels). The worker agents with different behavior patterns in our 
experiments are labeled as: 
1) Hon workers: honest worker agents who return high quality HIT results randomly 90% 
of the time. Since producing high quality work may require more effort, each honest 
worker is set to complete at most 5 HITs per time step; 
2) MH workers: moderately honest worker agents who return high quality HIT results 
randomly 70% of the time. Each moderately honest worker is set to complete at most 
10 HITs per time step; 
3) MM workers: moderately malicious worker agents who return high quality HIT results 
randomly 30% of the time. Each moderately malicious worker is set to complete at 
most 10 HITs per time step; 
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4) Mal workers: malicious worker agents who return high quality HIT results randomly 
10% of the time. Each malicious worker is set to complete at most 20 HITs per time 
step as they do not care about the quality of their work. 
The performance characteristics of agents following the four different behavior patterns are 
illustrated in Figure 27. Intuitively, Hon workers fall into the high-quality-low-capacity 
quadrant; MH workers fall into the high-quality-medium-capacity quadrant; MM workers 
fall into the low-quality-medium-capacity quadrant; and Mal workers fall into the low-
quality-high-capacity quadrant. 
A requester agent r can publish HIT Groups each containing up to 𝑁𝑟(𝑡) HITs. Once an 
HIT Group is published, it remains open to worker agents until all HITs in it are 
completed. We assume that there is only one type of task in the test-bed and all workers are 
qualified to perform this type of tasks. However, since reputation evaluations are usually 
only valid within a given context (i.e., type of task), the SWORD approach can be trivially 
extended to handle multiple types of tasks. 
Figure 27. The performance characteristics of different groups of worker agents used in the 
experiments. 
(Hon) 
(MH) 
(MM) 
(Mal) 
133 
 
According to studies conducted by [Ipeirotis, 2010] and [Ross et al., 2010] on the AMT 
system from 2009 to 2010, a total of 9,436 requesters and about 200,000 workers have 
registered with the crowdsourcing system. Over the same period, 165,368 HIT Groups 
with 6,701,406 HITs have been posted. From these statistics, it can be estimated that the 
ratio between the worker and the requester populations is about 20-to-1 and the average 
HITs in an HIT Group is about 40. We use these ratios to select the agent population 
parameters used our experiments so as to be as close to real crowdsourcing systems as 
possible. 
6.4. Benchmark Approaches 
In the following experiments, we compare the performance of the proposed SWORD 
approach against selected existing approaches. Since the currently available trust-aware 
interaction decision-making approaches are designed for one-to-one interactions, they are 
not suitable for direct use under crowdsourcing conditions where a requester (i.e., a 
service consumer) has to disseminate an HIT Group with multiple HITs to substantially 
more than one worker (e.g., service providers) to take advantage of mass collaboration. 
Therefore, we extend these approaches in our study to make them suitable for operation in 
crowdsourcing systems. The extensions are designed to preserve the spirit of the existing 
approaches so as to reflect the performance of the original approaches under the new 
system conditions as closely as possible. 
6.4.1. Extending the Greedy Approach 
Currently, trust-aware interaction decision-making approaches can be broadly divided into 
two categories: 1) static and 2) dynamic. In the static approach, a truster agent searches 
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for trustee agents either through peer recommendation or random exploration. The 
reputations of the candidate trustee agents are evaluated using a trust evaluation model of 
choice and the one with the highest reputation evaluation is selected for interaction. Many 
existing trust management models adopt this greedy approach [Jøsang and Ismail, 2002; 
Yu and Singh, 2003; Teacy et al., 2005; Weng et al., 2006; Teacy et al., 2008; Weng et 
al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Shen et al., 2011]. From an individual trustee agent’s point of 
view, in order to maximize its own long term wellbeing, it is rational to always select the 
best possible option for every interaction. 
In our experiments, we choose to extend the Beta Reputation System (BRS) proposed in 
[Jøsang and Ismail, 2002] which is the most widely used trust model in this area. The 
extended BRS will use a modified versions of BRS proposed in Chapter 4 – BRS2012. 
The extended BRS be referred to as BRS2002e in our experiments. A requester agent 
equipped with BRS2002e explores for potentially more trustworthy workers in a random 
manner to accumulate direct observations about them. Once enough direct observations 
are recorded, BRS2002e exploits the known workers according to the algorithm listed in 
Table 6.1. Workers with reputation evaluations higher than a predetermined threshold 
value 𝑇ℎ are selected for interaction and the available new HITs are distributed among 
them as evenly as possible. Their reputation values are normalized to [0, 1], where 1 
represents the most trustworthy and 0 represents the most untrustworthy. BRS2002e will 
spend 10% of the time allocating HITs to workers with few direct observation records. 
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6.4.2. Extending the Dynamic Approaches 
Recently, there are a few dynamic trust-aware interaction decision-making approaches 
proposed. One approach is denoted as M2009e. It is based on [Muñoz et al., 2009] where 
the authors measure a truster agent’s knowledge degrees about trustee agents and use this 
metric to determine which trustee agent to select for interaction. The knowledge degree 
depends on the amount of direct past interaction experience with the trustee agent, third-
party testimonies about that trustee agent, and the self reported trustworthiness by that 
trustee agent which the truster agent can gather. The value of the knowledge degree is 
normalized within the range of [0, 1], with 1 representing “completely known” and 0 
representing “no direct interaction experience”. In the local record of a truster agent, 
candidate trustee agents are organized into four groups according to their knowledge 
degree values: 
 Group TK (Totally Known): knowledge degree = 1; 
 Group PK (Partially Known): 0 < knowledge degree < 1; 
 Group AU (Almost Unknown): knowledge degree = 0; 
 Group TU (Totally Unknown): no information available. 
If there are enough trustee agents with trustworthiness values higher than a predefined 
threshold QT in Group TK, the truster agent will only select these trustee agents for 
interaction; otherwise, a number of exploration interacitons will be allocated to trustee 
agents in groups PK, AU and TU to build up the knowledge degree of trustee agents in 
these groups and promote them into higher order groups. For the exploitation phase of 
M2009e, the algorithm listed in Table 6.1 is applied only to trustee agents in Group TK. 
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Another approach is denoted as H2010e which is based on [Hoogendoorn et al., 2010]. It 
measures how much the operating environment has changed and uses this metric to 
determine the amount of effort a truster agent should devote in exploring for more 
trustworthy trustee agents. In this approach, each truster agent keeps track of the long 
term trust (𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡)) and the short term trust (𝑆𝑇𝑖(𝑡)) of candidate trustee agents, where 
𝑆𝑇𝑖(𝑡) reflects the changes in an trustee agent i’s behavior faster than 𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡). The average 
absolute difference between 𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡)  and 𝑆𝑇𝑖(𝑡)  is used to estimate the changes in the 
environment 𝐶(𝑡) . When 𝐶(𝑡)  is larger than 0, an exploration extent value 𝐸(𝑡)  is 
calculated. This, together with the trustworthiness value of each trustee agent, is used to 
derive a selection probability 𝑅𝑃𝑖(𝑡) for that SP. The candidate SPs are then selected 
using the Monte Carlo method according to their 𝑅𝑃𝑖(𝑡) values. When 𝐶(𝑡) = 0 , the 
trustee agent with the highest trustworthiness evaluation is selected for interaction. In 
H2010e, when the changes in the environment necessitate exploration (i.e. 𝐶(𝑡) > 0,), the 
number of interactions to be assigned to each known trustee agent is determined according 
to the weight of its selection probability 𝑅𝑃𝑖(𝑡) among the candidates. When 𝐶(𝑡) = 0, 
H2010e exploits the most trustworthy trustee agents by using the algorithm listed in Table 
6.1. The only difference is that the long term trust 𝐿𝑇𝑖(𝑡) is used to rank the trustee agent 
in H2010e. 
Both the static and the dynamic approaches are fundamentally similar in their goals – they 
aim to increase the overall quality of the results a truster agent can obtain from 
interactions with trustee agents by minimizing their risk exposure when exploring 
unfamiliar trustee agents. In our experiments, BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e will be 
used as the benchmarks for assessing the performance of the SWORD approach. 
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Algorithm 6.1 Extended Exploration Algorithm 
1:  Rank known workers in descending order of their reputation values 
𝜏𝑤(𝑡). 
2:  if the number of known wohrkers with 𝜏𝑤(𝑡) ≥ 𝑇ℎ  (a.k.a. trustworthy 
workers) is at least 𝑁𝑟(𝑡) then 
3:       Assign one HIT to each of them. 
4:   else 
5:       Determine the number of HITs to be assigned to each worker 
according to the weight of its 𝜏𝑤(t) value among selected trustworthy 
workers. 
6: end-if 
 
6.5. Comparison-based Evaluation 
In the first set of experiments, we investigate the performance of the SWORD approach 
against the benchmark approaches in a comparison-based manner where different 
approaches operate in separate MASs where agents have no knowledge of the existence of 
other approaches. 
6.5.1. Experiment Setup 
Five groups of requester agents each equipped with different HIT allocation approaches 
are compared in the proposed test-bed environment. They are Group AMT where requester 
agents who follow AMT’s passive HIT allocation approach (i.e., worker agents to accept 
HITs proposed in the system on a first-come-first-served basis); Group BRS2002e, Group 
M2009e, and Group H2010e where requester agents distribute HITs to workers following 
the approaches extended from [Jøsang and Ismail, 2002; Muñoz et al., 2009], and 
[Hoogendoorn et al., 2010] respectively; and Group SWORD where the HITs proposed by 
the requester agents are distributed to the worker agents by the crowdsourcing system 
following the SWORD approach. All groups, except Group AMT, adopt the BRS2012 
138 
 
model as the underlying reputation evaluation model. Each round of experiment runs for 
1,000 time steps and is repeated 10 times to reduce the effect of random variation.  
The environment of each experiment includes 50 common witness agents who accumulate 
direct trust evidence about worker agents and provide testimonies to requester agents with 
HIT assignment approaches that require this information (i.e., Group M2009e and Group 
H2010e). These agents are allowed to run for 200 time steps to accumulate some direct 
trust evidence before agents equipped with various approaches start to operate. A total of  
𝑁𝑤 worker agents are included in each experiment. The number of them adopting the four 
different behavior patterns is varied in different experiments to simulate different 
population configurations. Each worker agent population configuration is denoted as 
HonX. It represents a worker agent population consists of 
1
2
𝑋% Hon worker agents, 
1
2
𝑋% 
MH worker agents, 
1
2
(100 − 𝑋)% MM worker agents, and 
1
2
(100 − 𝑋)% Mal worker 
agents. Worker agents perform the Clean Sweep operation as mentioned in Chapter 4 at 
every time step to drop any HITs in their own request queues that have become expired. 
Table 8. Parameter Values in the Experiments 
Symbol Description Value 
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximum utility for successfully completing an HIT. 1.0 
c The utility cost to a requester for proposing an HIT (i.e., 
the reward offered to workers to complete it). 
0.2 
𝑁𝑟(𝑡) The average number of HITs in a HIT Group. 40 
𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑞 The total number of requester agents in an experiment. 50 
𝑁𝑤 The total number of worker agents in an experiment. 1,000 
N A weight parameter used to calculate the target queue size 
in the SWORD approach in Equation (5.9). 
1.0 
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V The performance tuning parameter in the SWORD 
approach. 
2.0 
𝑇ℎ𝑟 The minimum reputation value required by the approaches 
(except Group AMT) in the experiment for a worker to 
quality as a potential candidate for HIT allocation. 
0.6 
Pr (𝐸𝑥𝑝) The percentage of time spent by the SWORD approach for 
random exploration. 
10% 
𝑇𝑑𝑙 The deadline (i.e., maximum number of time steps from 
the time step an HIT is proposed) before which a HIT 
must be completed in order to be regarded as completed 
on time. 
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𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑞 requester agents are involved in each experiment. Requester agents are designed only 
to propose new HIT Groups when the last proposed HIT Group is completed or becomes 
expired. In this way, the social welfare produced represents the maximum social welfare a 
crowdsourcing system made up of the given requester agent and worker agent populations 
can produce under the given HIT allocation approach. The values for the parameters used 
in our experiments are listed in Table 8. 
6.5.2. Analysis of Numerical Results 
Hypothesis 1 
Figure 28 illustrates the performance of various approaches in terms of time averaged 
social welfare (𝑈) calculated according to Equation (5.4). Here, the box-plot is used to 
shown a summary for each approach containing the maximum, the 75-percentile, and 
median, the 25-percentile and the minimum 𝑈  values achieved by the respective 
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approaches. Comparing the median of the 𝑈 values, Group SWORD outperforms all other 
approaches by wide margins. Group AMT, which does not care about the reputation of the 
workers and adopts a laissez-faire approach towards allocating HITs to workers (a.k.a. 
letting the workers to decide which HITs to accept on a first-come-first-served basis), 
have achieved the second highest level of 𝑈. In fact, it can be seen that Group AMT 
significantly outperforms Groups BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e which are trust-aware 
HIT allocation. Among these three groups, Group BRS2002e which employs a static 
exploration method has outperformed Groups M2009e and H2010e which use dynamic 
exploration methods.  
Figure 28. The ranges of the Time Averaged Social Welfare achieved by various HIT 
allocation approaches under different worker agent population configurations. 
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It appears that, under crowdsourcing conditions, existing trust-aware interaction decision-
Figure 30. The ranges of the Average Quality of HIT results achieved by various HIT 
allocation approaches under different worker agent population configurations. 
 
Figure 29. The ranges of the Time Averaged Number of HIT Groups Completed by various 
HIT allocation approaches under different worker agent population configurations. 
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making approaches can cause significant deterioration in the overall system wellbeing as 
measured by 𝑈 . To gain deeper understanding of the cause of this outcome, the two 
factors affecting 𝑈 - the average quality of the HIT results and the total number of HITs 
completed on time – should be analyzed separately. 
Figure 29 shows the box-plot of the average quality of HIT results as reflected by the 
average normalized utility gain derived from a completed HIT. By comparing the median 
of this value achieved by the five groups of worker agents, it can be seen that Group 
H2010e outperforms other groups. Groups M2009e and SWORD have achieved similar 
levels of average HIT result quality. Group AMT has achieved a lower level of average 
HIT result quality than all trust-aware approaches. Among the four trust-aware 
approaches, M2009e and H2010e which use dynamic exploration methods outperform 
Figure 31. The Time Average Social Welfare achieved by various HIT allocation approaches 
under different worker agent population configurations. 
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Groups BRS2002e and SWORD in terms of average HIT result quality. 
Figure 30 shows the box-plot of the time averaged total number of HIT Groups various 
approaches can complete under different worker agent population configurations. Since, 
in our experiments, 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 50 and a HIT needs at least one time step to complete, the 
upper limit for the time averaged total number of HIT Groups completed for each group 
of requester agents is 50. By comparing the median of this metric achieved by the five 
approaches, it can be seen that Groups AMT and SWORD significantly outperform other 
groups with Group AMT doing slight better than Group SWORD. Among the three groups 
adopting existing trust-aware interaction decision-making approaches, Group BRS2002e 
Figure 32. The expected completion time for a HIT Group under different HIT allocation 
approaches under worker agent population configuration Hon50. 
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which use a fixed 10% of time exploring unfamiliar workers outperforms Groups M2009e 
and H2010e which use dynamic exploration methods. 
The poor performance of Groups BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e is mainly due to the 
low number of HIT Groups that can be completed on time based on their worker agent 
utilization plans. Since they are designed to minimize the risk exposure of the requesters 
in principle, their plans are not aimed to spread out the HITs among worker agents to 
utilize mass collaboration, but rather to concentration HIT allocations among a select few 
highly reputable worker agents. Although Group AMT produces the lowest average HIT 
result quality, the worker agents’ capacities utilization rate is high. Even with a large 
percentage of HITs being completed with poor quality, the social welfare achieved by 
Figure 33. The cumulative percentage of all HIT Groups completed with completion time less 
than or equal to x time steps under worker agent population configuration Hon50. 
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Group AMT is significantly higher than Groups BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e.  
In Figure 28, the performance of Groups AMT and SWORD shows significant variations. 
To investigate this observation, the time averaged social welfare values achieved by the 
five approaches under each worker population configuration are plotted in Figure 31. The 
performance of Group AMT and SWORD are affected more significantly by the changes in 
worker agent population configurations than the other groups. In the case of Group AMT, 
the changes in worker agent population configuration mainly affect its average HIT result 
quality. As more Hon and MH workers are present in the worker agent population, the 
average HIT result quality achieved by Group AMT following what essentially is random 
HIT allocation to worker agents improves. In the case of Group SWORD, changes in 
worker agent population configuration mainly affect the time averaged total number of 
HIT Groups completed. In Figure 31, from Hon10 to Hon60, as more reliable worker 
agents are present, the pool of eligible worker agents satisfying the requirements of the 
SWORD approach increases. Thus, its 𝑈 value also increases. From Hon60 to Hon100, 
the aggregate capacity of the pool of eligible worker agents under the management of the 
SWORD approach surpasses the total number of HITs the requester agents can propose. 
Therefore, the 𝑈 values achieved by Group SWORD stops increasing. 
The performances achieved by the SWORD and the AMT approach are partly due to the 
low HIT turn-around time which is measured by the expected HIT Group completion time 
shown in Figure 32. Groups AMT and SWORD achieved the lowest median expected 
completion time for a HIT Group among the five groups. The maximum expected 
completion time under the SWORD approach occurred in the worker agent population 
configuration Hon10. Since the clean sweep operation is regularly performed by the five 
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approaches, the maximum completion time for any HIT Group is (𝑇𝑑𝑙 + 1), which is 15 
time steps in our experiments. 
The detailed performance of the five approaches in terms of the HIT Group completion 
time (under Hon50) is illustrated in Figure 33. Around 92% of all HIT Groups are 
completed in 1 time step under AMT, while around 85% are completed in 1 time step 
under SWORD. Almost all HIT Groups take 2 time steps to complete under AMT and 
SWORD. In comparison, 90% of the HIT Groups are completed within 8 time steps and 
14 time steps under BRS2002e and M2009e respectively, and the majority of the HIT 
Groups take 10 time steps to finish under H2010e. Under BRS2002e and M2009e, there 
are around 1% and 10% of the HIT Groups not completed within the 14 time step 
Figure 34. The cumulative percentage of all HIT Groups completed with completion time less 
than or equal to x time steps under the SWORD approach with varying worker agent 
population configurations. 
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deadline respectively. 
Figure 34 shows the performance of the SWORD approach under different worker agent 
population configurations. As the percentage of Hon worker agents increases, the time 
taken for HIT Groups to be completed becomes shorter and an increasing percentage of 
all HIT Groups are completed within fewer time steps. Figures 32~34 not only illustrate 
the reason for the SWORD approach to achieve significantly higher social welfare than 
other approaches, but also demonstrate another improvement to the requesters’ user 
experience – shorter waiting time to receive HIT results. Our first hypothesis is 
considered verified. 
Hypothesis 2 
Figure 35. The ranges of the fairness index for Hon workers achieved by various HIT 
allocation approaches under different worker agent population configurations. 
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The effect of different approaches on social welfare ultimately depends on how well they 
build social equity among the workers in a given crowdsourcing system. Measured with 
the fairness index for Hon worker agents (𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛) in Formula (6.1), it can be seen in Figure 
35 that the distributive fairness achieved by groups BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e are 
significantly lower than that of groups AMT and SWORD. Groups AMT and SWORD 
both achieved almost complete distributive fairness among for Hon workers over the long 
run. Figure 36 breaks down the long term 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛  values of the various approaches in 
correspondence to different worker agent population configurations. The 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 values for 
groups BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e decreases with increasing percentage of Hon 
worker agents in the worker agent population. This trend is also present for Group 
Figure 36. The fairness index for Hon workers achieved by various HIT allocation approaches 
under different worker agent population configurations. 
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SWORD albeit the variation in very small and is only visible if we zoom into the scale 
between 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 = 0.995 and 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛 = 1 as shown in Figure 37.  
In the cases of groups BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e, this phenomenon is caused by the 
relative size of the highly reputable worker agents recognized by each of these approaches 
(𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ) v.s. the total number of Hon worker agents (𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛 ). Group M2009e and 
H2010e aim to minimize the requesters’ risk exposure by minimizing the need for 
exploration. Thus, their 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  value remain relatively constant when the worker 
population configuration changes. Therefore, their 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑: 𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛 ratios becomes smaller, 
causing decreasing distributive fairness with 𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛  becomes larger. With a constant 
predefined exploration probability, BRS2002e is able to discover more Hon workers as 
time passes. However, the greedy self-interested HIT allocation decisions made by 
Figure 37. The fairness index for Hon workers achieved by Group SWORD under different 
worker agent population configurations. 
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BRS2002e requester agents still cause concentration of requests to a relatively small 
number of highly reputable workers from their own perspectives. Group SWORD is faced 
with a similar situation. However, the proposed approach is able to decrease the 
magnitude of the influence of increasing 𝑁𝐻𝑜𝑛  and achieve a high distributive fairness 
among Hon workers. 
As illustrated by Figure 38 which is a snapshot of the total number of HITs allocated to 
each of the 1,000 worker agents in a simulation run with worker agent population 
configuration Hon50, Group AMT does not really social equity in the sense that it treats 
all worker agents equally (i.e., each worker receives 0.1% of all published HITs) with no 
regard to their reputations. Groups M2009e and H2010e achieve good quality HIT results 
by overly concentration of HIT allocations to a relative small number of highly reputable 
Figure 38. The percentage of all HITs allocated to each worker agent by various approaches 
over 1,000 time steps of simulation under worker agent population configuration Hon50. 
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worker agents determined by their reputation evaluation models. The selected worker 
agents receive up to 3% of all published HITs which is about 30 times more than the 
absolute equal workload of 0.1% each, while other worker agents receive no HITs. The 
variations in the treatment of Hon worker agents by requester agent in Group BRS2002e 
are quite significant as shown by the standard deviation compared to its average value in 
Table 6.2. The SWORD approach is able to efficiently utilize the capacities of the Hon 
workers over the long run. As illustrated in Table 9, the average total number of HITs 
completed by a Hon worker under SWORD is 2.66 times that under AMT, 9.49 times that 
under BRS2002e, 6.29 times that under M2009e, and 6.11 times that under H2010e. Apart 
from achieving high distributive fairness among Hon workers, the SWORD approach also 
achieves social equity among all worker agents where they receive HITs commensurate to 
their trustworthiness. Our second hypothesis is considered verified. 
 
Table 9. The distribution of HITs among Hon worker agents from the data in Figure 38. 
 AMT BRS2002e M2009e H2010e SWORD 
Average 1851.76 520.14 784.27 807.45 4935.45 
Standard 
Deviation 
42.34 122.97 1661.52 1831.14 227.77 
 
6.6. Competition-based Evaluation 
Comparing the performance of the proposed SWORD approach against benchmark 
approaches with a fixed number of requesters and workers for each approach may not be a 
good way to reflect their performances in a competitive crowdsourcing marketplace. In 
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reality, requesters and workers may decide to work in any of the crowdsourcing systems 
based on how well they are doing under each system. Intuitively, if a requester cannot get 
high quality results or suffers from long waiting time in a crowdsourcing system, he is not 
likely to be satisfied with the user experience and may switch to another crowdsourcing 
system. Similarly, if a worker cannot earn much reward through working in a 
crowdsourcing system, he may leave the crowdsourcing system and join another one. In 
this section, the relative performance of the SWORD approach and the benchmark 
approaches by letting them compete for the preference of self-interested requester and 
worker agents. 
6.6.1. Experiment Setup 
In this set of experiments, five simulated crowdsourcing systems, each using a different 
HIT allocation approach, are operating side by side. Similar to Section 6.5.1, the five 
approaches are AMT, BRS2002e, M2009e, H2010e and SWORD. All crowdsourcing 
systems, except AMT, adopt the BRS2012 model as the underlying reputation evaluation 
model. Each round of experiment runs for 1,000 time steps and is repeated 10 times to 
reduce the effect of random variation.  
The environment of each experiment includes 50 common witness agents who accumulate 
direct trust evidence about worker agents and provide testimonies to requester agents with 
HIT assignment approaches that require this information. These agents are allowed to run 
for 200 time steps to accumulate some direct trust evidence before agents equipped with 
various approaches start to operate.  
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A total of 𝑁𝑤  worker agents are included in each experiment. The number of them 
adopting the four different behavior patterns is varied in different experiments to simulate 
different population configurations. Each worker agent population configuration is 
denoted as HonX. It represents a worker agent population consists of 
1
2
𝑋% Hon worker 
agents, 
1
2
𝑋% MH worker agents, 
1
2
(100 − 𝑋)% MM worker agents, and 
1
2
(100 − 𝑋)% 
Mal worker agents. Worker agents perform the Clean Sweep operation as mentioned in 
Chapter 4 at every time step to drop any HITs in their own request queues that have 
become expired. 
𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑞 requester agents are involved in each experiment. Requester agents are designed only 
to propose new HIT Groups when the last proposed HIT Group is completed or becomes 
expired. In this way, the social welfare produced represents the maximum social welfare a 
crowdsourcing system made up of the given requester agent and worker agent populations 
can produce under the given HIT allocation approach.  
The worker agents and the requester agents are registered users of all five simulated 
crowdsourcing system. They are assumed to be self-interested and rational. The agents 
learn how to divide their time working in each of the five systems based on their 
experience in the past. Thus, the more reward an agent receives from working in a 
crowdsourcing system, the more time it is willing to spend working in that crowdsourcing 
system in the future. All agents adopt an actor-critic learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998] 
based decision-making method to learn how to allocate their time based on its own 
wellbeing. For each crowdsourcing system i, an agent keeps track of the rewards and 
penalties it has received as: 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝜇(𝑡) ∙ 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜇(𝑡)) ∙ 𝑃 
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𝜇(𝑡) = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑  
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑
                                      (6.2) 
where R and P are constants representing the reward and penalty values, 𝑇𝑖 is the total 
number of times an agent has performed a task (either publishing a HIT or completing a 
HIT) in the crowdsourcing system i. Once 𝑟𝑖 is calculated, it is compared with the baseline 
wellbeing variable 𝑟?̃? to update the learning parameter 𝑝𝑖 as: 
𝑝𝑖 ← 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜌 ∙ (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟?̃?) ∙ (1 − 𝜋𝑖)                                              (6.3) 
where 𝜌 (0 < 𝜌 ≤ 1) is a constant controlling the learning rate. The baseline reward is 
then updated according to the formula: 
𝑟?̃? ← 𝜑 ∙ 𝑟?̃? + (1 − 𝜑) ∙ 𝑟𝑖                                                    (6.4) 
where constant 𝜑  (0 < 𝜑 ≤ 1 ) determines the weight given to the previous baseline 
reward and the new reward received. The probability of an agent choosing to work in any 
one of the five crowdsourcing systems at time step t is: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑡) =
𝑒𝑝𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑝𝑖5𝑖=1
.                                                           (6.5) 
Based on this probability, each agent uses a Monte Carlo method to decide the allocation 
of its working time to the five competing crowdsourcing systems throughout the 
simulations. Once a choice is made at time step t, a worker agent will spend all its 
capacities working on HITs allocated to him in the chosen crowdsourcing system for that 
time step and disregard HITs pending its attention in other systems for that time step; 
while a requester agent will publish a new HIT Group in the chosen crowdsourcing 
system if its previous HIT Group has been completed. The values for the parameters used 
in our experiments are listed in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Parameter Values in the Experiments 
Symbol Description Value 
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximum utility for successfully completing an HIT. 1.0 
c The utility cost to a requester for proposing an HIT (i.e., 
the reward offered to workers to complete it). 
0.2 
𝑁𝑟(𝑡) The average number of HITs in a HIT Group. 40 
𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑞 The total number of requester agents in an experiment. 50 
𝑁𝑤 The total number of worker agents in an experiment. 1,000 
N A weight parameter used to calculate the target queue size 
in the SWORD approach in Equation (5.9). 
1.0 
V The performance tuning parameter in the SWORD 
approach. 
2.0 
𝑇ℎ𝑟 The minimum reputation value required by the approaches 
(except Group AMT) in the experiment for a worker to 
quality as a potential candidate for HIT allocation. 
0.6 
Pr(𝐸𝑥𝑝) The percentage of time spent by the SWORD approach for 
random exploration. 
10% 
𝑇𝑑𝑙 The deadline (i.e., maximum number of time steps from 
the time step an HIT is proposed) before which a HIT 
must be completed in order to be regarded as completed 
on time. 
14 
R The reward received for a successful performance in a 
crowdsourcing system by an agent. 
1 
P The penalty received for an unsuccessful performance in a 
crowdsourcing system by an agent. 
-1 
𝜌 The learning rate parameter. 0.4 
𝜑 The weight parameter for updating baseline reward. 0.6 
 
In the next section, we analyze the numerical results about the long term choices made by 
the agents and the wellbeing of the competing crowdsourcing systems. 
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6.6.2. Analysis of Numerical Results 
Figure 39 shows the average percentage of time allocated to working in the five 
competing crowdsourcing systems by the requester agents after 1,000 time steps of 
simulation under various worker agent population configurations. In all scenarios, the 
system using SWORD attracte
d the largest share of the requesters’ preference. Under worker agent populations Hon10 
to Hon80, the requesters spend more than half of their time, on average, using the service 
provided by SWORD. Although no trust management is used by AMT, it still managed to 
attract the second largest share of the requesters’ time. Crowdsourcing systems using 
BRS2002e ranked the third according to the requesters’ preference while M2009e and 
H2010e alternate on the fourth and fifth places. As the percentage of Hon workers 
increases, the average quality of HIT results achieved by AMT improves. Thus, its share 
of the requesters’ time also increases.  
Figure 39. The average preference for the competing crowdsourcing systems by requester 
agents. 
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Figure 40 shows the average percentage of time allocated to working in the five 
competing crowdsourcing systems by the worker agents after 1,000 time steps of 
simulation under various worker agent population configurations. It appears that, on 
average, worker agents do not have a clear preference towards any of the five 
crowdsourcing systems which is against the intuition. However, by plotting individual 
worker agents’ preferences under worker agent population configuration Hon50 as shown 
in Figure 41, it can be observed that different types of worker agents have different 
preferences for the competing crowdsourcing systems. Worker agents 
with IDs equal to 1~250 (the Hon workers) and 251~500 (the MH workers) prefer 
working under SWORD the most, while worker agents with IDs equal to 501~750 (the 
MM workers) and 751~1000 (the Mal workers) generally prefer working under M2009e 
and H2010e the most.  
Since the worker agents follow different behavior patterns, the treatment received by 
different types of worker agents can be very different. Figure 42 summarizes the average 
Figure 40. The average preference for the competing crowdsourcing systems by worker 
agents. 
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reward received by worker agents belonging to different types from the competing 
crowdsourcing systems under worker agent population configuration Hon50. Hon workers 
and MH workers received significantly higher net reward (i.e., reward – cost) from the 
crowdsourcing system adopting the SWORD approach than other competitors. This 
attracts Hon and MH workers to spend a large percentage of their time working under the 
management of SWORD. For MM and Mal workers, the situation is different. Since the 
quality of HIT results produced by them is generally low, on average, they did not receive 
enough payment from crowdsourcing systems using the SWORD, BRS2002e and AMT 
approaches, which gave them opportunities to service HIT requests either through 
exploration (in the case of SWORD and BRS2002e) or allowing them to taken on HIT 
Figure 41. The preference for the competing crowdsourcing systems by individual worker 
agents under worker agent population configuration Hon50. 
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requests on the first-come-first-served basis (in the case of AMT), to compensate the 
effort they have spent working on the HITs. This appears to the workers as a negative net 
reward and causes them to reduce their preference towards these three crowdsourcing 
systems. Under M2009e and H2010e, these two types of worker agents are allocated close 
to no HITs over the long run. Thus, although they receive no rewards from these two 
crowdsourcing systems, they incur no cost either. This results in the appearance that MM 
and Mal workers prefer M2009e and H2010e the most. In reality, these two types of 
worker agents are driven towards extinction in all five competing crowdsourcing systems. 
On average, the crowdsourcing system using the SWORD approach is able to attract more 
Hon worker agents over the long run as shown in Figure 43. This is especially the case 
when the percentage of Hon worker agents in the population is low (i.e., when trust 
management is most needed). 
Figure 42. The treatment received from the competing crowdsourcing systems by worker 
agents following different behavior patterns under worker agent population configuration 
Hon50. 
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The competitiveness of the fiving competing crowdsourcing systems is illustrated in 
Figure 44. Under all worker agent population configurations, the proposed SWORD 
approach achieved the highest share of the total time averaged social welfare produced. Its 
share of the total social welfare is larger when the general level of trustworthiness in the 
worker agent population is low 
 (i.e., Hon50 and below). As general level of worker agent trustworthiness increases, the 
total time averaged social welfare produced by the five crowdsourcing systems increases. 
When the worker population has a high level of general trustworthiness (e.g., Hon100), 
the performance of the SWORD approach is similar to that of AMT.  
Through efficient and trust-aware utilization of the available capacity of worker agents, 
the SWORD approach is also able to offer the requesters short waiting time to get quality 
results. Figure 45 shows the performance of various HIT allocation approaches under 
competition conditions with worker agent population configuration Hon50. With more 
requesters and more trustworthy workers being attracted to SWORD, it is able to 
Figure 43. The average preference for the competing crowdsourcing systems by Hon worker 
agents. 
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complete all published HIT Groups using no more than 7 time steps. The relative 
performance of other approaches is similar to that under comparison experimental 
conditions with one important difference. Being unable to retain the interest from Hon and 
MH worker agents as effectively as SWORD, BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e now have 
less worker agent resources at their disposal to complete HITs while still maintaining the 
quality of HIT results. This situation results in significant portions of the HITs 
cannot be completed on time and dropped by overloaded worker agents. The drop rates 
under 
Figure 44. The competitiveness of crowdsourcing systems using different HIT allocation 
approaches in terms of social welfare. 
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M2009e and H2010e are especially high which, in practical operations, will drive these 
two crowdsourcing systems out of business.  
6.7. Sensitivity Analysis 
In the SWORD approach, the control parameter V offers the system administrator some 
control over the trade-off between the proximity of the social welfare towards the optimal 
social welfare of a given crowdsourcing system and the average delay for requesters to 
obtain HIT results (i.e.,  their user experience). From Figure 46, it is apparent that by 
increasing V, the average quality of the HIT results increases while the 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛  value 
decreases. In essence, more HIT requests are being concentrated to highly reputable 
Figure 45. The performance of various approaches in terms of waiting time under competition 
conditions with worker agent population configuration Hon50. 
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worker agents. The overall effect of doing so on the proximity of the social welfare in the 
system to the optimal social welfare is illustrated in Figure 47.  
However, giving more importance to quality by increasing V cannot push social welfare 
arbitrarily close to optimal. In fact, as observed in Figure 48, once the V value is increased 
to 
Figure 46. The change in average quality of HIT request results and 𝑭𝑯𝒐𝒏 values achieved by 
the SWORD approach with different values for the control parameter V.  
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such an extent that over-concentration of HIT allocation to reputable workers starts to 
appear, both the average quality of the HIT results as well as 𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛  start to decrease 
together. In this situation, the reputation damage effect appears and brings down the social 
welfare achieved by the system as shown in Figure 49. When V is sufficiently large, the 
social welfare achieved by the SWORD approach becomes similar to those achieved by 
Figure 47. The percentage of optimal time averaged social welfare achieved by the SWORD 
approach with different values for the control parameter V.  
(V=0) 
(V=1) 
(V=5) 
(V=10) 
Figure 48. The change in average quality of HIT request results and 𝑭𝑯𝒐𝒏 values achieved by 
the SWORD approach with different values for the control parameter V.  
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BRS2002e, M2009e and H2010e as shown in Figure 50 because they suffer from the 
same reputation damage problem.  
 
Figure 49. The percentage of optimal time averaged social welfare achieved by the SWORD 
approach with different values for the control parameter V.  
(V=15) 
(V=20) 
(V=50) 
(V=100) 
Figure 50. Summary of performance in terms of social welfare against different values for the 
control parameter V.  
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6.8. Summary 
In Chapter 4 to 6, we have identified a new research problem mostly overlooked by 
existing trust-aware decision-making approaches – the reputation damage problem (RDP). 
The conflict between agents’ self-interest and the wellbeing of an MAS is at the centre of 
the RDP. In order to mitigate the adverse effect of RDP on the social welfare in an MAS, 
we proposed a centralized trust-aware decision-making approach called SWORD. 
Theoretical analysis has shown that it provides performance guarantees to the extent 
limited by the collective capacity of an MAS. Extensive empirical evaluations have shown 
that the SWORD approach can minimize the impact of the RDP on the social welfare of 
an MAS by making less greedy and more situation-aware decisions that state-of-the-art 
approaches. It provides better user experiences for the truster agents through increased 
utility and shorter waiting time, and better user experiences for the trustee agents through 
maintaining social equity among them while avoiding overloading top performers with 
requests. Through competition-based performance evaluations, it has been shown that the 
SWORD approach can better maintain social sustainability in a crowdsourcing scenario 
better than the benchmark approaches. 
Being a centralized approach, SWORD can access a wide range of information about the 
trustee agents. This enables it to make efficient, reputation-aware and situation-aware 
decisions. Nevertheless, this reduces its scalability. For systems without a central entity 
(e.g., mobile ad hoc networks, distributed sensor networks, etc.), the SWORD approach 
cannot operate. In view of these limitations, we propose a distributed approach to address 
the RDP in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7  
DRAFT: A Distributed Decision 
Approach for Social Sustainability in 
Multi-agent Systems 
 
 
In Chapter 5 and 6, we have proposed SWORD which is a centralized decision-making 
approach to enable existing trust models to make efficient interaction partner selection 
decisions in multi-agent systems (MASs) to improve their social sustainability. 
Nevertheless, we are aware that many MAS applications are distributed systems in nature 
and do not possess a trusted central entity to host the SWORD approach. Therefore, a 
distributed decision-making approach that can address the reputation damage problem 
will be able to serve a wider domain of applications.  
In this chapter, we propose the Distributed Request Acceptance approach for Fair 
utilization of Trustee agent services (DRAFT) to achieve this goal. It enables a trustee 
agent to dynamically determine how many new interaction requests from truster agents 
should be accepted into its pending request queues at each time step, given its current 
workload, its assessment of its reputation standing in the MAS based on the truster agents 
ratings, and the value and cost associated with serving new requests in order for it to 
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achieve and maintain a good reputation. It promotes social equity based on the reputations 
of the trustee agents (i.e., the contributions of trustee agents to the wellbeing of an MAS) 
and achieves efficient utilization of their services.  
To the best of our knowledge, the DRAFT approach is the first such approach designed 
for trustee agents in an MAS to use. Previously, most trust models were focused on 
helping truster agents select trustee agents. They usually assume that trustee agents are 
always motivated to accept more requests in order to earn more potential rewards. Thus, 
the prevailing assumption among existing trust models is that trustee agents adopt an 
accept-when-requested approach when their services are being asked for by truster agents. 
In order to enrich the decision-making approach for trustee agents in an open MAS where 
reputation is used as a social capital to facilitate interactions among agents with the 
DRAFT approach, we first propose a more realistic MAS system model to capture the 
limitation in trustee agents’ capacity to serve task requests and the truster agents’ 
tolerance on waiting time. 
7.1. System Model 
In a practical system (e.g., e-commerce), a trustee may only be qualified to perform up to 
N different types of tasks. In computational trust literature, the trust evidence of a trustee 
agent in serving different types of tasks are often recorded separately (e.g., a trustee agent 
can have a high reputation for selling T-shirts but a low reputation for selling gloves, 
although it is qualified to sell both types of items). This is referred to as the context of the 
trust evidence [Weng et al., 2010] and denoted as 𝑐 ∈ (1,… , 𝐶) in our system model. The 
maximum utility payoff for successfully completing one task of each type is denoted by 
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the vector 𝐺 = (𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐)
). The general effort level required to complete one task of each 
type is denoted as 𝑒 = (𝑒(𝑐)) which should be proportional to its corresponding maximum 
utility payoff. 
For each type of tasks, there is a generally accepted maximum completion time (the 
deadline) from the perspective of the truster agents represented by the vector 𝑇𝑑𝑙⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = (𝑇𝑑𝑙
(𝑐)
). 
If a task is completed within the maximum completion time, the trustee agent n will 
receive a rating from the requesting truster agent based on the quality of the result; 
otherwise, n will receive a negative rating regardless of the quality of the result. 
Pending requests are stored in trustee agent n’s task queues ?⃗? (𝑛) = (𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) according 
to the contexts to which the tasks belong. At each time step, n is able to expend up to a 
maximum of 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) amount of effort to serve the tasks in its task queues. This value 
differs from agent to agent due to the agent’s own limitations. The tasks in ?⃗? (𝑛) are 
served by n on a first-come-first-served (FIFO) basis across all queues based on their time 
of acceptance. 
The actual utility payoff gained by n for completing a task depends on whether the result 
is deemed successful by the requesting truster agent: 
𝑔𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) = {𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐)
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
.                            (7.1) 
As mentioned before, the interaction is deemed successful by the requesting truster agent 
only if the result produced by the trustee agent n is correct and received by the truster 
agent completed before the end of the deadline 𝑇𝑑𝑙
(𝑐)
. 
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At each time step, the number of incoming task requests received by trustee agent n are 
denoted as 𝜆 (𝑛) = (𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)). The exact number depends on the interaction decisions made 
by the truster agents in the MAS which is influenced by n’s reputation. The reputation of 
n in each context is represented by 𝜏𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡). As our focus in this study is on decision-
making by trustee agents, we do not discuss how n’s reputation is evaluated. Instead, we 
assume the existence of a probabilistic reputation evaluation model (e.g., BRS2012 as 
specified in Chapter 5) which produces 𝜏𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) in the range of [0, 1] with 1 denoting 
completely trustworthy and 0 denoting not trustworthy at all. 
7.2. Research Objectives 
In this chapter, we still define the social welfare in an MAS as the summation of the net 
utility produced by all individual interactions between truster and trustee agents. The 
common goal of multi-agent trust models is to maximize the social welfare (which is the 
summation of utility derived from all interactions) in the system. We define a utility 
function 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝜇) to represent the utility derived by trustee agent n from completing 𝜇 tasks 
of type c. 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝜇) will be defined in later sections of this paper. Then, the social welfare of 
an ODMAS is the summation of 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝜇) over all n and c. When trustees are resource 
constrained, the optimization objective can be expressed as: 
Maximize:      ∑ 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐)(𝜇𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝑡))𝑛,𝑐                                                     (7.2) 
Subject to:      ∑ (𝜇𝑛
(𝑐)
∙ 𝑒(𝑐))𝑐 ≤ 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)                                       (7.3) 
0 ≤ 𝜇𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝑡) ≤ 𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)     for all n, c and t                (7.4) 
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The vector (𝜇𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝑡)) depends partially on the discretion and capability of trustee agent n, 
which are intrinsic properties of n. Nevertheless, we propose the DRAFT approach to let n 
dynamically adjust the number of new task requests from truster agents accepted into its 
own task queues 𝑄𝑛⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗(𝑡) = (𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))  at each time step which can influence (𝜇𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝑡)) 
through Constraint (7.4). 
7.3. The DRAFT Approach 
In systems where 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 → ∞ , Constraint (7.3) is redundant. Greedy task delegation 
decisions made by truster agents, combined with the accept-when-requested request 
acceptance approach by trustee agents can maximize (7.2). However, under the revised 
system model, this may lead to severe congestion in task queues and inefficient use of 
trustee agents’ capacities. To mitigate the adverse effect of this situation, intuitively, the 
task backlog in the task queues of all trustee agents should be consistently pushed towards 
a lower congestion state. We propose the DRAFT approach based on Lyapunov 
Optimization [Neely, 2010] which provides a principled way of managing congestion.  
The overall level of task queue congestion in an ODMAS at any time step t can be 
measured by a Lyapunov function which, in our case, is defined as 
𝐿(𝑡) ≜ ∑ (𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))2𝑛,𝑐 .                                                     (7.5) 
The smaller the value of 𝐿(𝑡), the lower the level of congestion in trustee agents’ task 
queues. Given the task queue lengths for all n and c in an MAS, the conditional Lyapunov 
drift in the Lyapunov function from one time step to the next can be expressed as 
∆(𝑡) ≜ 𝔼{𝐿(𝑡 + 1) − 𝐿(𝑡)|𝑸(𝑡)}                                             (7.6) 
172 
 
where 𝑸(𝑡) = (𝑄1⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ (𝑡), 𝑄2⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  (𝑡),… , 𝑄𝑛⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗(𝑡)).  
Since the main cause for a trust-aware MAS to achieve low social welfare is shown to be 
over utilization of reputable trustee agents which results in the reputation damage problem 
in Chapter 4, in order to improve social welfare, trustee agents should be utilized in a way 
that promotes social equity in the long run. At each time step, if trustee agents can 
individually make control decisions about which new task requests to accept to greedily 
minimize ∆(𝑡), then the task backlog in their respective task queues should be pushed 
towards a lower congestion state consistently. Nevertheless, while minimizing the 
Lyapunov drift, it would be rational for the trustee agents in an MAS to try to maximize 
their reward (in the form of utility) as well. Combining these two considerations, the 
Lyapunov reward-minus-drift expression (𝑉 × 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 − ∆(𝑡)) which can be written as: 
𝑉 ∑ 𝔼{𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) |𝑸(𝑡)}𝑛,𝑐 − ∆(𝑡)                                      (7.7) 
should be maximized (i.e., maximizing reward while minimizing drift) through the 
selective acceptance of new task requests based on a trustee agent’s current situation. The 
potential reward is affected by the amount of work the trustee agent can accomplish, the 
amount of work allocated to it and its reputation standing from the perspective of the 
truster agents. Therefore, the new objective function in (7.7) can be expressed as: 
Maximize:   ∑ [𝑉 ∙ 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) − 𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)]𝑛,𝑐                          (7.8) 
Subject to:   ∑ (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)𝑐 ∙ 𝑒
(𝑐)) ≤ 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)                                              (7.9) 
0 ≤ 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ≤ 𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)     for all n, c and t                          (7.10) 
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where (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) are control decisions made by trustee agent n at each time step (i.e., the 
exact number of task requests belonging to each context to be accepted into its task 
queues), and V > 0 is a chosen constant that affects the relative emphasis given to the 
reward and the drift respectively. In this study, we assume that the potential utility 
𝑢𝑛
(𝑐)(𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) is linearly related to 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡). Thus, 
𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) = 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝑔𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡).                                        (7.11) 
In the long run, the actual utility gain is expected to be related to the probability of trustee 
agent n producing a correct result within the stipulated deadline. Although this probability 
cannot be definitively known, it can be approximated using n’s reputation in serving each 
type of tasks. Therefore, 
𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) = 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝜏𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐)
.                                  (7.12) 
By substituting (7.12) into (7.8), we have 
∑[𝑉 ∙ 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝜏𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐) − 𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)]
𝑛,𝑐
 
= ∑[𝑉 ∙ 𝜏𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐) − 𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)]𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)
𝑛,𝑐
= ∑𝑎𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)
𝑛,𝑐
 
 (7.13) 
174 
 
where 𝑎𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) = 𝑉 ∙ 𝜏𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐)
− 𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) is defined as the availability score of each 
task queue at n. The DRAFT approach helps a trustee agent come up with a task request 
acceptance plan (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) about how many new tasks of different types it should accept at 
each time step based on an agent’s current situation which is represented by the 3-tuple 
〈(𝑎𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) , (𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) , 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)〉 . In order to maximize (7.13), the DRAFT approach 
proceeds as illustrated in Algorithm 7.1. In essence, the higher the payoff per unit effort 
for a task 𝑡𝑐, the higher the reputation of n in performing tasks of type c, and the more 
spare capacity n currently has in accommodating more requests for performing tasks of 
type c, the more likely 𝑡𝑐  will be accepted by DRAFT on behalf of n. The 
Reject_Requests() function informs the requesting agent that a number of tasks of a 
Algorithm 7.1 DRAFT 
1: Input: 𝑎𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)  values for all c in trustee agent n, the 
incoming requests 𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) for all c at n, and 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡). 
2: 
Rank 𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) in descending order of 
𝑎𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝑡)
𝑒(𝑐)
 
3: foreach  𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) in n do 
4: 
    if 
𝑎𝑛
(𝑐)
(𝑡)
𝑒(𝑐)
> 0 then 
5:         if 𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙  𝑒(𝑐) ≤ 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) then 
6:             𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) 
7:         else 
8:             𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) =  
𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡)
𝑒(𝑐)
  
9:         end-if 
10:         𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) ← 𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) ∙ 𝑒(𝑐) 
11:      else 
12:         𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) = 0 
13:      end-if 
14:      Reject_Requests(𝜆𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡), c) 
15: end-for 
16: Return(𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) for all 𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) in n) 
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particular type are not accepted by the trustee agent for processing at the current time step 
so that the truster agent can look for other alternative. The DRAFT approach has a 
computational complexity of 𝑂(𝑐). 
The DRAFT approach enriches the existing trust evaluation models with a principled way 
for them to achieve more efficient utilization of trustee agent capacities in an MAS. It 
occupies an overlooked niche in the trust management domain by serving trustee agents 
instead of directly serving truster agents. With the DRAFT approach, trustee agents are, in 
effect, fitted with a set of intelligent faucets as illustrated in Figure 51 that dynamically 
determine how many requests of each type to be let into the trustee agent’s pending 
request queues for the benefit of the trustee agent. Truster agents, on the other hand, will 
be able to know with more certainty when they are required to widen their scope of 
exploration for trustee agents when they are informed that the currently chosen trustee 
agent is not able to accept new requests. In this way, we conjecture that social equity and 
Figure 51. The working principle of the DRAFT approach. 
𝜆𝑛
1 (𝑡) 𝜆𝑛
2(𝑡) 𝜆𝑛
𝐶(𝑡) 
𝑎𝑛
1(𝑡) 𝑎𝑛
2(𝑡) 𝑎𝑛
𝐶(𝑡) 
𝐴𝑛
1 (𝑡) 𝐴𝑛
2(𝑡) 𝐴𝑛
𝐶(𝑡) 
𝑄𝑛
1(𝑡) 𝑄𝑛
2(𝑡) 𝑄𝑛
𝐶(𝑡) 
𝜇𝑛
1(𝑡) 𝜇𝑛
2(𝑡) 𝜇𝑛
𝐶(𝑡) 
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thus, social sustainability in an MAS will be achieved and maintained through 
complementing existing trust evaluation models with the use of the DRAFT approach. In 
the next section, theoretical analysis of the performance of the DRAFT approach is 
provided. 
7.4. Theoretical Analysis of the Performance of DRAFT 
Assume there are positive constants B, M and V such that the reward-minus-drift 
expression in (7.7) satisfies: 
𝑉 ∑𝔼{𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)) |𝑸(𝑡)}
𝑛,𝑐
− ∆(𝑡) ≥ 𝑉𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝑀 ∑𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)
𝑛,𝑐
− 𝐵 
 (7.14) 
where 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 is the social welfare produced by the optimal solution for (7.8). Taking the 
expectations over the distribution of 𝑸(𝑡) on both sides of (7.14), we have: 
𝑉 ∑𝔼{𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))}
𝑛,𝑐
− 𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑡 + 1)) − 𝐿(𝑸(𝑡))} ≥ 𝑉𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝑀 ∑𝔼{𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)}
𝑛,𝑐
− 𝐵 
which holds for all time steps t. Summing both sides over 𝑡 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑇 − 1}, we have: 
𝑉 ∑ ∑𝔼{𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
− 𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(𝑇)) − 𝐿(𝑸(0))}
≥ 𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝑀 ∑ ∑𝔼{𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
− 𝐵𝑇 
(7.15) 
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Since 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐)(∙) ≥ 0 and 𝐿(∙) ≥ 0, and suppose the potential utility reward for completing 
𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡) tasks are bounded by ∑ 𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))𝑛,𝑐 ≤ 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 for all t for some value 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥, by 
re-arranging the terms in (7.15) and dividing both sides by TM, we have: 
1
𝑇
∑ ∑𝔼{𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
−
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(0))}
𝑇𝑀
≤
𝐵 + 𝑉𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑉𝑈
𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑀
≤
𝐵 + 𝑉𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑀
 
                               (7.18) 
By taking lim sup as 𝑇 → ∞ on both sides of (7.18): 
lim
𝑇→∞
sup {
1
𝑇
∑ ∑𝔼{𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
} ≤
𝐵 + 𝑉𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑀
 
(7.19) 
Similarly, by re-arranging (7.15) and dividing both sides by TV, we can also have: 
1
𝑇
∑ ∑𝔼{𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
≥ 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 +
𝑀
𝑇𝑉
∑ ∑𝔼{𝑄𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡)}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
−
𝐵
𝑉
−
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(0))}
𝑇𝑉
≥ 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝐵
𝑉
−
𝔼{𝐿(𝑸(0))}
𝑇𝑉
 
(7.18) 
By taking lim inf as 𝑇 → ∞ on both sides of (7.18): 
lim
𝑇→∞
inf {
1
𝑇
∑ ∑𝔼{𝑢𝑛
(𝑐) (𝐴𝑛
(𝑐)(𝑡))}
𝑛,𝑐
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
} ≥ 𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡 −
𝐵
𝑉
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(7.19) 
From the above analysis, it can be deduced that if the condition in (7.14) can be fulfilled, 
which can be done through careful choice of the values for B, M and V, then, based on 
(7.17), it can be concluded that a theoretical upper bound exists for all pending request 
queues in all trustee agents over the long run under the management of the DRAFT 
approach. This ensures that the request queue lengths will not keep on increasing and the 
trustee agents always can stop the growth of their request queues so that they will not be 
overwhelmed by incoming requests. 
In addition, based on (7.19), it can be deduced that the time averaged social welfare 
achieved through following the DRAFT approach can approach that achieved by the 
optimal solution within B/V in the long run. By increasing V, the social welfare produced 
by the DRAFT approach can be made closer to the optimal social welfare. However, 
increasing V also causes the upper bound to the pending request queue lengths to rise 
according to (7.17), thereby increasing the expected time taken to complete a request. Due 
to the physical limitations of the trustee agents in a given MAS, if the increase in the 
value of V causes the expected completion time of tasks to exceed the stipulated deadlines, 
social welfare will start to decrease as the level of satisfaction from truster agents will be 
reduced. Setting the value of V arbitrarily high will not make the social welfare produced 
by the DRAFT approach be indefinitely close the optimal since doing so will also require 
the value of B to be increased in order to satisfy the (7.14). Thus, the trade-off between 
social welfare and the delay in receiving services only exist within a certain range of the 
value of V which may be different based on the physical limitations of the agent 
populations in each given MAS. 
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7.5. Evaluation 
In order to further evaluate the performance of the DRAFT approach, it is implemented 
within a simulated multi-agent environment which is designed based on the revised 
system model. The objectives of the experiments are to investigate whether enabling 
trustee agents to make control decisions on which new task requests to accept through the 
use of the DRAFT approach can be beneficial to themselves as well as the agent society in 
an MAS. Our hypotheses waiting to be verified through these experiments are: 
 Hypothesis 1: A trustworthy trustee agent can better mitigate the adverse effect of 
reputation damage by using the DRAFT approach than using the traditional accept-
when-requested approach. 
 Hypothesis 2: The DRAFT approach achieves equitable distribution of task requests 
when applied under an existing trust evaluation model. 
 Hypothesis 3: The social welfare of an MAS can be improved through the use of the 
DRAFT approach compared to the traditional accept-when-requested approach. 
We now discuss the design of the experiments used to investigate our hypotheses. 
7.5.1. Design of the Simulation Test-bed 
In the simulated MAS, the trustee agent population consists of 100 agents belonging to 
four groups with different behavior patterns. They are labeled as: 
1) Hon agents: honest trustee agents who return high quality task results randomly 90% 
of the time; 
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2) MH agents: moderately honest trustee agents who return high quality task results 
randomly 70% of the time; 
3) MM agents: moderately malicious trustee agents who return high quality task results 
randomly 30% of the time; 
4) Mal agents: malicious trustee agents who return high quality task results randomly 10% 
of the time. 
The number of them adopting each of the four different behavior patterns is varied in each 
experiment to simulate different trustee agent population configurations. A trustee agent 
population configuration is denoted as HonX. It represents a trustee agent population 
consisting of 0.5𝑋% Hon trustee agents, 0.5𝑋% MH trustee agents, 0.5 × (100 − 𝑋)% 
MM trustee agents, and 0.5 × (100 − 𝑋)% Mal trustee agents. The maximum effort each 
type of trustee agents can expend per time step is shown in Table 11. More trustworthy 
trustee agents can complete less number of tasks in each time step than less trustworthy 
ones in order to maintain the quality of their work. 
Table 11. The 𝒆𝒏
𝒎𝒂𝒙 values for trustee agent in each group. 
 Hon MH MM Mal 
𝑒𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 25 30 35 40 
 
Five categories of tasks are available for trustee agents to serve. Their properties used in 
the experiments are listed in Table 12. 
Table 12. The properties of the types of tasks in the study. 
c 1 2 3 4 5 
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𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑐)
 5 4 3 2 1 
𝑒(𝑐) 5 4 3 2 1 
𝑇(𝑐) 1 2 2 3 3 
 
1,000 truster agents equipped with BRS2012 as presented in Chapter 4 for evaluating the 
reputations of the trustee agents are included in the simulation. Each truster agent 
randomly use 15% of its time for exploration. During exploitation rounds, truster agents 
require a trustee agent to have a reputation of over 2/3 in order to consider it as a 
candidate. At each time step, an equal number of requests for each type of task are sent 
out to the trustee agents based on their reputations by the truster agents (assuming truster 
agents do not intentionally distort their reputation ratings about the trustee agents).  
7.5.2. Experiment Setup for DRAFT 
Two MASs with the same environment conditions are run in parallel. In one MAS, the 
trustee agents adopt the traditional accept-when-requested approach for handling 
incoming task requests. In the other, the trustee agents adopt the proposed DRAFT 
approach for handling incoming task requests. The results from these two sets of 
experiments are labeled as TRD and DRAFT respectively in the figures in this chapter. If 
no trustee agent is willing to accept a task request under DRAFT, the truster agent will 
attempt to propose the same task in the following time steps. Each simulation is run for 
1,000 time steps and repeated 10 times to reduce the effect of random variations. 
7.5.3. Analysis of Results 
Hypothesis 1 
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Figure 52 shows a snapshot of the change in the reputation evaluation of a trustee agent n 
which belongs to the Hon group (trustworthiness is 0.9) over 500 time steps under both 
TRD and DRAFT. It can be seen that under TRD, the agent’s reputation fluctuates 
significantly. The sequence of event is: during time steps 1~15, n was discovered by a few 
truster agents through exploration and its good performance had gained it a high 
reputation (about 0.8) compared to other trustee agents. This attracted many other truster 
agents to request n’s services. The sudden influx of requests to n resulted in long backlog 
in its task queues. During time steps 15~270, n kept working on these tasks and producing 
high quality results. However, as most of them were completed with long delays, it 
received a large number of negative ratings from unsatisfied truster agents and its 
reputation dropped to a very low level (about 0.1). As its reputation dropped, the number 
of requests received by n also decreased. Over time, the backlog in n’s task queues had 
gradually been worked off. From time step 270 to 300, n’s high quality service was 
rediscovered by a few truster agents through exploration. Then, a similar sequence of 
events occurred, causing another round of severe fluctuation in its reputation. 
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On the other hand, the reputation fluctuation of n was significantly smaller under DRAFT 
than under TRD. By dynamically deciding when to accept and decline task requests based 
on its current situation, n was protected from the adverse effect of reputation damage 
caused by truster agents seeking higher utility in an uncoordinated fashion. The 
fluctuations in n’s reputation under DRAFT were due to the 10% of time when it produced 
low quality results. 
Hypothesis 2 
Overall, the social equity among the group of the most trustworthy trustee agents (Hon) 
can be gauged through the fairness index (𝐹𝐻𝑜𝑛) as defined in Chapter 6. 
From Figure 53, it can be shown that 𝐹𝐻𝑂𝑁 under DRAFT is consistently close to 1 (its 
Figure 52. Evolution of reputation evaluation of a Hon trustee agent under different 
approaches over 500 time steps. 
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value varies from 0.996 to 0.999), whereas 𝐹𝐻𝑂𝑁 under TRD fluctuates erratically over 
Figure 54. The fairness index for trustee agents belonging to Group Hon in various trustee 
agent population configurations. 
Figure 53. A snapshot of task distribution among trustee agents under agent population 
Hon50. 
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different trustee agent population configurations. Although in some cases, TRD can also 
lead to highly fair distribution of tasks among trustee agents, when left to chance, such 
performance cannot be consistently achieved. 
A snapshot of the task distribution among trustee agents under agent population 
configuration Hon50 is shown in Figure 54. Under TRD, clear peaks representing high 
concentration of tasks on a few trustee agents can be seen; whereas the distribution of 
tasks is smoother under the management of the DRAFT approach which represents better 
utilization of the trustee agents’ capacities. In addition, the DRAFT approach helps 
existing reputation-aware interaction decision-making approaches to ensure that: 1) more 
trustworthy trustee agents receive more tasks than less trustworthy ones, and 2) similarly 
trustworthy trustee agents receive equitable amounts of tasks. 
Figure 55. Time averaged social welfare achieved under different trustee population 
configurations. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Figure 55 shows the time averaged social welfare achieved by given trustee agent 
populations under TRD and DRAFT. By reducing the adverse effect of reputation damage 
through efficient utilization of trustee agents’ capacities, the MAS equipped the DRAFT 
approach consistently achieved significantly higher social welfare than the MAS where 
trustee agents use the traditional accept-when-requested approach. The DRAFT approach 
is able to help a given trustee agent population to achieve close to its full potential in 
terms of social welfare which depends on the characteristics of the trustee agents. 
From Figure 56, it can be seen that under DRAFT, all tasks accepted by the trustee agents 
can be completed on time (within a maximum of 3 time steps in this study). However, 
Figure 56. Cumulative percentage of requests served within x time steps. 
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only 23.73% of the tasks completed by trustee agents under TRD are on time. This is the 
reason behind the low percentage of optimal social welfare achieved by TRD. The task 
backlog of trustee agents under TRD can become very long. A small percentage of the 
tasks (about 0.01%) even took almost the entire duration of a simulation to complete. 
7.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
The parameter V control the trade-off between social welfare and average waiting time 
(which can be gauged by the average task backlog for every trustee agent across different 
agent population configurations at any given time step). When 𝑉 = 0, only the Lyapunov 
drift will be minimized; when V is sufficiently large, only the reward will be maximized 
Figure 57. The effect of varying the value of parameter V on the performance of the DRAFT 
approach. 
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(in this case, according to (7.13), the DRAFT approach is equivalent to the traditional 
accept-when-requested approach). If we vary the value of V, the trade-off between social 
welfare and waiting time is illustrated in Figure 57. Increasing the value of V results in 
increases in social welfare and results longer waiting time. However, the rate of increase 
in social welfare drops rapidly as the value of V increases. Beyond the point of V = 10
2
, 
further increasing the value of V starts to cause congestions in reputable trustee agents 
again and results in reductions in social welfare. These two parameters provide the owners 
of the trustee agents with some flexibility in customizing their trustee agents’ behaviors 
according to their own personal preference.  
7.7. Summary 
Trust is necessary for protecting individual truster agents in open MASs characterized by 
uncertainty. However, our study has shown that, under a more realistic system model, 
existing trust management approaches may result in highly unfair treatment of trustee 
agents even when their underlying trustworthiness is similar.  
In this chapter, we proposed the DRAFT approach which is a distributed decision-making 
approach for trustee agents to manage their own reputations through the dynamic 
management of their workloads. The DRAFT approach is simple and requires only local 
knowledge to operate. It can complement existing trust evaluation models and trust-aware 
interaction decision-making models by enabling trustee agents to dynamically determine 
how many new interaction requests from truster agents should be accepted at each time 
step, given its current workload, its assessment of its reputation standing in the MAS 
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based on the truster agents’ ratings, and the value and cost associated with serving new 
requests.  
By doing so, individual trustee agents can benefit from less fluctuation of their reputations 
and more equitable access to task requests from truster agents. Opportunities are passed 
up by trustee agents who are busy and picked up by agents who have more spare 
capacities while taking into account of their reputations. The collective capacity of the 
trustee agents can, thus, be efficiently utilized, which increases the social welfare in the 
MAS and improves social sustainability in the long run. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
This thesis sets out to investigate how to make socially sustainable interaction decisions in 
multi-agent systems based on accurate assessment of agents’ trustworthiness in the face of 
possible collusion among them. In this final chapter, we will summarize the research 
contributions of this work and discuss potential directions for future research. 
8.1. Contributions 
In an open MAS where agents come from various background and have potentially 
conflicting objectives, establishing trust can be regarded as a multi-step decision process 
where a truster agent’s utility is a function of other agent’s behavior. During the trust 
building stage, behaviors of other truster agents who act as witnesses can affect the 
accuracy of the information a truster agent uses to evaluate the reputation of a trustee 
agent. During the trust-aware task delegation stage, the number of truster agents who 
selected the same trustee agent can affect the expected quality of service received by each 
one of them, especially in cases where the trustee agent has limited capacity. 
The work described in this thesis makes a number of important contributions to the state 
of the art in the area of trust management in multi-agent systems by extending the 
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theoretical framework of trust-aware interaction decision-making to more realistic settings 
involving considerations on the limitations in the capabilities of the trustee agents as well 
as the real-time situation facing them. The contributions of this work can be summarized 
as follows: 
(i) The ACT Model: Although there are a large number of research works over the years 
focused on addressing the problem of unfair testimonies from public reports of direct 
trust experience by witness agents. Many of these approaches generally suffer from 
three main types of shortcomings: 1) relying on assumptions about the characteristics 
of the witness agent population: They are usually majority voting based and perform 
poorly in situations where the majority of the witness agent population are 
compromised; 2) tightly coupled with specific operating environments: They often 
require additional infrastructural support (e.g., payment systems, knowledge of social 
relationships among agents, etc.) in order to work; or 3) involving manual tuning of 
parameters crucial to the performance of the model: This reduces the adaptability of 
the models in the face of a dynamically changing environment and makes regular 
human intervention necessary. We propose a trust evidence aggregation model based 
on the principles of reinforcement learning called the Actor-Critic Trust (ACT) model 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.1 to 3.7). It enables truster agents to dynamically learn the 
appropriate values of a large number of parameters based on their interaction 
experience. Compared to existing work, the ACT model does not require additional 
information or infrastructure support other than the third-party testimonies received by 
a truster agent. Experimental results show that it outperforms related work. The ACT 
model was applied to solve the collaborative spectrum sensing problem in Cognitive 
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Radio Networks (CRNs) and demonstrated effectiveness in preserving the wellbeing 
of the network under various attack scenarios (Chapter 3, Section 3.8). 
(ii) Multi-agent Trust Game: In Chapter 4, the assumption made by most existing multi-
agent trust research that trustee agents’ perceived performance is not affected by the 
amount of workload assigned to them is removed. The multi-agent trust management 
problem is reframed into a new framework of thinking that is capable of taking the 
limitations in trustee agents’ capacities into account. We redefine the trust-aware 
interaction decision-making (TID) problem as a Multi-agent Trust Game (MTG) 
based on the concept of Congestion Games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996] (Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2). The MTG complements existing research [Mikulski et al., 2011] by 
providing a theoretical framework for analyzing TID approaches under more realistic 
conditions where trustee agents have limited resources and capabilities to handle 
workload and the delay experienced by truster agents is a function that is partially 
affected by the choices of interaction partners made collectively by them. By 
explicitly including these limitations into the analysis of trust in MASs, the MTG can 
facilitate the design of TID approaches that can produce higher system-wide social 
welfare. 
(iii)The SWORD Approach: Based on a system model under MTG, we propose the Social 
Welfare Optimizing Reputation-aware Decision-making (SWORD) approach 
(Chapter 5). Designed for a system manager such as an e-commerce platform operator 
to use, the SWORD approach observes agents’ real-time situations (such as their 
reputations, current workload, historical performance in handling assigned tasks per 
unit time, etc.) and helps truster agents who want to delegate tasks at the current time 
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select interaction partners subject to multiple constraints. The SWORD approach is 
the first TID approach designed with the objective to mitigate the adverse effect of the 
RDP. The objective is to compute a decision policy for the truster agents that 
minimize their collective waiting time and maximize the sum of their utility over a 
potentially infinite horizon of interactions. Based on the principles of Lyapunov Drift 
analysis [Neely, 2010], it produces solutions to the MTG which can be proven to 
achieve social welfare values in an MAS close to the optimal value. Solutions are 
produced in polynomial time. Experiments conducted under crowdsourcing system 
environments have shown that the SWORD approach significantly outperforms 
related work in terms of promoting social equity and enhancing social welfare 
(Chapter 6). The SWORD approach protects trustee agents from being overloaded 
with requests, makes efficient use of the overall trustee agent resources in an MAS, 
reduces truster agents’ waiting time for delegated tasks to be completed, and increases 
the throughput of interactions among agents in an MAS. 
(iv) The DRAFT Approach: being a centralized approach, SWORD depends on the 
existence of a central trusted entity and may face difficulty scaling up. In order to 
address these issues, we propose the Distributed Request Acceptance approach for 
Fair utilization of Trustee agent services (DRAFT) in Chapter 7. The key to solving 
the RDP is to coordinate decisions made by truster agents. In a distributed MAS, this 
is difficult to achieve and incurs significant communication overhead. To address 
these challenges, we take a novel approach. Instead of designing a distributed TID 
model for truster agents, we propose the DRAFT approach to help trustee agents 
determine how to react to potentially uncoordinated truster agent decisions. DRAFT is 
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the first approach in the state of the art to enable trustee agents to make situation-
aware decisions about whether to accept incoming task delegation requests. Through 
an analysis of its current situation taking into account its current reputation standing in 
the MAS, its current workload, and the anticipated effort level it can spend on 
completing tasks over the current time step, the trustee agent can adjust the degree of 
greediness for accepting incoming requests with the DRAFT approach. Based on the 
same design principle as the SWORD approach, the DRAFT approach can also be 
proven to produce solutions for the MTG achieving close to optimal social welfare 
over the long run. The solutions can also be produced in polynomial time. 
Experiments conducted in open dynamic environments show that the DRAFT 
approach achieves significantly higher social welfare than related work and promotes 
social equity in the community. 
The impact of the proposed models and approaches on the state of the art in trust 
Figure 58. The areas of application of the proposed models and approaches in the trust 
management process. 
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management process is shown in Figure 58. The ACT model enable truster agents to 
dynamically adapt to changing behaviors of witness agents when they report testimonies 
about other trustee agents, and maintain the quality of the reputation values produced 
from these potentially biased opinions. In MASs with a central trusted entity, the SWORD 
approach can help truster agents coordinate their interaction partner selections in real time 
to achieve near optimal utilization of system resources. In fully distributed MASs, the 
DRAFT approach can still achieve this goal without incurring significant communication 
overhead needed for coordinating truster agent decisions in a distributed manner.  
With the proposed models and approaches, this work provides various stakeholders in 
MASs (such as truster agents, trustee agents and supervisory agents if any) with means to 
combat collusion and make near optimal use of the collective capabilities in the MASs. In 
this way social equity among agents can be achieved through the proposed approaches 
which will help sustain trustworthy interactions in open MASs over the long term. These 
contributions, especially SWORD and DRAFT, bridged important gaps in existing multi-
agent trust management research, and have the potential to enable trust models to operate 
more effectively in MASs where agents and human beings co-exist. 
8.2. Future Research Directions 
There are several areas in which current research can be extended: 
(i) Reputation rating distortions have been reported in some of the world’s largest online 
e-commerce systems as one of the goals of people participating in such schemes is to 
quickly build up their reputations through illegitimate transactions [Hexun.com, 2012]. 
Although their subsequent behaviors may not necessarily be malicious, such a practice 
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is very disruptive to the e-commerce community. In general, reputable sellers whose 
reputations are gained through illegitimate means often appear to be building up their 
reputations much faster than peer members in the community. Integrating the analysis 
of the temporal aspect of the reputation building process may be a research direction 
which has the potential to yield more effective trust evidence filtering and aggregation 
models. In the largest e-commerce platform in China – Taobao.com, the buyer 
communities are starting to respond to this problem by coming up with some 
rudimentary guidelines on helping buyers spot collusive sellers through looking at 
their historical reputation scores. Nevertheless, these collusive sellers are adapting to 
these self-protection mechanisms by slowing down the rate at which their reputation 
scores grow through less greedy behavior. Future research attempts in incorporating 
temporal analysis into trust evidence filtering and aggregation models should therefore, 
be rooted in analyzing real world data to identify and respond to these strategic 
behavior patterns. 
(ii) In some applications, what really matters to a truster is not always the immediate 
outcome of trusting a trustee, but rather the long term impact of such an act. An 
example is in investment planning. By taking portfolio adjustment actions at a 
particular point in time following the advice of an investment planner (who is the 
trustee in this case), the truster expects to achieve long term financial wellbeing. If the 
portfolio value drops immediately after taking the actions recommended by the 
financial planner but rises to much higher values over a longer period of time (e.g., 
after a few months), should the interaction be considered a failure? What should be the 
case if the portfolio value first rises then drops?  
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In this scenario, where the truster is an investor, depending on his investment horizon, 
either case could be considered a success. Current interaction outcome evaluation 
models in trust management are designed more for situations where the effect of an 
interaction can be fully known relatively quickly after the completion of the 
interaction. Directly applying them into application domains where the effect of an 
interaction differs with changing time and situation may mislead truster agents into 
trusting the wrong trustee.  
To handle such scenarios effectively, existing interaction outcome evaluation models 
should be enriched with the following considerations: 
1) Feedback may be given not necessarily immediately after the conclusion of an 
interaction: truster agents should be given more time in the interaction protocol to 
assess the effect of the last interaction until he has reached a level of uncertainty 
about the result which he is comfortable with to give a rating to the trustee. This 
requires the incorporation of the factor of time into the current uncertainty 
evaluation models for trust management (which are mainly concerned with 
aggregating trust evidence from multiple sources [Wang and Singh, 2007]). 
Alternatively, new feedback reporting protocols could be designed to allow the 
truster agents to withdraw or modify a previous feedback rating based on newly 
available evidence with regard to its impact. 
2) Improving the accountability of trustee agents through more sophisticated 
feedback information: if the time between the completion of an interaction and the 
time when the feedback for it is given is extended, there may be cases where other 
activities that may affect the outcome of the previous interaction taking place 
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during this interval. Therefore, the impact of each interaction should be clearly 
identified. This may require incorporating models used for describing an 
interaction with features to distinguish its own sphere of influence on the 
wellbeing of the truster agent. Such an approach may facilitate the analysis of 
accountability in cases where an eventual impact is due to the outcome of several 
interactions between a truster agent and possibly more than one trustee agents. 
(iii)As human beings with limited resources (in terms of task processing capacity, time, 
health, etc.) are starting to play the role of trustees in many online communities (e.g., 
e-commerce systems, crowdsourcing systems, etc.), research on modeling their utility 
functions using a human centric approach is necessary for trust-aware interaction 
decision-making mechanisms. For example, a decision model that takes the holistic 
wellbeing of a human trustee into account may not necessarily adopt a utility function 
which is always linear to the amount of work allocated to him. Instead, a more 
complex utility function that allows the decision model to vary the delegation of tasks 
to trustees in such a way as to achieve work-life-balance for the trustees, while 
satisfying the overall goal of the community, will be desirable in future human-agent 
collectives. 
The above-mentioned issues are important for constructing and sustaining a trust-based 
digital ecosystem in which human beings and artificial intelligence agents coexist. In 
order to pursue these research directions, the field of computational trust and reputation 
management needs to deepen the collective understanding in human strategic behavior by 
involving more evidence-based research into the current predominantly model-based 
research practice. When these research issues are successfully tackled, the resulting trust 
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and reputation management system will be of greater relevance to practical applications, 
such as e-commerce and crowdsourcing, than existing systems. 
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